THE SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE
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OF THE FUTURE

by

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TO MY WIFE
EDITOR'S PREFACE

The Society of the Future is the first work to appear in English by H. van Riessen, a prominent member of a school of philosophy that has developed in the Netherlands, under the leadership of Herman Dooyeweerd.

Dr. Van Riessen has earned a master's degree in engineering and a doctor's degree in philosophy. In addition to many other publications he is the author of a 700 page treatise on Philosophy and Technique. At present he is a professor of philosophy at the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands.

The English reader who is unfamiliar with the school of philosophy to which Dr Van Riessen belongs will be surprised, if not genuinely disturbed, by the introduction of articles of faith into an analysis of society.

Van Riessen fully realizes that it is most unusual to introduce Christian beliefs into philosophical and sociological discourse. However, he is convinced that it is possible to demonstrate on philosophical grounds that a religiously value free approach to society is impossible. Such a demonstration is further available to the English reader in the four volume translation of H. Dooyeweerd's, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, H. J. Paris, Amsterdam, and the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. Philadelphia.

The critical reader ought to avoid a hasty and final judgment with regard to the merit of mixing sociology and religion until he has become familiar with this approach.

The work of translation was complicated by the untimely death of my collaborator, B. D. Dykstra who worked on the first draft. The responsibility of making a new translation, with the assistance of Mr. Dykstra's material, fell on my shoulders. Invaluable assistance was further provided by the author and by my friend and collaborator H. de Jongste. Mr. De Jongste is untiring in his devotion to the work of translation and this work is one of many translation projects that have been mutually undertaken.

I wish to express further appreciation to J. Marcellus Kik, for his valuable suggestions for the improvement of the manuscript; to Mr. and Mrs. Charles H. Craig and to Mrs. Lewis Grotenhuis, for assistance in proof reading; to Professor Carolyn Zelany, Chairman
of the Department of Sociology, Wilson College, and to Dr. Dirk Jellema, of the Case Institute of Technology for their friendly advice and encouragement; to Mrs. Maxine Minnich, for her painstaking and careful typing of the manuscript; and last but not least to the generosity of Dr. Samuel G. Craig, and his son whose interest in the subject at hand made the translation and publication of this work possible.

DAVID HUGH FREEMAN
Department of Philosophy
University of Rhode Island
The present American edition of my book “The Society of the Future” has been prepared with my wholehearted consent and in compliance with the request made by both of the publishers concerned. I am all the more ready to give my consent as there is nothing better for me to wish than giving publicity in other countries to the results of my study, and especially in the United States which is at present the leading power in Western civilization. Such publicity is all the more important as the American cultural lead is concerned with the formation of the future society. The reader will not be slow to notice that in my opinion the most alarming social phenomenon in the twentieth century is the continuous direction of society towards collectivism. On some points I think I may say that the U.S.A. takes the lead in the collectivistic development as compared with Western Europe, and in other respects the States put up a much stronger resistance to the general tendency.

In America technique has made greater progress; its mass production is of far greater importance to the country in which it made its first appearance; the American tendency towards equality; the concentration of economic power; American activism allowing too little scope to the contemplative side of life to develop; the change-over to the consumer’s style of life in the period of abundance that has already started; all these factors are conducive to collectivism in the present circumstances. On the other hand the practical mind of the Americans, their striving for decentralization, the great variety in the way they tackle problems, their dynamic attitude in life, their respect for the personality, their communal sense, frankness and ease in social intercourse and their profound respect for freedom and democracy put them in a better position to oppose the prevailing collectivistic trend.

In the last chapter I have explained the manner and the means to avoid the dangers of collectivistic developments in the future — for such developments will end in totalitarianism — and I have indicated the way how to realize the possibility of the liberation of society.

On my journey to the U.S.A. made at the invitation of the F.O.A. in 1954 for the purpose of studying human relations in industry I was
pleased to find that my therapy was not idle fiction. Under the
guidance of leading progressive personalities in industrial life and
in Universities a great deal of such therapy was already being put
in practice.

There is one more aspect of this study that requires some comment
in this introduction because some of my readers might think it strange.
In this book they will repeatedly find references to Biblical
revelation, and there are principles posited here whose root is not
found in science itself but is factually based on the Bible. This study
is, therefore, not a neutral, “value-free” inquiry. I am of the opinion,
however, that at least in this field such a neutral inquiry cannot
exist, because consciously or unconsciously every thinker starts from
pre-scientific pre-suppositions which, to him at least, have the
character of the certainties of faith. To my mind a man of science
will render his science a service by being aware of such pre-sup-
positions and explicitly introducing them and working with them.

It was necessary to make various changes in this edition. Many
references to Dutch writers and to Dutch conditions had to be
cancelled, whereas for the sake of American readers it was thought
desirable to discuss American literature on the subject in greater
detail than in the original text. For this reason and also on account
of the utilization of the results of my journey to the U.S.A. the last
chapter has been considerably altered and enlarged.

The translation of the Dutch text into English was attended with
the customary difficulties. In a way this task of rendering the original
into English required genuine creative ability; for it implied the
reproduction of the sphere of the book and involved reflection on the
different usage of various words and conceptions in the Dutch
and the American worlds of thought. As far as I can judge of these
matters the efforts of the translators have been successful.

This English version is the work of Professor David H. Freeman,
the Department of Phylosophy of The University of Rhode Island;
and of the late Reverend B. D. Dijkstra, whose enthusiastic devotion
to the first draft of the translation will always remain in living and
grateful memory.

I wish to thank Prof. Freeman sincerely for all the care, trouble
and time he has so successfully devoted to this translation. Trans-
oceanic cooperation is an extremely difficult proposition, and it is
certainly in the final analysis owing to him that the task could be
accomplished.

On the Dutch side of the ocean Mr. H. de Jongste undertook the
revision of the translation, especially in connection with the material not included in the Dutch edition of this work. I want to thank him for the pleasant way of cooperating and for his important contribution to the final result.

Finally I wish to express my sincerest thanks to the publishers T. Wever, Franeker, and the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Philadelphia. I take no mean view of the care they have given to this publication and of the risk they have thereby taken.

I should not omit to express my acknowledgment to Mr. C. H. Craig, Manager of the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Philadelphia, for his valuable suggestions with regard to the necessary alterations of the text in view of American conditions.

Delft, September 1952

H. VAN RIESSEN
This book has been written from a deep sense of alarm about the social development of our time. To be sure, there is generally little sympathy for a man who tries to make others participate in his own worries and trouble. But this reproach is invalidated as soon as an attempt is made to rouse some people to a sense of danger in a situation in which they ought not to feel at ease, and to help others in localizing the cause of their uneasiness.

But mere alarm is not worth much. Nietzsche, in his poetic vein, once said that alarm may give birth to a dancing star. Or rather, he said so about a chaos. But this is characteristic of Nietzsche's remarks. For the rest, the expectation of a dancing star would require too much of our imagination. But I venture to hope that this book will contribute to elucidating our situation, or rather, that it has done so, for a preface is really an epilogue. If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending — I am quoting again; this time it is the wise Lincoln — we could better judge what to do and how to do it.

It will be clear now that the title of this book is not meant as an inducement for the reader to transport himself mentally into the future. On the contrary, its purpose is to let him reflect on the perspectives of the historical process in which he knows he is involved. He should then come back to his own time and consider the way in which he could do his little bit to put over the helm and help us to escape from a disastrous course.

I have in mind those readers who know their duty and are able to take their share in the responsibility for the trend of events. Their number is not so very large, but, at any rate, large enough to encourage me to write in a way that can be understood by every one who is willing to think it over. Fortunately, a sense of one's responsibility is not a function of one's intellectual training.

Nevertheless my effort may turn out to be a failure. For it is clear to me that when one has been occupied with a certain subject for a long time, one does not realize any more how far one's reflections are intelligible to others. Besides one always has to curb the instinct of writing in an involved way, or in a strange language, about things
one does not quite understand oneself. I must admit that for some years past I have been writing about this alarming subject in weeklies, periodicals and books. Yet it has proved desirable to collect this material and fit it into a coherent whole. Such a procedure has the additional advantage that the writing itself adds to our knowledge.

We can also learn a great deal from others. That is what I have tried to do; and I have greatly benefited by it. Fortunately so much is written nowadays that nobody can keep up with it, which is a sufficient apology for our rigorous restrictions in the matter treated. Such restrictions are certainly necessary if we are to produce anything ourselves. They are not too irksome, for one repeatedly comes across oneself in the work of others. But the joy of recognition is mixed with a sense of disappointment when it concerns some "discovery." On the other hand, such an experience is also reassuring. This leads me to the remark that I do not exactly know where I have committed plagiarism. One reads something; it sinks into oblivion; and many years later one advances it with an air of importance as something spick-and-span-new. I have to acquiesce in such things, just like all the others who do the same thing. In any case, the reader now knows that it has not been done on purpose.

Can we indicate a special motif for this book? One should always be on one's guard against the simplicity of a black—white scheme. But the authors who warn against such schemes generally avail themselves of one on the next page. The motif elaborated in this book is the conflict between freedom and security. There need not be any conflict between them at all, but at present there is a conflict: the real conflict is between human freedom and the security which, regardless of man's own responsibility, is forced upon him by those in authority.

The attempt to perfect this security of the individual as well as of society, and the very general desire for such security, are typical of our age. But the prevailing tendency to exaggerate in such matters is in conflict with man's divine call to accept his responsibility in freedom. It is also in conflict with the fact that man's security is not of this earth. Man should not try to push his own work, his planning and his organizing, in between himself and the guarantees of his security, promised us as the fruits of the redemption Christ has brought about. Anyone who does so endangers the life of faith, deforms society and will certainly never realize the security he sought to establish.

Amsterdam, September 1952.

H. VAN RIESSEN

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Chapter One

ANTICIPATIONS OF THE FUTURE

Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying, my counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure. (Is. 46:10)

In the course of history the society of the future will occupy a position between the social world of our own time and that of the end of days. Its structure will be the result of the social development in former centuries, and will be transformed into the society of the Antichrist, i.e., the social organization immediately preceding the great catastrophe and the last Judgment. Judgment day will mark the end of the present dispensation and the beginning of the new era.

For the treatment of our subject we have a firm hold on the continuity of history and the direction of history towards the final crisis, the completion of the plan of creation and redemption.

In this chapter we propose to deal with the sources, the necessity, the possibility, and the special direction of our inquiry. We shall then examine the way in which the world anticipates the future, and the attitude a Christian ought to adopt. And finally we shall have to consider the signposts marking the course of our argument.

The available sources

For our insight into the future we have access to the knowledge of the past and the present as well as to the Word of God. This Word not only tells us about the future — in particular about the last phase of human society on earth — but it provides us with the indispensable standards enabling us to find the meaning of the past and the present, their tendency towards the future, and their bearing on the end.

We may sometimes be astonished at the fact that non-Christians understand so much of their own time and of the future without using the light of Scripture. But we shall repeatedly find them baffled by the problems of the origins and the perspectives of the historical situations. They may be able to fit their fragmentary discoveries into some creditable whole, deserving our grateful recognition and use, but they do not realize the true meaning of the picture; they do not
know what it is all about. This is the poverty of their unscriptural procedure. Without the Bible — and in the case of man this means without the intuition and the way of thought inspired by a life guided by the Word of God — every attempt to contemplate the society of the future must necessarily be futile.

The necessity of our inquiry

Many Christians hold it to be improper for us to use the Bible for speculations about the future. As a reaction to all kinds of fantastic prophetic theories of the Antichrist and the last days, they go to the other extreme, and are content with a purely negative attitude. Often they give evidence of a well-developed sense of their vocation in life, but they display an appalling lack of eschatological awareness. They are unaccustomed or unwilling to turn their thoughts to the second coming and to what will precede it. As a result they fail to see the signs announcing that coming and run the great risk of being surprised by the events foretold.

But Christ explicitly would have his followers learn from the fig tree that summer is near (Matt. 24: 32); they ought not to have that day come upon them as a thief in the night (1 Thess. 5: 4). To this end the Bible teaches them “what shall come to pass hereafter” (Matt. 24; Luke 21; 2 Thess.; 1 John; Revelation). We are even instructed about the succession of events, the coherence of history, and the culmination of things.

Far from being superfluous information, this knowledge is necessary to strengthen our faith and direct our actions. The man who does not fear God will be eating and drinking, marrying and taking in marriage until, as in the days of Noah, the flood comes suddenly upon him. A Christian will have to live like Noah, who, knowing what was coming, built the ark.

Other Christians look upon such attempts to form an idea of the future as permissible, but futile. In their opinion one ought simply to do what lies at hand while heeding God’s commandments.

But one thing is certain: the future cannot be let alone. To be concerned with it is the essence of life. We buy refreshments because of expected company; we plan to expand our business or to let our child attend school. Such planning automatically relates our activity to the future.

Of course the reliability of our plans depends on a time-factor. The picture of the future of tomorrow is quite clear, whereas our view
of ten years hence is very hazy. Our planning resembles the aiming of a gun-barrel: a shot which at a yard’s distance would hardly miss, will be wide off the mark at five hundred yards. But the difference is only one of degree.

There is in this a warning not to be too ready with forecasts about the more remote future of the last days. It is my firm belief that such predictive speculation would render our efforts fruitless. The purpose of this book is something quite different.

We do not intend to visualize the future of society in a kind of imaginary perspective, because that would mean a shifting of our present responsibility into the future.

Quite the reverse: we want to discover the signs of the future as so many warnings in the sphere of our present responsibilities.

The difference between our position and that of Christians refusing to reflect on the future should not be misunderstood; we do not dwell on the future for its own sake, whereas they are merely willing to listen to God’s commandments. For the future is only of interest to us insofar as it may clarify the present situation. A Christian’s refusal to consider it properly deprives him of the guidance of God’s promises and judgments. As a result he has to be content with a worldly view of the future when he has to decide upon a course of action. He does not see any sign in Christ’s timetable when he learns, e.g., about the Unesco’s declaration of the rights of man. The UNO, Federated Europe, and the iron curtain have nothing to say to him with regard to the tension of the last days.

Possibilities of the research

That we must busy ourselves with the future does not signify that we are able to forecast coming events. Not only is our investigation of the past and the present incomplete, and the possibility of knowledge limited, but — and this is far more important — the history of the world is not causally determined the future is not fixed. World events are not directed by an automaton but by God. And He has appointed men who, as stewards of reality, exercise freedom in their decisions. We may not therefore fall into extremes. We know something of the future from the Word of God, e.g., the signs of the times and the course of history; but we cannot read the future from a blue-print.

The Bible itself admonishes us on this point. God Himself determines the periods and the moments of time (Acts 1:7). The Son of man will come again in an hour that we expect Him not (Matt. 24:45).
In the book of Revelation we find an elaborate account of what is coming, so that we may read the signs of the times and realize their importance: He that hath ears to hear, let him hear (Rev. 13:9). But the facts and the times are symbolically draped, the picture of the future is veiled. On one occasion part of the picture is even entirely hidden, viz., when John is told to seal the message of the seven thunders.

In summary we affirm that an attentive consideration of the future, with the Bible and history as aids, is necessary and possible, although limited in its nature.

The direction of our inquiry

Our purpose is to investigate one particular facet of reality in relation to its future: the structures of society as organized by man.

By the term 'society' we do not refer to the third member of the customary series: church, state, and society. Whatever merits that classification may have had in the past in stressing the independence of social life outside of the church and the state, it lacks precision. For the word 'society' taken in this sense covers an extremely complicated variety of social structures. This use of the term denotes everything that does not fit into the state or the church: families, industrial and commercial concerns, market-organizations, free associations, schools, etc., together with all the interrelations between these social units. It seems therefore more fruitful to employ the term 'society' for the totality of the forms constituting human social life; e.g., its incidental contacts such as business-calls and friendly visits; organized groups of a temporary nature such as festive meetings, or assemblies; and the permanently established groups (the societal relationships *). Among the latter it is especially those that have been subject to fundamental changes in the past that will demand our attention. Their influence on the future development is greatest. We refer to the social complex in which science, technique, economy, and politics play an important rôle.

From this statement it will be clear that man is not in the center of our observations. Naturally, we cannot neglect him entirely: he is the organizer of society. He will repeatedly attract our attention. For what man is, and his beliefs, basic convictions, and attitudes are of decisive significance for the community of the future. Nevertheless, man will be discussed only in so far as he influences its social aspect.

*) i.e., organized communities.
An illustration may clarify our intentions. If we wish to predict the future of a farm, recently inherited by a farmer’s son, we must make an estimate of the value of the farm and of what the son will be worth as a farmer. There is no reason for worry if the farm is flourishing and the son is of the right material. If the farm is in bad shape and the young farmer is efficient and aflame with energy, there is still a reasonable chance. If he is lazy and of little ability, however, there is still a chance that he will make good if the farm is in excellent condition. But there is little hope if the farm is run down and nothing good can be expected from the young farmer. That we can say nothing with certainty conforms to our previous position.

Many Christians underestimate the present condition of the farm in considering its future, while Marxists and modern Socialists take the young farmer too little into account.

Both aspects, the social and the human (or, if you like, the spiritual), mutually influence each other. Reality is highly complex; fortunately, it is not simple. The old farmer is to a large degree responsible for what the farm is now; the young farmer will be responsible for what the farm will be worth in the future. In addition to his own original nature, his beliefs, and his inherited qualities, the young farmer’s personality is considerably modified and inevitably moulded by his life on the farm. These considerations will explain why and in what sense man will appear in the limelight of our considerations.

One more thing should be said before our discussions can begin: our inquiry depends on the investigation of the Bible and of modern society. The Biblical perspective and that of modern society are both indispensable, and either of them could be chosen as our main theme. With reservations I deem myself competent to examine only the societal aspect.

The secular anticipation of the future

A striking feature of the secular view of the future will always be those elements that call to mind the relevant Biblical data. It is as if the Scriptural view has left vague impressions behind. We encounter a yearning, a homesickness for paradise, a longing for and a description of a bright and sinless future. There is an awareness that on the way thither something must happen to man. Frequently in our age there is a vague memory of a sense of sin. There is also an inkling of the truth that the path of sin is fatal, so that there is a ‘law of sin’ (Rom. 7:26). The ideas of fate and of catastrophe have been very deeply imprinted in the imagination of modern man. In our own century
the indestructible hope of the redemption of man, so tenaciously clung
to in western history, now for the first time goes about in deep
mourning, often robed in a stony cynicism.

This agreement with the Bible never completely or consistently
occupies the worldly vision. In the long run the argument usually
takes a speculative turn, affecting us as unreal; or, in our age, it comes
to a dead end. The music of the future of society sounds in our ears
as a sentimental melody of yearning, or it loses itself in a chaos
of dissonance.

Why such an aberration at the very moment when a single step would
lead to a confrontation with reality? This is not so hard to understand.
Man is not willing to take the step toward the reality of the Word and
the sign: the Word of God and the sign of the cross, an offense
to the Jew and foolishness to the Greek (1 Cor. 1). This Word and this
sign are also with us, and they are still foolishness and an offense
to the man of the world. They remain so to every one who in the
consciousness of his own sovereignty rejects the dependence posited
by the Word and manifested by the cross. Because of his faith in his
power to redeem himself man is a rebel. He would rather build
upon the ruins of fatalism than accept the idea of his own radical
and fatally lost condition. Trusting in his own strength he rebels
against the shameful and humiliating cross on which Christ hung to
open the gate of redemption.

The cross brings us to the very heart of the antithesis between
Christianity and Humanism. Nietzsche, the extremist of all humanists,
wished to divest himself of everything reminiscent of Christianity
and desired to be the prophet of the Antichrist. Nietzsche understood
that the cross of Golgotha signified the parting of the ways. The
cross is to him the deepest humiliation of all that is human, the most
awful decadence, a sign of the civilization of weakness.

One and the same spirit rules and unites the offended Jew, the
wise Greek, the aristocratic Roman, the hardened humanist, the
perplexed Pharaoh (Ex. 9: 28; 10: 16), Nietzsche, and the man of the
end of days (Rev. 9: 5, 20). This is the spirit of self-maintenance and
of self-redemption. To such men, redemption through Christ remains
foolishness, a cause of mirth or an object of scorn. Those who “über
den Tag hinaus noch Ziele haben” (still have a purpose beyond the
day) indulge in speculations and Utopias, others turn into the dead
end of despair, or frankly confess to shameless cynicism or to fatalism.

Our next concern is to discuss what modern man expects from
science. Modern history is dominated by Bacon’s theme, “Knowledge
is Power”; and Comte’s, “Know to look ahead.” The confidence placed in science is reflected in the famous words of the mathematician La Place: "We must regard the present condition of the universe as the result of its former state and as the cause of the next. Imagine a spirit which at a given moment knew all the forces at work in nature, and the inter-relations of the beings of which it consists. If such a spirit were able to subject all these data to an investigation, it could include in one and the same formulation the movements of the heaviest bodies in the universe and of the lightest atoms; to it nothing would be uncertain; future, as well as past would stand before its gaze.”

La Place’s notion of such a hypothetical spirit seems quite innocent. More serious, however, is the fact that he considers the future determined by the past and present, so that, in principle at least, the future is attainable or explicable to science. This scientific-ideal dominated the nineteenth century. It is not simply a matter of an hypothesis, but of practical application. A knowledge of the facts serves as a basis for the knowledge of the future, by which the future can be predicted and controlled with certainty. And the facts in this case teach us of the progress of society through science and technique. Thus the new way of self-redemption in the nineteenth century becomes the way which science shows to the future of society.

The philosopher Comte (1798-1857) posited his law of the three stages: A theological stage, in which faith in the gods gave the pitch, was followed by a metaphysical stage under the leadership of speculative ideas, only to be surpassed by the positive industrial stage of the full-grown man. This final stage is positive in the sense that science no longer speculates but only takes cognizance of the facts. This is positivism. For us the important thing is Comte’s plea for the necessity of the development of sociology, the science of society, as the keystone of the sciences. Since this view is still prevalent, the science of sociology will frequently claim our attention.

The next step toward the realization of the ideal of science was the doctrine of evolution. Karl Marx (1818-1883), whose theory is related to this doctrine, made an attempt to forecast the future development of society on the basis of facts. Unintentionally he illustrates how prejudiced positivism is. No one can proceed in science without selecting and interpreting the facts. Marx also selects and interprets, but he will not admit it. For him the struggle for power, specifically, the struggle for the control of the means of production between the classes of society, is the decisive fact. There is some truth in this contention but it is not the whole truth. Before Marx could reach the
conclusion desired at the outset, he had to don quite a number of colored glasses permitting him to see only such “positive” facts as he had a use for.

But a keen reader may observe: “Why all this trouble? If the future contains nothing, not cognizable from present and past facts, then it will not only be dull, but nothing about it can be changed, so why bother ourselves with it. The clock is wound, let it run its course.”

Such criticism strikes at the very center of the old rationalistic positivism. Because its advocates are aware of this fact, they have sought to permit some re-entry of the free personality, who may occasionally exercise some control over the future.

But why is such a niggardly reception given to freedom? This is the crucial point. The degree of freedom recognized in a theory of the future renders the theory proportionately uncertain in its results. Every uncertainty detracts from the science-ideal concerning comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge of the present and the future, and weakens the motive of absolute control by mixing a fragment of doubt in the faith in progress. We shall subsequently examine the attempt to control uncertainty further by means of the calculus of probability.

The starting point and ideal of positivism thus leads to an internal insoluble contradiction. It desires to show the way of self-redemption. To that end, man must first establish his own security and independence in the idea of an impeccable, self-sufficient positive science, wholly free of speculation, based solely upon positive facts. Such a science supplies knowledge enabling man to control reality, thereby insuring progress and social redemption. The humanistic ideal of science (we might call it speculation) is completely harmonious but excludes freedom. The forced entry of a small dose of freedom disturbs the science ideal.

The thesis of the scientific self-sufficiency of philosophy and its neutrality is untenable even in this case. Positivism rests squarely on a faith in the sovereignty of man, at least in the absolute independence of his scientific thinking. And leadership is given to the faith in the self-redemption of man and society.

Note in passing that the idea of progress and of the control of reality is by no means the privileged property of humanists. Christians have the most ancient claim to it in their faith in the call of man on earth, of which mention is made in Genesis 1 and 2. The practice of this idea with the aid of practical and scientific knowledge has led to the blossoming of Western culture. The positive and decisive influence
of the Christian religion upon the development of our culture is at present admitted also by many humanists, one of whom is Jaspers.3

Even in the activities of Christians, sin has brought the symptoms of decay. We must make it absolutely clear that sin has penetrated into the life of everyone; it exists together with the sense of a positive divine call, still persisting in our culture. The difference in behavior between Christians and humanists may become more and more manifest with time. They are, however, in practice closely associated with each other.

But the main source of disintegration, encountered in practical life, is rooted on the religious level in the heart of man.

The secularization of the idea of progress and control originates in the religious commitment of humanism. For humanism cultivates the original sin of mankind: man's declaration of independence and his faith in self-redemption. As a result, an unlimited science is in principle and in practice employed in a haughty self-hypostasis of man. The steward proclaims himself lord of creation (the spirit of the wicked tenants lives on in humanism, Matt. 21). Christ's work of redemption as the basis of progress and as the unfolding of life is denied; and its true perspective which is the glory of God, is shut out. Humanity is then pre-eminently governed by the fundamental thesis of unbelief: by man and for man. This thesis inevitably leads to the derailment of science and civilization.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the effects of this derailment were at length realized in the camp of the humanists. But its true causes were sought everywhere except in the fact of the denial of the Redeemer. However, too much had happened to maintain unshaken faith in progress. Technique and science had enriched life, but the hard fact remained that wars did not belong to the past; in 1914 the greatest of all wars broke out. Whoever had believed in the triumphal march of humanity had to adjust to the situation that violence, deceit and injustice continued to list their victories. That which, thanks to the faith in progress through science, had seemingly become a harmonious human fellowship, fell to pieces in the twentieth century in a spiritual confusion of tongues. And worse still, modern humanity became decadent. It lost its cultural vivacity. Nietzsche had seen through this long before the facts gave the lie to the theory of progress. The decadence was not in the first place the result of disappointment, though the latter was a strong stimulant; wrong ideals were the cause of decadence. The bourgeois mentality of modern humanity and its materialistic tendency were poorly adapted to sustain a lasting interest. And, basically, the cause of such incorrigible tedium was the fact that
nothing in its ideals rose above man, or reached further than the earth. In any event, it was understood that science is unable to bring true redemption; at least, not alone. For a humanist this was at most but an incentive to press the crown once more upon the head of reason, the first queen of humanism, whom science had dethroned. Reason must bring up the arrears, the cultural lag, e.g., in ethics, as compared with the enormous development of science and technique. The praises of reason and the hope in its enlightenment are once again sung. For the spiritual elite reason is reserved; of course the ignorant common people may live by their religion. And the latter fact may be regrettable; because it is out of the narrow mindedness of the common masses that suspicion is rife, together with intolerance, persecution, strife, violence, and slavery. If one happens to belong to these dumb folks, it can only provoke a smile, when, after a century of humanistic superiority and control, the responsibility for the fiasco is shifted to Christianity and the church; and if, after some rummaging about in the old humanistic box, there again appears the well-known figure of reason to adorn the faith in the sovereign personality of man.

It is surprising. For what would have been a discord in the harmony of the triumphant science of the nineteenth century, what would previously have been a reason for one's degradation to a pariah, is now suddenly posited as self-evident: life and the future are impossible without faith. The existentialist Jaspers puts it even stronger by declaring that our cultural plight and crisis are caused by the lack of faith. The faith intended by Jaspers is, however, not Biblical faith. The latter would again shackle the free and sovereign man. Faith must liberate itself from dogmas; it must become existential faith. In the desire for self maintenance, a foundation is here sought behind and beyond reason, in human existence, whose deepest truth is in silence, whose freedom is a flight from the practical \textit{dasein} (practical human life).

All this does not mean much for the ideals of the future society. What once was progress has now become a mystery. What once was certainty concerning the future, has become a \textit{myth}. A myth, according to Sorel, of which we know naught, nor is there any sense in knowing naught about it; its sole function is to inspire man to action. Unto what? "\textit{Und ein Narr der auf Antwort wartet.}" ("And only a fool waits for an answer.")

Now that the certainty of progress has been radically undermined, the anticipation of the future dissolves into mere question marks. Apostate thought swings from one extreme to the other. This irrationalism does not only posit its crisis of uncertainties with respect to
historical evolution and the anticipation of the future; it doubts everything, including tradition, attitudes, customs, moral norms, and the reliability of words. Its doubt is universal because of the reversal of a vital conviction. Behind the faith in progress lay hidden the faith in control: the conviction that humanity is able to control reality and its future. With the defeat of the first belief, the second also fell. The deepest root of humanism, its self-maintenance, was not thereby eradicated, but its only reason for existence, namely, its faith in self-redemption, came to a stage of crisis.

Undoubtedly, many still keep far aloof from a radical attitude of defeat such as Spengler's, or from the brazen and disconsolate nihilism of Sartre — "Rien n'a jamais aucune importance" — (nothing ever matters). There are still many who struggle to be free of a dominating mood of pessimism concerning western culture as encountered in Huizinga and Schubart. But whatever may be the optimism cherished concerning the future, the cheer of certainty is gone, the fragrance of the western culture with its heroic Faustian man has been dissipated in the storm of crisis.

A moderate optimism still persists. Two tendencies are encountered. One is concerned with the hope of an internal renewal of man; the other would put its trust in a planned ordering of society. Those who point to the path of inwardness, as does Jaspers, are, however, not certain any longer that a recovery from the cultural crisis may be expected. They think rather in terms of a spiritual elite who will escape from the decadence. The masses can perhaps not be reached any more, and a threatening society is slipping away from the leadership of the elite. Besides Jaspers, we may mention Ortega Y. Gasset. But what is this threat to society?

Those who would vote for planning are generally convinced that their ideal society has an Achilles heel that frustrates every attempt at effective planning, viz., man. But what is the matter with modern man?

In this spectrum of hesitant optimism, doubt, pessimism, despair and nihilism, two ancient Greek mainstays, previously discarded by humanism as decidedly obsolete, are brought into use once more. They are fate and chance. Their revival is significant. It proves that the modern humanist has surrendered his faith in control. His confidence in the future and his planned progress have to make room for influences not caused by man.

To the degree that he nevertheless considers himself able to understand future developments, he substitutes fate for these influences. The destiny introduced is mostly the fate of decline (Spengler). If
there could be any question of an advance, of a revival, the secularist certainly would not introduce fate; he would point simply to the success and the merits of man's endeavors. Such is man. When all goes well, we strut about like peacocks; when things go wrong, efforts are made to find scapegoats; we wash our hands in innocence.

If we lack confidence in our forecasts of a gloomy future eluding human control, then chance is brought in. Chance, which Tielicke wittily calls the other side of fate. It is the whimsical unknown side, but it serves as fate; it provides man with excuses.

Does all this signify the end of science? Science had been entrusted with the task of smoothing the path of progress, and now that complete success is not forthcoming, is science to be pushed aside? It is not as simple as all that. We have touched upon a very important facet of our argument, a point that demands immediate attention. Science can no longer be banished from Western civilization; it cannot even be forced to the background. Naturally, I have in mind modern applied science. It is because of its practical application that this science is firmly entrenched and plays a leading rôle in our social life.

In one sense the position of science is legitimate. Without science, technique and medicine could never have made such tremendous advances. But science is now busy conquering the social and economic spheres. It is in this area that we have many reservations.

In spite of a general doubt and pessimism, scientific development moves steadily on with notable success. Great differences exist, however, in the evaluation of science. Generally speaking science is no longer regarded with the reverence customary in the nineteenth century, even though its influence at present is more powerful. Science no longer animates people with the old feeling of superiority over reality. Science no longer enwraps humanity with its perspectives of progress. For many, science no longer wears that proud crown of neutral, objective, universally valid knowledge.

Those who emphasize the inner cultural renewal of society devalue the worth of science even more strongly. Some of them hold that science is the disturbing factor in our culture.

And yet there still persists a preponderating confidence in the results of science. Many consider its exclusive value to be in these very results. These results are therefore the truth of science. Truth is what is usable — pragmatism. Science then no longer provides humanism with a Weltanschauung — a world view. It no longer provides a firm basis for confidence in the future. Rather it is pursued for immediate practical purposes in fields of specialization. Long range perspectives are lacking; no common bond now unites those engaged in the
pursuit of science. The common attitude of the scientist and of the consumer of his results is that of a restless activism, without deep reflection.

Our interest will be with another group who combine their anticipation of the future and science in a manner different from the nineteenth century. What was then calculated to refute the determinism of a knowledge which La Place deemed possible in principle has now become the focal point of scientific interest: namely, man. The attempt is made to realize what was then a dream: to know as well as to control the future. Certainty about the future is now sought by means of applied science, by scientific planning for the future of man and community. The ideal of control will at last be realized if a transition can be made from the knowledge of an uncertain future to the planning and organization of a certain future.

The Christian view of the future

The Christian ought to have the courage of his convictions and dare to affirm that a trustworthy conception of the past, present, and future can arise only within a Christian framework. The signs of the times are veritably discerned only by "a spiritual man" (1 Cor. 2). His discernment is not due to superior knowledge and wisdom. Personal contact with humanists makes it clear that things are often quite different, and that we have no reason for self-glorification. The difference is simply that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge and nurtures unto wisdom (Prov. 1:7; 15:33). The Christian looks in the right direction because Christ has placed him in a position to see correctly. In spite of his own shortsightedness and reluctance, Christ continues to give him a proper perspective.

Only a Christian is in a position to obtain real knowledge insofar as such is possible. The Christian can distinguish proportionate values, the important from the trivial, assign facts to their proper perspective in a total view of the world, and gain an insight into the future. On the decisive level the humanist tends to fall into extremes. This is a common phenomenon when unbelief takes the lead, in such forms as rationalism and irrationalism, individualism and collectivism, liberalism and socialism.

As has previously been stated, there is no question of forecasting the future. Because of historical continuity, however, if we consider what the Bible says concerning the issue of certain tendencies, we are able to express anticipations of the future. The effect of the continuity of
history suggests the movement of a car which can reach another rate of speed only gradually, not abruptly. However, at any given moment innumerable potentialities for further developments are always present. But we also know something about the ultimate end. Our knowledge of this end and of historical continuity forms the basis for a conception of the future.

Much is to be learned by considering the past in which are discernible historical sequence, God's guidance of history according to His Word, and the effect of man's spiritual attitude on history. The history of Israel is most eloquent in this connection. And the issues are sufficiently clear in western civilization, and, as far as the chief points are concerned, in the history of other cultures as well.

Strikingly, there is little awareness of the fact that western culture is a unity in a historical sense, a meaningful temporal reality, moving forward to its completion. Western culture is unique in world history, extending between the coming into this world of the incarnate Son of God and His second coming.

Modern science, technique, modern methods of organization, and spiritual attitudes contain tendencies of decisive significance for the future.

Today insight into the future is on the one hand more readily acquired. Man's freedom introduces an element of uncertainty into the theory of the future, at least if its freedom leads to activity. A passive person, caught in the daily routine and lacking original cultural activity, contributes nothing new to the future. Even a person who would like to be active is at present often enmeshed in the web of social organization and is unable to do anything. The mass man and the devaluation of labor are a highly common occurrence in our society, and in proportion to the frequency of their occurrence the future will be more determined.

On the other hand, insight into the future is extremely difficult today because it is highly probable that we are at a critical juncture of history. There is a deep and far-reaching structural development of society in progress. Great caution in the appraisal of events ought therefore to be exercised.

But two types of misconceptions must be guarded against before any general conclusions can be drawn from the tendencies of our time. The opening paragraph of this book might suggest that the society of the future not only occupies a position in the period between the present and the days of the Antichrist, but also concerning its character. Such a conclusion would be warranted if, and only if, historical development ran a straight course. But such
is not true of past history, and will not be true of the future. Fluc-
tuation is characteristic of the many facets of society. Our spiritual
life, for example, discloses an alternation of ups and downs in history;
individualistic periods follow collectivistic periods; free trade succeeds
protection; revolutionary and totalitarian states follow one another;
the role of the people in government is great, small, and at times
insignificant. Before concluding that planned economy is of our day,
remember that, e.g., in the Babylon of 1700 B.C., King Hammurabi
partially directed economic life.

Of course I do not mean to exclude all connection with and gradual
transition to the society of the Antichrist. On the contrary, there are
many indications in that direction.

A second misconception is found in representing history as a
concatenation of isolated cycles or circular movements. Impressed by
the fact that all things in the world are unspeakably weary, the
Preacher said: “What has been, shall be; what has been done, shall
be done; there is nothing new under the sun.” It may well seem that
Nietzsche with his theory of the eternal return is in close harmony
with Solomon. But Nietzsche knew nothing further, whereas Solomon
concludes that we must fear God and keep His commandments;
Nietzsche preached the futility, the senselessness of all things, whereas
Solomon broke through the distressing circle of the senseless by
pointing to the fact that God will bring every deed into judgment.
But Nietzsche proclaimed that God was dead; Solomon knew God is
alive.

Spengler goes still further. Nietzsche recognized a tension between
fatalism and the expectation of culture, but in Spengler fate reigns.
Rising, shining, and sinking are the lot of every culture, and ours has
now reached the point of decline. Not only ought we to accept this fact
heroically, but we ought to cooperate in the process. Even if Spengler
is right that our culture is declining, it still makes a great difference
whether our submergence is considered to be fate or a consequence
of sin. It makes a great deal of difference whether we view our culture
from the perspective of mere decline or from the perspective of a
judgment and emergence into a new existence.

Both the cyclical and the linear conception of history are one-sided
and therefore erroneous. Progress and analogous repetition exist side
by side. Reality swings forward through time, and in this process
concentrates upon the end. History shows the interaction of opposing
tendencies, i.e., of both positive meaningful and negative disturbing
trends. But this fact does not imply that there are two separate co-
existent cultures. They are moments of one cultural development; completion and depletion, acquisition and demolition. It is the intolerable tension eventually arising between such opposites that will lead to the great catastrophe.

It is desirable to pause for a moment in the anticipation of the end of days. Many are of the opinion that this thought should be put aside, because we have so often guessed wrong, e.g., at the end of the Roman Empire, again at the end of the Middle Ages, and later, under Robespierre's reign of terror. Bear in mind, however, that history is not a time-piece, wound by God at creation, whose hands ever and again assume the same position with monotonous regularity.

Past expectations teach us something about the periodicity of history, but in no sense entitle us to assume that history will again repeat itself.

Let us indeed be on our guard lest we adopt the language of the Israelites which provoked the anger of the Lord, "The days are prolonged and every vision faileth" (Ezek. 12:22). Particularly in connection with the return of Christ, we should guard against the defeatist's scorn, "Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation" (II Pet. 3:4). The New Testament abounds with the thought of the approaching end; it is filled with intense anticipation. In his address on the day of Pentecost, Peter applies the words of Joel to his time, "And it shall come to pass in the last day" (Acts 2:17). And John even writes that it is the last hour recognizable by the manifestations of the Antichrist (1 John 2:18). Paul writes, "The time is short" (1 Cor. 7:29) and it seems that in this context we must think of time as "pressed together." In thinking of the many centuries which have since passed, the thought arises that perhaps these writers were mistaken about the tempo. If the Bible is God's Word, such a thought is inadmissible, but a problem still remains.

Theologians are cautious on this point. However let me say one thing. According to the apostles, Christ said, "Surely I come quickly" (Rev. 22:20). And when Peter contends with defeatism he points to the fact that a thousand years are with the Lord as a day (II Pet. 3:8). If we think in terms of periods of world history, and not in terms of a human lifetime, the length of our era is brief when compared to the ten to fifteen thousand year history of mankind. Our era is a period of rapid change and development. From this perspective the Biblical utterances about the course of history are intelligible. It is evident that in the past Christians were mistaken on this point. Their attitude did not only display discouragement, however; it also testified to the
tension of faith and to their love of Christ. They knew that through the black night there would break a radiant morning and they would behold their Lord. They were all too eager to accept the notion that the night had appeared. With a believing heart they would embrace its darkness in too great haste. But such an attitude is preferable to a defeatism that can only say: “It will pass over.”

Such defeatists are like people weary in their hike in the mountains, who no longer believe that eventually the last peak will be reached. They fear that there will ever be a new descent and a new slope to be overcome. Has the last ascent finally been reached? Only God knows. But in the following pages it will become evident that for the first time in history, society is striving to attain a number of clearly defined ends. Besides, the building stones of the structure of the society of the antichrist are for the first time in evidence.

A preliminary sketch

This paragraph contains a summary of the outcome of our research. In a detective story such would be an unpardonable fault, but in a work of this kind the reader should be properly orientated from the start.

The impressive period in which we live is often described as a crisis in our civilization. A crisis is a critical situation, a turning point, a web of confusion waiting for conclusive trends and momentous decisions. In such periods, society is like a person lost in a forest, seeking an exit.

Much of the above description applies to our time. What is strange, however, is that the vanishing of the old and the appearing of the new seem to happen chiefly without our cooperation. A new period is dawning; it seems to engulf us independently of our volitions. Humanity does not experience this crisis as a moment of hesitation at the crossroad of decisions. It feels rather that it is driven forward along a path marked by danger signals, a path as yet devoid of any sign of a new vitality, strewn solely with marks of continuous dissolution, without new life.

Some believe that in the strength of his conviction the socialist is at least seeking to devise a way for the future by directing an inescapable social development, thereby enabling man to adjust to it more readily. According to him the present crisis is a lack of harmony, a state of maladjustment, the delayed growth in the formation of society, a “cultural lag” (Ogburn). But even among such, increasing voices of insecurity are heard, and rightly so, for the same road also leads to a communistic society and to totalitarianism. And how can such be avoided?
The future outlook of the present social development and revolution is a totalitarian society. The sphere in which one is freely responsible is slowly but surely being circumscribed. This experience is universal. Socialists intend to prevent totalitarianism and even enlarge the area of personal freedom by a planned central regulation of communal life. Their hope is in planning and in a society organized on the basis of planning. It will subsequently be evident, however, that the introduction of planning is but a step on the road to totalitarianism, a road on which there is no half-way resting-point.

Science and technique are equally in evidence in social development and in the methods for planned direction and organization. Indeed, science and technique determine the unique and peculiar character of the latter. Regimentation, planning, centralized organization, directed economy, and totalitarianism existed much earlier in history. But it was mere child's play in comparison to what has been achieved by the application of modern scientific method and technical instruments. Technical achievements, now developed far beyond the experimental stage, provide the potential dictator with the means by which he could intensively and extensively achieve a radical control of man and society. It takes little imagination to conceive of the manner in which the Antichrist will tyrannize humanity.

The social progress of concentric integration, the centralizing formation of power, and the striving after the planned control of communal life contain many phenomena justifying the view that society is approaching its last structural type; not, therefore, its last phase. But let us not forget that our era of science and technique is moving on rapidly in a historical sense. Christ makes haste.

In addition to the ideal of security through planning and organization, the human aspect of society, although not our chief concern, contains nevertheless some other noteworthy features. In 1 John 2 the Antichrist is described as the one who denies the Father and the Son. And Paul describes him as the man of lawlessness, the man of sin. The mystery of lawlessness (nihilism) is to be revealed in the last days (2 Thess. 2). Nihilism is repeatedly encountered in history but as time goes on it takes the form of an increasing radicalism. For the first time in the history of Western civilization some present-day philosophies consciously and deliberately choose a nihilistic way of thought. And what is perhaps even more significant, nihilism has for the first time obtained control of the public at large. The mass-man is in the process of becoming; his chief mark is his nihilism.

Consequently, serious symptoms are present in both the social and the spiritual aspect of our society. It is therefore important to realize
that without new reflection and basic reorientation these symptoms will be accentuated in the direction of a nihilistic totalitarian society, such as that of the Antichrist. This conclusion is not based solely upon past historical development. It is a deduction based upon God’s prediction of the consequences for man in case he forsakes his divine calling. When unbelief gains ground, the law of sin comes into operation (Amos 3:6; Haggai 1; Rom. 6:22; 8:2).

The main purpose of this book is to investigate the social aspect of our civilization, including its historical origin and its tendency towards the future. Its main point is to show that the future is not the ironbound result of the present; it is not mere fate.

To bring this home to the reader it is necessary to draw up a sketch of the seriousness of our situation and to warn against the dangerous tendencies of our time. It is useless to camouflage the present state of affairs. The greatest open-mindedness is needed to establish a foundation on which we can still construct a spiritual attitude that can deliver us from a paralyzing pessimism and a leaden cloak of acquiescence in the course of things. The attitude of acquiescence and pessimism arises when we do not penetrate to the depth of the situation and thereby lack all means of control.

Diagnosis is but half of the work; therapy, a method of cure, is also needed. Much will become evident in the diagnosis, but I shall pay special attention to the cure in the last chapter. The matter of therapy is not the principle concern of my study because the diagnosis is important in itself. In Christian circles diagnosis has hardly started; and without it, the search for therapy makes no sense. If such be the case, and if the disease is very serious, the reader will no doubt think it reasonable that my ideas of the method of cure only point the way without laying claim to completeness.

For even if none of the therapeutic measures proposed are feasible, we shall still be justified on the basis of the diagnosis in affirming that we ought not to acquiesce in the present conditions and tendencies of society. Let us not make the usual mistake of camouflaging the diagnosis because we fear that we cannot find a cure.

Undeniably, we are confronted with some tremendous problems; they will stay with us in the course of our investigations and they will be a menace to our solutions. It may be useful to name some of them. Those who feel ill at ease in our society will recognize the following five problems as encountered in practical life.

The first problem is the duress we are under because the misuse
of science and technique has so far advanced the malformation of society.

I shall illustrate the second problem from my own experience. Recently I moved from a house with automatic oil heat to a house with an old coal furnace. It was a very instructive experience; under similar circumstances most everyone prefers automatic heat. But if society continues to relieve man of all his responsibilities — the present trend — then, without any resistance on the part of the public, it will pass the point — already reached in many respects — beyond which a person is no longer able to be responsible and in most cases does not even want to be. As long as democracy functions, the conflict will be heaviest on this issue.

The third difficulty is that a real cure can be expected only as the result of a Biblical Christianity. I would not minimize the value of an appeal to non-Christians. Nevertheless, with the grace of God our civilization can be redeemed only in a Christian way. And while Christianity may still have some influence, its significance in the world has become so minute that one might despair of a change for the better.

In the fourth place, if the process of decline continues, Christians will gradually be forced to decide if they can continue to cooperate with those of a different mind, or whether the only path open to them is that of withdrawal into separate organizations of Christian action. Or should they merely be content to protest and testify in their own environment? We are thinking of such spheres as the stage, theatre, school, politics, and social action as well as of situations that lead to such conflicts of conscience as arose during the German occupation of the Netherlands.

The problem is neither new nor insoluble. The same difficulties were faced during the Reformation period. During the last hundred years, however, the situation has become more acute. Each instance demands careful decisions, rendered more difficult because of the gradual changes in the development of society. What is needed is a fervent faith, conscientiously subject to the discipline of God's Word.

Our final difficulty is that the Christian desires, or at least should long for, the second coming of the Lord. At the same time he knows that the end is to be preceded by the apostasy and decline which he is duty bound to try and prevent with all the power in him. His charge is to bring men to Christ and to stem cultural decay.

Also this problem is an old one, but as cultural tensions increase, it comes closer to home, proportionately increasing as our longing for Christ's return increases. Our temptation is, however, that we would
know too much. It is not our business to speculate whether Christ's imminent return is delayed by our obedient labor. Our duty is clear. It is not our task to sit idly by in isolation, watching the world go under, waiting for the fulfilment of signs and promises. God will isolate us in His own time, if He deems it necessary. Our calling lies in the crowded market-place of life. Wherever possible we must labor in obedience to His commandments.

The pressure of a double anticipation in our heart increases proportionately as the signs of the end become clearer. We must be relieved of this pressure and we can be, if we learn to realize that it is God who rules the world.
Chapter two

UTOPIAS

Abandon all hope, all ye that enter here.

Dante

The Utopians are driven by homesickness for the lost paradise, and long for the new earth. Their dreams are utopias, “never to be realized,” because they seek a road to such a paradise that does not pass along the station of the fall into sin. In their flight to a new earth, they forget that there is first a scroll to be opened; and that only the Lamb which was slain can break the seals thereof (Rev. 5).

And the confused Utopians, coming up against those barriers, are unaware of the light kindled upon Golgotha whose rays penetrate through time, conflict, and death, and illuminate the new earth, where death, sorrow, weeping and pain shall be no more (Rev. 21:4).

“The Republic”

The “Republic” of Plato (428–348 B.C.), written in dialogue form is of extreme importance. Its exceptional literary qualities, the fascinating personality of Socrates, Plato’s teacher, who is the leader of the discussion, evoke aesthetic enjoyment. The “Republic” is not a utopian romance but a philosophical work of strict logical design.

Plato’s object is to construct a theory of justice. His practical conception of “justice” implies that the just man is happy; and happiness is profitable and useful. According to Plato justice is more readily discerned on a large scale. And as there is a parallel between justice in man as the microcosm, and in the state, as the macrocosm, he prefers to investigate the latter. Thus he develops his theory of the state.¹

This transformation of the problem is important. He argues that justice must be realized in the individual man as well as in the state, by having the better elements prevail over the others. Man always chooses the good rather than the evil. And the same rule should hold good for the community. Plato proposes that the state make this choice for the community. Thus the state becomes the all-inclusive vital relationship.² The criteria of happiness, profit, and justice, are now exclusively established by the community, by the state. Man and the relationships
in which he lives are subject to them. Dooyeweerd correctly observes: “The idea of the sphere-sovereignty of the different spheres of society, rooted in their inner nature and their created structure, is completely foreign to classical antiquity. It originates in the basic motive of the Christian religion.” 3 We shall see how foreign this idea has become to modern humanism.

The argument of the "Republic" boils down to the contention that an ideal just communal life can be obtained, and existing deficiencies and injustices can be corrected simply by permitting the state to organize society in terms of its own conception of justice. This is the key to Plato's reasoning; it is the basis of all utopias, including present day socialistic proposals. Sin in society is to be overcome, paradise regained, an ideal state established, simply by employing human power, in the central organization of society. Life is not to be redeemed by the Messiah, but by man!

Of first consequence for Plato is the control of an enduring division of labor according to birth and natural inclination. The most ancient and lowest status is that of the common folk, the artisan class; the craftsman, the farmer, and the like. Quite fortunately, Plato leaves them unmolested.

When the community of artisans becomes too large, it is threatened by external and internal dangers, so that a second or warrior class is needed. Its special virtue is courage. Since they should be warlike only to the enemy, the community must be protected against their unbridled passion by giving the warriors a good mental education, including gymnastics and music; the latter conceived of in the broadest sense.

Above the warrior class is enthroned the highest class of all, the rulers or statesmen. Education in gymnastics and music is for them merely a preparation for the study of philosophy. The evils of the state cannot be corrected until philosophers become kings, and kings become philosophers.4

The education of the two highest classes is of the very greatest importance. A variety of foods are forbidden; certain specified types of music, and most stage plays are prohibited. The imitation of bad people and playing the rôle of women and slaves is harmful to a man. Only approved stories may be told to children. To instill fear of death by the gloomy portrayal of the hereafter would make a warrior cowardly. And as to the world of the gods, uncontrolled pleasure, extravagant festivities, quarrels, infirmities and passions, such as Homer attributes to the gods, must be banished from instruction. Though wisdom is closely connected with truth, myths and legends are not
only permitted, they are desirable, provided they are conducive to the education for military or governmental tasks.\(^5\)

This one-sided instruction and the use of myths directed to the welfare of the state may seem to be in harmony with the educational method of national socialism and communism. There is undoubtedly some relationship, but it must be kept in mind that in Plato truth and justice are held to be beyond doubt, whereas in the irrationalism at the root of the previously mentioned modern views, truth no longer finds any support; in these systems the final aim is the creation of mere power.

Nevertheless, Plato goes very far in his application of lying and deceit. Deceit and untruth are not confined to education, but can be used by the rulers on other occasions for the best interests of the ruled. The main untruth to be told is that God created three kinds of human beings, corresponding to the three classes of society. Deceit is also necessary in the begetting of the race, for sexual union and frequent pairing of the best men with the best women, and the rare association of the poorer specimens, are essential. Those concerned must know nothing of the controlled direction of their intercourse.\(^6\)

The guardians possess no private property and even hold wives and children in common, sharing a common dwelling and eating place, in order that they may fulfill their task well. Every man is husband and father of all. Parents do not know their own children. Propagation is ordered by the state on the basis of eugenics, so that birth is only given to the best. The weak and deformed are eliminated, and children, begotten at an age beyond the limit set by the state, are to be liquidated. Besides education, the begetting of children must also be to the best interest of the state.

From the above it will be clear how the idea of justice applied to the state inevitably leads Plato to a dangerous control of man and society by the state. The idea of such a social order is encountered in all manner of utopias with variations of execution. The complete leveling or equalization of social life and a static social structure are the notable results of human thinking concerning a centralized society.

Plato's ideal was in no small measure an expression of his dislike of the democratic regime in Athens. In some respects his ideal was practised in Sparta. But, as the adviser of the King of Syracuse, he was unable to put his ideas into practice.

**Utopia**

The second ideal society which we shall discuss is that which Thomas More (1478–1535) portrayed in his novel, *Utopia*, written in 1516.
When I describe More as an English humanist and, with Erasmus, the most important representative of humanism in Northern Europe, this does not in any way imply that More was not a Christian. The humanism of that period had not yet broken with Christianity. In More are to be found only the seeds of ideas that were later to direct humanism along its unbiblical course, separating it further and further from Christianity.7

More was a pious and steadfast Roman Catholic. He paid for his convictions with his life. He was a man of high standing who, knighted and in high esteem as Lord Chancellor of England, remained untainted by the customary corrupt practices of the time. He was not a philosopher, but rather a jurist-statesman whose written ideas reflect the practical pedagogical attitude of the then existing humanism.

More refused to acknowledge Henry VIII’s forced break with the Roman Catholic Church and Parliament’s coerced proclamation that Henry VIII was the head of the English Church. For this reason he was charged with high treason and condemned to death. The terms of the execution are so typical of the time that I shall mention them in passing. More was to be dragged through the city, hanged, cut loose half dead; thereupon his privy parts were to be dismembered, his belly cut open; and, after he had been quartered, his head was finally to be placed on London Bridge. He was granted grace, however, to be punished by beheading. Even with his head already under the axe, his humor did not forsake him; to the executioner he said: “Wait a moment, till I have laid my beard aside, for that has not committed treason.”

Utopia consists of two parts. The first, with which we shall not concern ourselves, contains a criticism of the society of More’s day. The second part is the portrayal of a perfect communal life on an imagined island visited for five years by a seaman, the narrator of the story.

The island is shaped like a new moon; its center is 200 miles wide; its fifty four cities, with the exception of the centrally located capital, are all alike, situated a day’s journey apart. Each city is divided into four equal portions; each part is built around a market. Streets and houses are all alike. Dress is very simple and uniform, allowing only for a difference between the sexes and for the married state. Meals can be taken at home, but most inhabitants prefer the common dining halls. Necessities can be obtained at the market without money; everyone takes the products of his labor there, and no one is inclined
to take away too much. Gold and silver are not much esteemed. They are used only by children for decoration, until age makes them feel it beneath their dignity. To journey to another place a license is necessary and easily obtained.

More's Utopia is the necessary consequence of the abolition of _private ownership_ and the fostering of a mental attitude of _common ownership_. The more intense the desire to reach and to guarantee his state, the farther the expansion of the process of collectivism and _equalization_. That such a communal life grows indescribably dull, is sensed on every page. One is amazed that the pen of More, noted for its spirited wit, did not drop from his hand from sheer tediousness. At one point, however, a breach in his system lends color and variety to the monotony of the city. An innocent competition exists between the different streets in the growing of gardens. People are required to move every 10 years, however, so they will not become too much attached to them. Of course, the abolition of ownership not only leads to an equalization of existence but also to the disfigurement of life. Everything must be as sober as possible; every ornament leads to the desire for property. In return More contends that in Utopia everything is directed to the maintenance and the development of a free _spiritual_ life.

More's abolition of private ownership differs from Plato's at one point. Family life remains intact in Utopia. Married sons and their wives live with their parents and are governed by their father. If the family becomes too big, the sons establish a new family life for themselves. In this difference the influence of Christianity upon More is discerned.

Another very important difference discloses that Plato's sense of reality is greater than More's. Both would have a central government and regimentation of society. In More it is directed by an administration elected by the people. But while Plato introduces diverse means of maintaining the public order against revolution, the citizens of Utopia evidently do not need policing and the ruses of a ruler, but adapt themselves to the order of non-ownership and promote it by their conduct. What Plato, in his age of decay, sensed of the sinful human heart is lost in More. There is a clear humanistic trend in the latter's thinking. Whoever lives according to his nature as required by God, lives virtuously. Nature is untouched; disturbance in life has come through private ownership.

Many utopians, including those in socialistic circles, harbor the thought that the abolition of private ownership conforms to the situation in the first Christian church (Acts 4 and 5). Whatever may
have been the character and wonderous beauty of that communal
life, it differs greatly from any proposed utopia in that the Christian
abolition of private ownership was not the result of measures taken
by the apostles. Each of the first Christians decided for himself.
They acted not from prescription but from a converted, liberated
heart. Anyone like Ananias who wished to keep part of his possessions
in reserve was free to do so. Ananias and Sapphira were not punished
because they cooperated only in part, but because, by lying, they
denied their conversion and did damage to the church. An enormous
difference exists between communistic utopias and the Christian idea
of fellowship. The former is an attempt at a social justice, legally en-
forced and centrally organized. The latter urges personal action ac-
cording to the command of love. The artificial measure of equalization
is superfluous in a truly Christian fellowship; attention is paid to
those in need, not to those who have plenty. And if, as in the case
of the first church, the intensity of faith diminishes, succumbing to
routine and the temptation of possessions, then nothing of the pristine
glory can be restored by prescribing an organization of common
ownership. Such an artificial measure even cuts off the very source
out of which Christian love might arise.

But let us return to More’s island. On this island the food supply
comes mainly from farms, each manned by forty persons. Each year
twenty people are shifted to the city to make place for twenty others.
This prescribed regulation is elastic; if some wish to stay longer, they
may do so. In the city everyone is taught a trade. A working day
calls for six hours of work preceded by lectures, which, although
non-compulsory, are heard gladly. In Utopia the University extension
classes are eagerly attended by the people. Sport follows the working
hours. That the day of actual work can be so short is possible because
of modest demands and because Utopia contains no rich men, priests,
or beggars and the like, who either waste their time or spend it
without benefit to the community. Everyone is obliged to work.

More’s division of labor and his classes of society correspond in
some respects to that of Plato. Utopia has three classes, the highest of
which is the scholarly class, from which the rulers are chosen. Those
who may devote themselves to study are selected from the people
during their early education. Everyone else belongs to the second
class, viz., artisans. The artisans are skilled workers capable of toiling
in the factory and on the farm. A separate warrior class does not exist;
internal harmony is certain among these noble folk, and in case of
external invasion every citizen must stand ready.
Finally, there is the slave caste, recruited from criminals and foreigners condemned to death in their own country who fled to Utopia. The slaves must perform the mean tasks, e.g., those in the dining halls and on the farms.

The citizenry of Utopia go to war to defend their own territory, or to aid allies against attack, or to free a people from tyranny. War is not desired. If possible, the citizens of Utopia seek to incur the favor of other nations who might furnish mercenaries. Great rewards are promised for the destruction or capture of a hostile king.

Ample freedom is allowed in matters of religion. In addition to rational philosophy, several principles are universally accepted. Faith in these principles is based upon their rational proof. They include: faith in God, in the immortal soul, in the reward of virtues and good deeds, and in the punishment of evil. Many religions exist from which one is free to choose.

When the narrator and his comrades tell the inhabitants about Christ, many are converted; especially upon learning that Christ would abolish private property. Those embracing Christianity are unmolested. However, one Christian is punished with banishment when through a lack of wisdom he begins to preach that the Christian religion excels all others. For this is giving evidence that he despises and condemns all other religions and calls their adherents, godless, satanic, children of eternal damnation. Such despicable conduct conflicts with the precept of gentle persuasion and abstention from unpleasant and inflammatory words.

Surprisingly enough, this exile simply shared the opinion of men like Elijah, Jeremiah, and Paul; even of Jesus himself. More no longer understood God's displeasure when His worship is forsaken and other gods are served. He had yielded to the humanistic conception of toleration. The relativity of humanistic "tolerance" has since become more and more evident in its discrimination against those unwilling to bow to reason, or to its heir and competitor, positive science; in brief, against those unwilling to pay homage to the sovereignty and nobility of the human spirit.

To do More full justice, it must not remain unsaid that, after the conclusion of the story, he expresses some reservations regarding certain laws and religions in Utopia. He is equally reserved in his judgment of the importance of what the inhabitants had to give up, especially the beauty of life. But the narrator was so weary that More did not persist in his questioning!

More has undoubtedly been deeply affected by the misery of the
poor and the luxury of the rich. With great courage he has exposed
the injustices caused by this contrast and the practices of the rich.
In his narrative he points out that it is pride, deeply rooted in the
human heart, which keeps man from the right way of life. The narrator
concludes, however, that such ineradicable pride has been uprooted
in Utopia by the abolition of private property and money, which
otherwise often enable some to enrich themselves and to render their
wealth secure under the guise of promoting the general welfare. It is
clear that, according to More, ownership is the source of misery, but
by a dexterous literary maneuver at the end of the narrator’s story,
he succeeds in arousing doubt as to whether or not he really believes
that the abolition of ownership would solve all the difficulties in
question.

“New Atlantis"

A full hundred years after Utopia, the New Atlantis written by Francis
Bacon (1561–1626) was published in an incomplete form after his
death. Like More, Bacon played an active part in political life. He
was adviser of Essex during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, but
deserted him when Essex incurred Elizabeth’s disfavor. Bacon became
Lord Chancellor under King James. Charged with bribery, he was
later deprived of this office. He certainly was not a man of high
standing like More. In his publications, concerned especially with the
rise of natural science, he assumed a tone of condescension toward
men of great learning, an attitude not warranted by the value of his
own achievements. His work in the field of natural science was highly
esteemed for a very long time; close investigation, however, would
seem to indicate a weakness in criticism and a failure to enrich natural
science with positive results. In spite of his shortcomings, Dijksterhuis,
for example, believes that Bacon’s style and his introduction of the
new inductive method in natural science insures him a prominent
position as one of the leading figures at the beginning of modern
natural science.9

Bacon, enthusiastic in his hopes for science, emphasized its application
in technique. A quick survey of his New Atlantis 10 is therefore of
interest to us. A remarkable feature of this Utopia is that Bacon views
the practical application of a science, based solely on facts and devoid
of all speculations, as the means to deliver humanity from its troubles
and miseries. What is significant is not so much the fact that Bacon
does not sufficiently distinguish technique from science. The error
that technique is really nothing more than applied science is still often encountered in our day. Nor is it of great importance that the method he proposed apparently could not be followed. What interests us most is that Bacon's idea of the role of science expressed at such an early date the ideal which has since controlled people's minds. Also in our century, although abandoning its lofty ideals, both the learned scientists and the mass of the people adhere to this idea either as a program or as the basis of their hopes.

But let us return to Bacon's *New Atlantis*. A ship in danger of being wrecked on the Pacific Ocean reaches an unknown island. Its seamen are cordially received by the inhabitants who by making the sign of the cross reveal that they are Christians. After an initial objection is overcome, the shipwrecked party are allowed to recover from their misfortune. The inhabitants appear to be extremely sympathetic and humane, for the writer takes great pains to emphasize how noble and uncorrupted these people are. The perfection of their purity makes life on the island idyllic. Bacon differs from More in that he is less concerned that the basis of his ideal community be its organization. He then goes on to tell that twenty years after the ascension of Christ, a shining cross is seen in the sea by the inhabitants of his island. One of the wise men of the house of Solomon (around which the entire story turns), when investigating the cross, receives a book containing the Old and the New Testament, and a letter, promising the inhabitants of the island peace and goodwill from God and Christ. Bacon intends this to indicate a reward for the exalted way of life upon the island, thereby showing how closely Christianity and humanism are interwoven in his thought.

The mode of life on the island is the fruit of the administration of a wise king who saw to it that the happy life-in-common he had instituted would remain permanently. His most important creation is the house of Solomon, the eye of the kingdom. Through the labor of this house, living conditions are improved, and communal life is freed of its defects. Nothing is left to chance; everything is examined systematically. The results of such investigation serve as a basis for further action and as a means of enlarging human dominion.

Some scholars visit foreign lands to assemble the results of science; others collect experiments from books; some investigate and gather all the mechanical experiments and practices that may be useful; others engage in performing new experiments. Another group tabulates the results collected (Bacon's method of classification), so that axioms may be established. Next come those who seek a practical application for such axioms. Other scholars draft new and higher experiments,
and still others apply them. To the latter group belong those who formulate from the tabulations, axioms and insights into nature. The inductive method of Bacon — the collecting and listing of empirical data with the expectation that they will ultimately disclose natural laws — is a form of positivism which is apparently not of practical use. But this point is not directly concerned with our subject, nor are we directly interested in the survey of the surprising number of inventions made in the different departments of the house of Solomon: incubators, submarines, flying machines, preserving apparatus, "paradisewater", which lengthens the span of life; rooms with an artificial atmosphere for the sick (like an oxygen tent), installations for sound and light, telescopes, microscopes, condensed food, apparatuses for perpetual motion, and devices for sense delusion. For a long time Bacon was regarded as the prophet of applied science. Cohen has pointed out, however, that many of these inventions had already been put into use by the Dutchman, Drebbel, who was at the court of James I at the same time as Bacon. Cohen supposes that Bacon did not publish his book because he feared his plagiarism would be discovered. Such details are of interest in themselves. For our purpose, however, Bacon's significance lies in the fact that the center of his ideal community contains a house of science and technique, a laboratory, a bureau of planning, and a workshop. Upon this complex scheme was built his hope of a perfect society.

With the increasing success of science in the succeeding centuries, the inclination grew stronger to realize this utopia in practical life. On the eve of the French revolution the antithesis between the scientific ideal concerning the anticipation of the future and the Christian faith, an antithesis already present in the utopias discussed, was accentuated and consciously pushed to the fore. However, faith in an omnipotent science did not find undivided support within the camp of humanism. Rousseau (1712–1778) emphatically denied that it is wholesome for humanity, and pointed the way back to the freedom of nature.

These two currents of opinion concerning science re-occur after the French revolution in the so-called utopian forerunners of socialism, who, taking as their starting point the free human personality, strive to reorganize the existing iniquitous society. Orthodox Christian elements are increasingly eliminated from their past unnatural union with humanism. The utopian Saint Simon (1760–1825) declared that dogmatic Christianity must give way to a social Christianity. Others even turn openly against Christianity. In addition to this clarification
of the humanistic view point, the utopians of the nineteenth century
revive the idea already cherished by More that private ownership
is the root of all evil and a new community must be based on the organization
of labor and the promotion of the ideal of community. Moreover, industry, the new factor in culture, now began to play a great rôle in
utopian thinking. Industry put the scientific ideal into practice; it
guaranteed a steady progress through technique. St. Simon thought
that the war-state had to give way to the industrial-state.

Fourier (1772–1837) would so organize the new community that
man will be brought closer to nature with more liberty to develop
and to satisfy his passions and impulses. Labor can thus become a
pleasure. He planned the organization of fellowships of 1600 people
or phalanxes, whose members would, among other things, be free to
choose the order of the day. For a long time Fourier waited in vain
each day, between 12 and 1 o’clock, for a millionaire who would
supply the means to bring his scheme into practice.

The Englishman Owen (1771–1858) had more possibilities. A
wealthy manufacturer, impressed with the fact that the machine
robbed the workman of his wages, Owen zealously supported the
plans of Fourier by establishing in 1820 a socialistic community in
England. This scheme miscarried, as did his experiment in America in
1825. The name “socialist” was first applied to his followers in 1827.
Another utopian schemer was the Frenchman Cabot (1788–1856)
who followed in the footsteps of More, Rousseau, and Owen. On
his initiative a communistic fellowship was founded in America which
continued to exist until the year 1895.

These utopians were succeeded by the scientific socialists. The
latter sought to replace fantasy about the future society by
scientific evidence. Proudhon (1809–1865) directed his critique at
private ownership: “Ownership is theft.” He felt society ought to
realize an equality of rights; authority and centralization should dis-
appear. Proudhon directly opposes the idea of a centrally organized
ideal society; he ends in anarchistic individualism.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) sought to base socialism on sound scientific
research, so that it might be convincing to the masses. Two points
are of particular interest: his theory of class-struggle and his scien-
tific proof of the necessary liquidation of the existing social order by
revolution, after which arises the socialistically organized ideal com-

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direction to their thought and action. The antithesis between utopians and Marx is not that the former were motivated by a belief in a creation of their fantasy, whereas Marx bases his starting point exclusively on the certainty of positive science. Far from it, for even Marx was driven on by a faith in his ideals; his so-called scientific proof of the development of society was simply an investigation of selected facts, seen through glasses colored by his socialistic faith (in the revolution and in the ideal community). For this reason, Sorel is later able to degrade the faith in the revolution and in the ideal community to an inspiring myth.\textsuperscript{12}

Marx's enmity against Christianity and against all other religions, as the opiate of the people for which science is the cure, is plainly evident. On this point he joins the spirit of his age, in which the negation of Christianity progresses ever further. From the Middle Ages on, the authority of the church has decreased, and the authority of science has increased.\textsuperscript{13}

"Looking backward"

Let us now examine another utopia, portrayed in Bellamy's (1850—1898) \textit{Looking Backward}, written in 1887 on the eve of the twentieth century. A best seller, with a quick sale of a million copies, this novel gave impetus to the establishment of many societies that sought to put its ideas into operation.

As his predecessors, Bellamy, a man who saw affliction, was deeply moved by the social misery he observed. We must keep this in mind when judging his picture of the future. With Jeremiah, who also saw and suffered affliction, Bellamy knows that such is brought about by man. But he finds the cause of man's wrongdoing in the wrong structure of society, whereas Jeremiah cried out, “But what is a living man troubled? Trouble over your own sin.”

\textit{Bellamy} does not understand the words of Jeremiah. Therefore, what \textit{Bellamy} regards as misery is only the social consequence of true misery; and not even that, for social misery is for him mainly material want. \textit{Bellamy} fares like all utopians and socialists. He blocks his exits on all sides. Misery in the true sense of the word he does not know, he does not see its real cause, and he has no perspective. For when Jeremiah speaks of the relationship between misery and sin he knows that God is enthroned above misery. The rod of the wrath of God is encountered in misery. But God's wrath includes his mercy. “It is of the Lord's mercies that we are not consumed, because his compassions fail not.” Jeremiah does not hope in the reconstruction
of society, seeking consolation in the acts of the mighty and compassionate of this earth; his comfort is expressed in such words: “To crush under his feet all the prisoners of the earth; to turn aside the right of a man before the face of the most High; to subvert a man in his cause; doth not the Lord behold?” (Lamentations 3:31-37).

The false prophet Bellamy never considers such matters as he walks through the streets of the year 2000. Bellamy did not need to consider man's sin, God's providence and mercy to create his future candybar-society. What does his future hold in store? Bellamy's illustration to stress the difference is intriguing. Formerly a man had his own umbrella; the rain ran down his neighbor's neck, but the new society has one umbrella for all: huge rain-shields are put over the sidewalks.

The formation of such an altruistic society, however, requires collectivization, to which end central planning and central social control is necessary. This is the regularly recurring theme of the novel.

Let us first see how Bellamy landed in the year 2000. Like his predecessors, he painstakingly connects his fantasy with a realistic setting. In the Boston of 1887, the narrator, a man of means called West, impatiently awaits the completion of his house, so that he can be married. A series of strikes, then quite common, force postponement. One evening while he is asleep in temporary quarters in the basement, the house burns down over his head. The existence of his retreat is not known; its isolation keeps West alive until the year 2000 when he is revived by a Dr. Leete. West is compelled to believe the doctor's account on beholding the wholly new city of Boston, whose architecture is of wondrous beauty, a city with huge buildings of magnificent form; with spacious squares, provided with beautiful trees, fountains, and statues; and houses built in groups, without smoke or chimney.

Dr. Leete's beautiful daughter is the great-granddaughter of his fiancee of 1887. Their subsequent romance is, therefore, morally proper, a question of some concern in Bellamy's day, since when he holds her in his arms, he feels that he is also embracing his former fiancee. The conclusion of the novel is somewhat complicated. West is again transplanted to his old house. His old acquaintances become disturbed, however, when he tries to convince them of their fearful social maladjustment and of the need of reform. But then he awakes anew in the year 2000; his visit to 1887 appears to have been a dream, possibly because Bellamy wants to convince the reader of his confidence in the new society. So much for the plot. What does it mean?

The great change in the year 2000 arises because everyone now
serves the community as previously only the military had done. The former organization of the army has now been replaced by the organization of the community for labor.

The new development has unfolded spontaneously from the Society of 1887 (an imitation of Marx). Trade and industry have grown to ever greater units, accompanied by greater prosperity and security because of the concentration of organization and control. The next logical step that followed was the nationalization of capital, trade, industry, and labor. At last the axiom was recognized that the bigger the enterprise, the simpler the principles of its operation. As the machine is more reliable than the hand, a system employed in a big concern brings better results than the foreman’s eye in a small enterprise.

Bellamy has clearly stated the issues involved in socialistic ideals: a state organized and modelled after big business; the abrogation of any distinction between economic and political life; the amalgamation of both; and the organized substitution of a scientific impersonal system instead of a personal relation. We shall subsequently discuss the serious errors committed here.

West shrewdly asks whether human nature must be changed to be fit for the new fellowship. He receives the socialist’s answer that human motives will automatically adapt to the modified conditions of living.

The new society has banished all war, class-struggle, barter, competition, money, wages, crises, burden of taxation, political parties, politicians, prisons, lying, human bestiality and charities, as well as all worries. At its center stands the community, the all-directing magnet to which man’s life is devoted. In exchange for his loyalty to the service of this community man is guaranteed a good life. Nobody need have any care for tomorrow; everything needed is provided by the state from the cradle to the grave, food, education, comforts, work, etc. To attain this ideal; labor and life must be collectivized; therefore labor must be under discipline, wages equalized, and production and distribution centrally regimented. The community is served by labor, especially industrial labor, since to the socialist, production is the pivot of society. Labor is compulsory between the ages of 21 to 45, after which a person is retired. Everyone is at liberty to choose his own vocation, but overemployment is prevented by a central directory regulating the attractions and the burdens of every occupation, thereby insuring good employment everywhere.

Since man is no longer merely a commodity, the equal reward of labor is regarded as the restoration of its dignity. But Bellamy understands the need of incentives. They are provided by a division
into classes, accompanied by the bestowing of honors on those promoted. Everyone must start at the bottom. The first class consists of unskilled laborers; the second, of apprentices; the third of full-fledged workers — subdivided into six groups; the fourth, of officers of many ranks, from the lowest to the highest office of the president of the state, the chief of the industrial army. The rank of the officers is made attractive by some special privileges and exemptions from discipline.

Every promotion in class or rank is granted by superiors, exclusively on the basis of a person's qualifications for the job. Elections are held only for the highest ranks, namely, from a generalship over an industrial group, up to the presidency. And only those pensioned have the right to vote.

A planning bureau draws up a production plan on the basis of the probable demand. The price of each product is fixed according to the amount of labor expended upon it (Marx). Business is entirely eliminated from the distribution of articles. Everything is systematically arranged in warehouses with prices neatly marked; everyone can get what he wants simply by recording the cost on a credit card. No one needs to have savings; the state saves for all. And no one inherits anything; everyone has enough. Since the very idea of ownership has disappeared, a surplus is a mere bother.

Unlike the state of More, a rich variety is now shown in dress, in homes, and the like. The sober moderation, so essential for the establishment of More's community, has been replaced by prosperity and luxury, the essence of the new social order. The social prosperity because of technique enables Bellamy to think of an abundance of which More could not even conceive. The gradual increase in the appreciation of the value of material prosperity has its counterpart in the decreasing regard for things spiritual.

In spite of the equalization of wages because of technique, Bellamy deems it possible to retain diversity in the mode of living. Moreover he wants to keep family life intact. Nevertheless, the trend toward collectivization is also manifest outside of the sphere of labor. To save extra work at home, meals are generally taken in a public eating place where everyone has a private room. An effort is made to furnish lavishly the club houses of the labor union; so homes need only the bare necessities.

The women work in the same way as the men; however, they usually work at a different task and for fewer hours if married and with children. Women are organized separately. They are regarded on a basis of equality with the men, without thereby eradicating es-
sentential differences. Since money is no longer important, and cares do not exist, marriages are concluded exclusively on the basis of love, viewed as a service to the community and to posterity. Thus the law of sexual selection now begins to operate for the first time: the best are most desired and the lazy are left. As a result, the race clearly discloses decided physical, spiritual, and moral improvements.

In contrast to Marx, Bellamy wants to restore religion to a position of honor. West listens to a sermon in the year 2000, not in the church, but at home on the telephone; a method apparently regarded by Bellamy as a technical and economic improvement in the life of the church. He regards, as a matter of course, the church as the brotherhood of all mankind. At any rate, the man of the year 2000 certainly has everything near at hand.

The theme of the sermon is progress. A world of poverty, filth, fraud and injustice, directed by the motive of self-interest, has now become a world of wealth, justice and love in which devotion to the community reigns. The miserable creatures of the nineteenth century despised their Creator; it is now very easy to believe in the fatherhood of God. This development has been brought about by a change in social conditions, wrought by the greatest and most peaceable revolution ever to create a social order worthy of rational human beings. "For the first time since the creation, every man raised himself upright before God". For the first time in history the human race began to realize the ideal that God had intended for it. Every generation must now advance a step farther until its final consummation, individually in death, or as a race in the completion of evolution. (Unfortunately, death strikes a discord in the human symphony. And thirty years after Bellamy it has become a principal theme.) "The long and weary winter of the race is ended. Its summer has begun. Humanity has burst the chrysalis. The heavens are before us".

Here is a humanistic creed that has passed through Marx and Darwin. Man walks erect before God on the march to heaven, attaining at last what God had hoped for him!

Opposing faiths here confront each other. Will man be redeemed by historical development, culminating in the social liberation of his human nature; or was his redemption accomplished in the darkest hours of history, in the most horrible misery experienced on the cross of Golgotha? And was He who hung there offensively and hideously bleeding to death right in saying, "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life. No one cometh to the Father but by me" (John 14:6)? Or with Bellamy can we by-pass Christ, believing that humanity is itself the way to truth and life? This is the great antithesis in Western culture!
The paths of Christianity and humanism diverge as the way to life and the way to death.

The entire novel is based upon Bellamy's humanistic faith. He pictures a community — not mentioning its indescribable dullness — beaming with wealth and basking in the sunlight of love, peace, justice, and beneficence. Its prevailing discipline is not even felt because of a readiness to sacrifice for the community. Everyone is free to use the press and the novel to give such advice as he may wish. What is not good will disappear of its own accord; people will reject it. The equality of the communal life is no hindrance to freedom; on the contrary, it creates the very sphere in which freedom can flourish.

It fits like a glove, on one condition: that man is not the sinner the Bible takes him for. The Bible teaches that all are under sin; there is none that doeth good, no not one. And the root of sin is that men do not seek God in the way prescribed: "This is sin, that they do not believe in me", Christ says. (Cf. Ps. 14:3; Rom. 3:10; John 16:9.)

The truth of sin and grace is the Achilles heel of all utopias, from More to Bellamy. They suffer shipwreck at their very launching. That is the lesson which we can even now draw from the twentieth century. For men are busy putting socialistic ideals into practice with varying degrees of haste. The utopia of Bellamy is the last gasp of a confidence, cherished for centuries, that the time will come when man will redeem the world. It is like the happy ending of a flowery, filmed fantasy. But the doors of the theatre are opened, and outside the rain drizzles in a dusky street. While Bellamy was dreaming within, a man, Nietzsche, stood in the drizzling rain, prophesying the decadence of Europe's culture. Nietzsche beheld the flame of life growing dim, the cancerous growth of disillusionment and melancholy. And Nietzsche knew that nihilism was about to crash the gate of our civilization, "Whence comes this most terrifying guest?" Yes, that is a very good question!

*The twentieth century*

What could be more surprising than the radical change in the attitude displayed since the turn of the century in novels about the future? The novelists still note the same structural change and the same characteristics of society: technique and science; the formation of a community with its collectivization, equalization, planning, and discipline. But whereas formerly all this was represented as a glorious perspective, it now signifies a dull ominous future.

This cultural phenomenon does not stand alone. It reflects the revolutionary tendency in humanism to fall into extremes. A change
of attitude is now expressed among those interested in political and social life. Burnham, for example, agrees with Bellamy's prediction concerning the structure of the coming society. But while the latter awaits the abrogation of the class struggle and the realization of freedom, Burnham expects a society composed of new classes, a society of managers, in which there will be no freedom.

The first reason for the present change is that the utopian dream is being realized. And as a result the hopes and dreams of many have ended in bitter disillusionment. They observe regression instead of progress, disintegration instead of evolution, constraint instead of liberation. But nothing else was to be expected from an endeavor that did not originate in Christ, the sole source of life.

A second cause, more or less connected with the first, is that humanists began to see that man is not so humane, even under favorable circumstances, and certainly not when he acquires great power over others; one of the most significant consequences of regimented collectivization. Men learned to know the beast in man. Even worse than that, in man they met the mad desire for power, the egoist, the barbarian, the hater, the deceiver, the faithless: briefly, man, the sinner, not because of circumstances (conditions had improved), but because of his nature, his heart. It was a dreary discovery. Few have dared to face the consequences by pointing not only to others, especially those in power, but also to themselves.

Nietzsche dared! Man is a beast of prey ruled by the will to power. No other values exist except such as man proposes to himself to serve his struggle for power. All else is a priestly lie, the fabrication of moralists.

It should be fully realized what this implies. Hitherto humanism had wanted to build a future ignoring sin. And in so doing it did not need redemption through Christ. Nietzsche would build a future with sin as its foundation, a future based upon the most violent antithesis to the cross of Christ.

Only a few expressed such a nihilistic tour de force regarding the evil in life. But the reality of the power of that evil was generally noted. The first Adam was now beheld in the blackest light, without stepping over into the white light of the second Adam. As a result a fundamental pessimism and a brutal cynicism gained the upper hand. And this is what strikes us in the reversed perverted utopians of the twentieth century.

There is yet a third cause of the change in climate, likewise related to the realization of socialistic ideals since the first world war. Cultural ardor and elan have been lost. There were spiritual reasons for this
change. Nietzsche already pointed to the decadence of our culture in this sense. And Bergson wrote as a countermovement a philosophy about the \textit{élan-vital} — a vital enthusiasm. Bearing in mind that restraining influences are present in the spiritual decadence and the realization of socialism, we must realize that both spheres stimulate each other. This interrelation is manifest in the decadent practice of substituting the man \textit{willing} to bear \textit{responsibility} and to take \textit{risks} by the man who insists on \textit{security} and \textit{delegates} his \textit{responsibility}. Such a tendency is easily recognized in Bellamy's utopia. The significance of this fact is that the authors of utopias and their practical followers have misunderstood not only man's corruption but also the \textit{positive} meaning of his earthly existence. Such is the reason why the reader of utopias becomes so thoroughly bored.

We shall now devote ourselves to the hopelessly pessimistic utopias of our century, utopias as somber as a tomb over which the words \textit{Dante} placed over the entrance to hell might well be written: "Abandon all hope, all ye that enter here."

Only eight years after Bellamy, H. G. Wells wrote a perverted utopia: \textit{The Time Machine}. The latter is of interest to us because it deals with the struggle for certainty and yet portrays a future society quite opposite from the others. Wells writes of a "time machine" which can move about in history and the future as a flying machine moves in space. Its inventor travels 8000 centuries into the future where he meets two sorts of people. The first live above ground, cute, delicate little creatures with intellects of five-year olds. They are very indolent, with fleeting interest, and readily tired. Dressed alike, by day they play a little in the sun, eating fruit and picking flowers. At night they sleep together in big delapidated buildings bearing witness to a brilliant culture of long ago.

This nightly banding together is not without reason, for \textit{fear} is not banished.

The second kind of people are small, light-shy, monkey-like creatures that dwell underground, where they operate machinery and manufacture clothing for the little folks of light. But at night, they try to steal the latter to still their own hunger. Thus developed the fear of the people of light for the people of the darkness.

The first class of the people are the product of the organization of the community in the service of security. The security and the comfort obtained eventually rendered men lazy and they degenerated spiritually and physically. The organization had automatically provided for every need. The triumph of technique and science over nature became one triumph, over nature and \textit{man}. 
The most important trait of the security of existence in the new well balanced society, namely, its stability, could not be maintained in the long run. Originally, the privileged aristocrats ruled over the mechanical slaves who operated the machinery of the underground organization. The degeneration of both from different causes, and, therefore, with different effects, resulted in the slaves growing so powerful that at last the aristocrats, unable to control them, found their sole protection in the daylight.

The same theme is worked out differently by Forster in his Celestial Omnibus, the ironic thesis of which is that the greatest security is found in life below the earth's surface. Thus free of the caprices of nature man can control air, light, sound, temperature, and the like. The inhabitants of Forster's utopia dwell under ground. Only banished criminals and displaced persons live above ground. Forster, writing somewhat later than Wells, has better technical means at his disposal: modern facilities of communication for sound and light. Every person can live shut off in his own room. By pressing buttons every desire can be fulfilled: A lecture or panel discussion can be heard; he can be “isolated” in privacy with someone from another hemisphere and converse with him face to face; have automatic medical examination, order food, and so on. The environment of everyone is exactly equal; people have nothing to do but listen to lectures and music, or originate their own ideas, the possession of which is just about the highest attainable happiness. Bodily and physical contact with another person is shunned as an abomination.

Forster is important in that he brings a new element into the game: The machine which rules the organization of the community. All security stands and falls with the machine; it regulates everything and is honored as a deity. Everyone has a handbook giving instruction in its use. The central direction rests in the hands of a committee which draws up the instructions by which everybody must abide. Even procreation is accurately directed.

The message of our writer really is: man created the machine as his slave but is no longer its master. People are dying; the machine is the only live being. This interesting aspect of the communal formation will occupy us again.

The story ends with a panic as the machine gradually begins to slow down, leading ultimately to the annihilation of “civilized” humanity.

Other aspects of the society of the future stand out in bold relief against the framework of collectivization and central communal
control. Recall the red horse of Revelation 6:4, the horse that trots through history taking peace from the earth; think also of the beast arising out of the earth (Rev. 13:14), that deceives them that dwell thereon; think of tyranny (Rev. 13:16, 17). Such aspects were known even to Plato; but today they threaten to overwhelm us in a more terrible form.

Orwell's imaginary society embodying this idea is found in a novel to be discussed. However we must first consider a novel by Huxley, in which another phenomenon, a very important aspect of science and technique in a modern controlled society, is thrown into perspective.

It is not superfluous to mention the obscenity of both writers. The raw and sensuous treatment of delicate and chaste themes makes the reader feel defiled in the reading. This also is a sign of the times.

When all norms have been lost a writer can no longer discriminate between what and how he may and may not describe. Most modern novels suffer from this fault. It is remarkable how such lack of discrimination complicates the life of modern man. The same author, Huxley, who would sometimes entertain us with a display of such sensualities, elsewhere expresses his disapproval of the fact saying that the essence of modern life is its shamelessness.

"The Brave New World"

Written by Huxley in 1932, this novel deals ironically with the technical scientific control of the community of the future, especially of man, the one factor of greatest menace to control. The problem of man in collectivization was known to Plato. Huxley mocks the very ideal of science: that man can control man if birth, education, and environment are regulated. Both Huxley and Orwell characteristically seek to avoid any moral judgment in their parody of the future; for the most part they are successful.

The story begins with a conducted tour through the Brood- and Conditioning Center, on whose gable is blazoned the motto of the new world state: Community, Identity, Stability. Children are here manufactured by artificial impregnation and control of the growth of the cells. Through the treatment of the cells, control of the environment, mechanical manipulations and chemical reaction, the final product is produced. Disease is eliminated — the bodies maintain a stability until people die quite suddenly — and most cells are rendered sterile, since fertility is only a bother; a small number of people suffice for planned reproduction.
Humanity can, therefore, be divided into five accurately controlled varieties: the Alphas, Betas, Gammas, Deltas and Epsilons. Such a division is necessary since an experiment performed exclusively with Alphas (the highest variety) revealed that such a community rapidly degenerates and is given to strikes and riots.

The Bokanovsky-process, which by dividing a single cell is able to produce ninety-six entirely identical people, is important for the control and for social stability — a brilliant achievement for the benefit of the planned operation of identical machines, and all kind of routine work. This process, however, is not applied to the Alpha and the Beta types. Additional special treatment adapts the product, e.g., to tropical work, rocket-aviation, and labor in a crematorium.

Every bottle containing an ovum is so labeled after treatment that all information of social importance is recorded.

A child's education is taken in hand immediately after its formation. Delta children, for example, must learn not to be interested in books and nature. As infants, therefore, they are allowed to enter a room filled with beautiful books and flowers, but as they creep toward the colored objects, explosions and sirens burst forth, and the babies receive a shock through the floor. Thus the Deltas are taught to shun literature and nature.

Less radical, but very effective, is the method of the head-telephone under the pillow. As soon as they can comprehend words, all children get never-to-be-forgotten-lessons in their sleep. Such lessons consist of a continual repetition of the rules of life which serve as axioms for their type. Everyone is educated and placed in a surrounding compatible with his hereditary disposition. Here is a sample lesson oft repeated for the Betas: “Alpha-children wear gray. They work much harder than we do, because they are so frightfully clever. I am really awfully glad I am a Beta, because I don’t work so hard. And then, we are much better than the Gammas and Deltas. Gammas are stupid. They all wear green, and Delta-children wear khaki. Oh no, I don’t want to play with the Delta-children. And Epsilons are still worse.” And then over again.

A few more sample slogans, “I do love flying,” “Ending is better than mending.” “The more stitches the less riches.” “Do not put off till tomorrow the fun you can have today” (this slogan concerns sexual intercourse). “When the individual feels, the community reels.” “Everyone belongs to everyone else”. “Civilization is sterilization”. “Was and will make me ill; I take a gramme and only am.” (A gram of “soma” is meant here, of which we shall speak later.)

Everybody gets what he needs; all are grateful; good, happy and
obedient people are produced. The secret of happiness is to like what one has to do and not to do what one likes. Happiness and stability are thus obtained simultaneously.

Civilization is impossible without social stabilization. Stability is menaced by a feeling of strength (e.g., feeling that one is individually able to withstand various dangers), by a desire for independence, and by the possession of emotions. To seek solitude is punishable. One must feel at home in the crowd. Family life is a danger and hence abolished. To speak of a father or a mother is so unbecoming that it makes people blush. An enduring union between the sexes is not allowed. Communal ethics require a continual change of partners. Everyone belongs to everyone else.

A feeling for the communal way of life is promoted by “solidarity-services” in which six members of each sex are aroused to a state of ecstasy by the playing of selected music, a state that reaches its “communal” culmination in a sexual orgy.

A longing for “thrills”, e.g., for rage or fear, naturally remains. Such are supplied by a medicine that arouses the emotions, permitting them to be experienced while avoiding the inconvenience of their results.

Very important is the regular dosage of “soma,” a means against emotion; it operates by exciting a pleasant spree; or when administered in small doses, it results in a temporary numbing. Free time, weekends, and vacations are thus regulated and enlivened.

Of interest in this connection are the metal knobs on every fauteuil in a theatre which when grasped produce a sensation in harmony with the film.

For the Alphas at least, thanks to technique, life is very luxurious. Every Alpha has his own helicopter for short distances. Leisure time is spent in sport, theaters, and restaurants. There are such a great number of amusements to choose from that nobody need come to himself.

Any semblance of initiative endangers social stability, which is to be preferred above everything else. In the past a choice had to be made between annihilation or world-regulation. Such regulation is assured solely by a stable system. Even art must be sacrificed for the happiness of humanity.

Every change endangers stability. Even science is a danger, since every new discovery has practical consequences. The appearance of science is saved but it is only a pragmatic illusion. No one acquires more knowledge than is needed for his work.

One of the world rulers, for whom the truth is reserved, is of the
opinion that God exists, but manifests Himself in society only by his absence. A choice had to be made: “God is not compatible with machinery, scientific medicine and universal happiness.”

The masses of course cannot do without religion. The deity, in harmony with the new age, is Henry Ford. His model-T is its religious symbol, a convenient symbol, obtainable by merely removing the upper portion from crosses.

The story in which the new society is described furnishes additional information. It is worth repeating. As an ovum, one of the Alphas presumably had a wrong dose of alcohol so that he falls outside the general pattern. Such a condition is dangerous; he feels lonesome and alone. Permission is granted to him to investigate a reservation where savages in a natural state, live behind high tension wire. One savage is of “civilized” parentage and, therefore, shunned by the dwellers of the reservation. Our Alpha-man therefore feels quickly drawn to this particular savage, who is then removed from the reserve as a curiosity. So the reader witnesses the reactions of a freedom loving man to the life of socialized people. Of course, no one can comprehend his preference for danger, tension, adventure, self-denial and anticipation. Pursued by reporters, cameras, and microphones, the lover of freedom concludes that only suicide offers escape from the “community.”

Some readers may shrug their shoulders at the grotesque exaggeration of Huxley. Will it ever be possible to so control procreation and the life of man? I believe not. That which is wholly unique in man, his sense of freedom, his awareness of standards, his faith in perspectives, overthrows the scientific trammels. Nevertheless, do not take Huxley’s constructions too lightly. Granted that they exaggerate, the question remains as to whether or not such attempts at the control of man in the future may assume huge proportions and dangerous forms. By a simple operation on the brain it is even now possible to render a person passive and to produce moral degeneration. Only the future knows whether electrical processes can produce a more subtle interference in the brain cells forming the basis of memory and thought so as to determine and influence its content.

But, apart from such considerations, to share a totalitarian society man need only be controlled in a social sense, as a social puppet. In a concentration camp such occurs with little effort, even in the case of very strong personalities. It is much more readily attainable with the normless, passive man of the masses, who lives by the day. Such a one is without faith; he shuns freedom; all he needs is the security that the social system will not leave him in the lurch. Today there
are not a few such people; in the days of the Antichrist, the world will be full of them. The first point I would make about Huxley’s novel is therefore that the control of man, in a social sense, with the help of science, is not a mere fantasy.

The second is that not a few clever men actually believe in such a powerful science. They do not think of the consequences, because their interests are not totalitarian but of a purely specialized kind. They are aware of the unlimited potentialities of their special skills and undoubtedly have only the best intentions. On the other hand they are in fact often deeply indignant and perturbed over the way dictators employ science to make life a hell. Huxley has simply confronted such dangerous naive souls with the consequences of their own work and with the result of the collective scientific enterprise. If such would only catch on. But some people carelessly throw a wad of paper on the street and then shortly after are greatly incensed that the streets of their city look like the city dump.

In the third place I would point out that an elite is among us, not only on the other side of the iron curtain. This elite would insure the happiness of the masses by bridling them for their own good, if need be.

Huxley’s vision of the collective society is in many respects naive, too goody-goody, too quiet and too peaceable. George Orwell furnishes a more realistic perspective.

“1984”

Orwell’s understanding of the future community surpasses Huxley’s because his book was written in 1948, at a time when more factual material was available for the tracing of the lines of the future. Therefore, in a certain sense, 1984 is a sequel to The Brave New World.

The new society is not adequately portrayed solely in terms of a humanity striving after security and happiness; an elite cooperating in the shaping of the communal life; and a science and technique, employed in the successful over-stepping of its proper limits. More is necessary. Huxley did not answer the key question, the agonizing question, for which humanism no longer has an answer. What is the meaning of my existence? Even the mass-man cannot always avoid this fatal query. When the elite know how to control man and society so absolutely, they are confronted with the question of the meaning of it all.

Notice carefully that an ideal has been put to work, an ideal that
formerly gave to the God-forsaking, Christ-denying world the appearance of being able to reply to the question of meaning. But now that the ideal is being put into practice, it is evident that nothing is behind it; the “happy society” — the welfare state — is in itself meaningless. Its meaninglessness is revealed by its very stability.

For the fundamental meaning of all that exists is its dependence and dynamic concentration on the origin of all meaning, and this radical unrest disturbs any stability. No enduring situation exists on the way to death, or for that matter, on the way of life. To the degree that the ideal of science is more fully actualized, the feeling grows that all is vanity, meaningless. If a person rejects God’s law, eventually he will no longer see any guiding principles or perspectives. He will become a nihilist. In a factual sense this is well understood by Orwell.

And yet the questioning remains: Unto what end? As long as the heart beats and the mind functions this question persists. When Benvolio would adjure Romeo’s unrest over the maiden of his dreams by telling him not to think of her, Romeo utters that profound and far-reaching reply: “O teach me, how I should forget to think” (Romeo and Juliet, I, 1, 201, 202).

Such an art cannot be learned; unrest is not to be banished. Orwell describes a solution still open to nihilism; namely, communism; and again the solution is that of the Antichrist described in Revelation. Unrest must not be averted, but channeled and cultivated. The soldiers and policemen of Plato again appear.

The beast of the earth, the minister of propaganda, must juggle love and hate, falsehood and truth, so that unrest may find nourishment, and men may grow dizzy and submissive. The beast of the sea must ascend the throne and unfold his power over man in a reign of terror that sustains fear and prevents the arbitrary derailment of unrest.

Orwell outstrips Huxley. It does not suffice to control procreation, education, and environment. Man could then escape. Winston, the leading character of the novel at first states: “They cannot get inside you.” After his treatment by the “Ministry of love,” however, he says: “But they could get inside you.” Two times two becomes five. Not in appearance simply because a man wants to save himself with a lie; but seriously, man becomes spineless; he literally betrays everything; in his utmost need, he is concerned about only one thing: himself.

Is this true? They will buy and sell the souls of men (Rev. 18:13). For Orwell it is true, because “concern for self,” “All you care about is yourself,” is his last humanistic answer to the threat upon life.

Is it true for Christians? Will they be able to get inside them? A reading of 1984 and a glance at what has been realized in practice
will urge them to say: “I believe Lord, help my unbelief” (Mark 9:24).

“He that dwelleth in the secret place of the Most High, shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty”. “Under his wings shalt thou trust.” “A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand; but it shall not come nigh thee” (Ps. 91).

When deceit and terror direct the unrest of the masses, what will be the reply of the elite to the question about meaning? It will answer with Nietzsche: “The will to power is the guidepost.” “God is power” says Orwell. “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are interested solely in power.” The story of man’s happiness and security is cruelly disturbed, drowned in nihilism. It is now what it always was, in *Plato, More, Marx, and Bellamy*: a myth, the unbeliever’s myth.

The weapon of irony cannot be employed by a man who is himself without an escape. Orwell’s book is bitterly and disconsolately serious. The distance and reserve of Huxley has vanished. Orwell places us in the very midst of the terror; a dull sense of resignation settles upon us.

He sketches a world in which three superstates, Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia, exist in a state of permanent war with each other in varying combinations. Oceania is governed by four ministries, a Ministry of Peace, which conducts war; a Ministry of Plenty, regulating the distribution of goods; a Ministry of Love, which directs espionage, terror, and hate; and the Ministry of Truth, which keeps “truth” up to date. Above all this stands Big Brother whose picture stares from every wall. “Big Brother is watching you.” Everybody must love Big Brother, their redeemer, but they may hate everyone else.

The education in hate begins in the youth organization, where children are instructed to spy on their parents. Everyone views each day a program of two minutes of hate. By suggestion each group is wrought into a delirium of hatred against the enemy of the moment and against Goldstein (one may think of Trotsky). The latter, who wants to overthrow the power of Big Brother, runs an underground organization, and has written a heretical book opposing party orthodoxy. When hatred has risen to its height and the group has become a shouting, smashing mob, the kind face of Big Brother appears, followed by three party mottoes: “War is peace; freedom is slavery; ignorance is strength.”

The administration employs helicopters to spy on the populace. More important, however, are the television-like apparatus openly placed in every room, and secretly hidden in the most unexpected
places. Such "telescreens" send general and individual instruction, spy on every movement, and listen to every word uttered.

Winston, the principal character, is employed at the Ministry of Truth. Every day the truth is brought up to date. The past is erased and costrued anew in agreement with what is true "today." "Who controls the past, controls the future; who controls the present controls the past." Every day old papers and books of the past are rewritten. If Big Brother previously stated that Eurasia will attack in North Africa, and it attacks in India instead, the erroneous prediction must be corrected everywhere. Likewise if the results of the three-year plan do not jibe with past promises, the latter must be changed. And when Eurasia is ally against Eastasia, Oceania's past wars with Eurasia are forgotten; all mention of them is removed from print.

The Ministry of Truth also edits the new edition of the dictionary, which numbers ever fewer words, thanks to the scientific analysis of language. Such a procedure promotes uniform thinking and is a safeguard against thought-crime. Thinking is directed along certain channels.

Strikingly Orwell sketches the isolation of man at his work. He does not know what his neighbor does; his orders are automatically received on a piece of paper, and the paper results of his own efforts are placed in a pneumatic apparatus. As far as the individual is concerned his work makes no sense; what happens further to his work remains a mystery. This isolating specialization is the result of the merely scientific organization of cooperation, even if it is carried on without ideological aims; this will occupy us some more.

Isolation is carried through as far as possible even in life outside of work. The masses move together in a spiritual isolation. Intimate relations are intentionally discouraged. Love must wax cold (Matt. 24:12), hate and mutual fear must reign, so that all is directed in the service of Big Brother. The new viewpoint of Orwell in the matter of social ideology gives rise to a completely different social situation.

Clandestinely Winston keeps a diary in which he expresses aversion to the system. He hates Big Brother, and his "thought-crime" may at any moment cause his arrest by the "Thought Police." Winston meets Julia, a girl who like him feigns loyalty. Their contact leads to an intimate secret relationship. It is not their sexual intercourse that is forbidden, such is even commanded for the begetting of children. But to be properly conducted intercourse must be viewed exclusively as a duty. There must not be any mutual surrender or feeling of happiness with anyone else. From the description of their association it is especially evident how greatly Julia has been infected with nihilism.
During a hate session Winston exchanges a look with a certain O'Brien and at a glance realizes that the latter is of like mind. From O'Brien, Winston and Julia obtain information of the underground movement and receive the book of Goldstein.

Winston becomes curious concerning the proletariat class that dwells in isolated wards. They constitute the rubbish of humanity. No notice is taken of them. They are kept in a state of moral anaesthesia with pornographic literature. Unlike the party members they have time to themselves; they may dress as they please, and are loyal only to themselves and not to the Party. "Proles and animals are free."

Winston finds a room in the proletarian district where he occasionally meets Julia, until he is finally discovered and arrested. It then appears that O'Brien and the landlord belong to the "Thought Police." The "Underground" is a fiction, as is Goldstein. The latter's book was written by the Secret Police. Even Big Brother does not exist.

In prison Winston undergoes a treatment designed to convert him to party orthodoxy. The treatment is so successful that he grants that twice two makes five, if the party so declares. "Nothing exists except an endless present in which the Party is always right."

The climax of Winston's capitulation is his betrayal of his love for Julia; in dire distress, threatened with torture, Winston exclaims that Julia should suffer instead of him. He is then released, and becomes a docile member of the Party, to such an extent that he finally likes Big Brother.

What is Orwell's message? It is in the first place that liberty is being lost, sacrificed for a show of happiness, for the reality of the power of the Party. And secondly, Orwell would tell his reader that nobody is able to maintain his freedom against such power, not even in his deepest personal convictions.

What is tragic in Orwell is that he does not himself know what to defend in opposition to this tyranny. He has nothing with which to oppose it as he lacks a position of his own. In this he is like the Party. His conception is that of a negative freedom, a freedom from tyranny, culminating in a sensual, norm-less love for Julia. Orwell can oppose a nihilism of power by substituting for it the nihilism of freedom, the nihilism of Sartre. Therefore he cannot 'stand firm' in his freedom (Galatians 5: 1). His freedom is based on his own power, existing solely because of himself, and, consequently, readily destroyed when his own life is at stake.

Only a normative freedom is permanent, a freedom established by Christ, the giver of norms. Nietzsche knew that Christians and their
Lord were his arch enemy. Orwell does not encounter Christians among the proletarians. It is among such that they finally will be found, but the Orwells will not notice them.

Orwell as Huxley and many other men of science, unintentionally indicate the track on which the tyranny of the power-state, the society of the Antichrist, will arrive. Their own lack of resistance will usher in tyranny. They rage and mock at the lust for power of the elite; they excel in the portrayal of horrors, their conception of man is the picture of a creature whose life demands tyranny. But the Orwells do not understand man. They do not know who or to what end he is. Therefore they are nothing but the rebellious gravediggers of Western civilization.
Chapter three

STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETY

And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good. (Gen. 1:31)

Our examination of some literary speculative novels has given us an impression of what has been expected, hoped, or feared from the society of the future. The contemplation of history itself presents us with another side of the matter. It discloses the development of society and the social tendencies propelling it into the future; or, if you will, it shows the challenges of society, to which humanity must need respond (Toynbee).

To gain such insight, more is needed than a knowledge of the facts of history, as is clearly evident from the variety of views of history. History, as such, is never dealt with in science. It operates with facts. And these facts are always selected and interpreted facts. The mere happenings of the past are selected and interpreted in accordance with the outlook of the historian. For example, in considering history, Marx selects production as the most significant historical fact; all else is then interpreted as a class struggle to control the means of production. Another example is given by David Riesman in “The Lonely Crowd,” in which he selects the development of population to explain various attitudes and behaviors, but in which he above all overlooks the role of inner motivation and belief.¹

The very idea of an unprejudiced investigation of the facts resulting in their so-called objective description is an instance of self-deception. The investigator is far more objective if he acknowledges the non-scientific criteria he employs in his research. The charge that by so doing his analysis becomes onesided and dogmatic, is not fair; no one can escape in science a starting point beyond science, in the field of world view and principles. So it is better that one distinctly realizes what principles are employed in one’s historical investigations. And this is a definite gain. It explains why we regard some facts as important or unimportant, normal or abnormal.

It is necessary, therefore, that we first discuss the principles by which society and its history ought to be tested. Since our concern is with the formation of society, only those principles will be examined that contribute to the more or less permanent organization of society.
Man forms various types of lasting societal relationships. Together with others the individual lives and works in labor unions, associations, schools, the state, the church, business concerns, the family, and so on.

The scriptural principles valid for such vital relationships and their inter-relations are the balance of authority and freedom, and sphere-sovereignty.

We cannot treat these principles exhaustively; nor do we pretend to solve such difficult questions as those concerning the task of the government, a subject again of central interest. It is sufficient for our purpose if we can show that these principles are better guides for our social life than the current trend toward a hierarchical and collective society.

The most important advantage that can be gained for our analysis is that it will free us from the dilemma resulting from a forced option between collectivism vs. individualism; the community vs. the individual. It is wrong to think that if one is dissatisfied with individualism and with collectivism (respectively ascribing primacy to the individual and to the community) the only course open is to choose an agreeable compromise position in the middle. Another possibility is open if in addition to the over simplified problem of the individual and the community, we also consider the problem of the relation between the individual and authority, and the problem of the relation between various social units.

This other possibility, typified by the principles named above, is able to prevent the justification of collectivism on the basis of the defects of individualism. And since individualism has been defeated in our society, humanity is confronted with a decisive choice between a collective course and a trend which would recognize the principles of sphere-sovereignty, and of the balance of authority and freedom.

**Sphere-sovereignty**

*Abraham Kuyper* (1837–1920) founded the Free University of Amsterdam on the principle of sphere-sovereignty. After seventy years, however, many of his spiritual heirs now snicker or become incensed at the mere mention of sphere-sovereignty.

I do not have in mind those who believe this principle merely means that social units, such as the state and business, have nothing to do with each other and are completely isolated so that the state, for example, may not concern itself with economic life. Such would do well to read up a bit on the subject.

I am more concerned with the idea that sphere-sovereignty between
the state and economic life has become meaningless in practice and can therefore be disregarded. There is much truth in the first statement. But because in practice a principle does not fit the historical situation, it does not follow that such a principle can be abolished. Practice is not normative. Many principles have been discarded in the practical life of the Soviet Union!

The fact that sphere-sovereignty between the state and economic life is being disregarded might lead to the conclusion that society is in a process of decay, a process obviously started in our time in the relations between these two spheres. A wrong conclusion drawn from this fact has its consequences for other fields; e.g., if the freedom of the press is curtailed, if universities lose their independence or are closed by the state, should the principle of sphere-sovereignty then also be abandoned, since in fact it no longer exists? And if not, what is the difference from the above-mentioned case of economic life?

Hitler comprehended sphere-sovereignty to the extent that he knew that whoever would rule the souls of men must first conquer their institutions, the independent living associations of society. One by one they had to fall under his power, i.e., the institutions of economic life, the press, the schools, the unions, the family, and so on. Do not be deceived by a difference in tempo. When institutions are abrogated slowly and silently, we must be on our guard all the more.

Another objection sometimes raised is that sphere-sovereignty practically did not exist in long past centuries, so it is not strange if it should now disappear again. This argument is not valid. If sphere-sovereignty is a legitimate normative principle for the historical development of society, a proper attitude will gradually put it into practice. A good historical development is one in which the social units of life will gradually enjoy a more and more differentiated and independent existence.

A preliminary orientation.
Let us examine the meaning of the above mentioned principles in greater detail. Generally speaking, in our case sphere-sovereignty expresses the mutual independence of the social units or lasting relationships of society. And it expresses in particular the mutual independence of the authority inherent in units of a different nature.

If by “sovereignty” we should mean complete power, the choice of the term would be unfortunate. But this was not Kuiper's intention. By “sovereignty” he understood an authority that includes the right, the duty, and the power to break and to avenge any resistance it encounters. In its original absolute form this sovereignty is identical
with the Majesty of God. No particular bearer of authority on earth is the highest power from which other forms of authority are deduced and derived. From this state of affairs we can deduce the most important fact about the sphere of validity of the principle of the balance between authority and freedom. Each sphere of authority is limited by its own societal relationship. The relation of authority and freedom exists within such relationships and not externally (e.g., not between them).

Parents have authority over their children within the family; they do not have authority over the school. Therefore, insofar as children are pupils they are under the authority of the principal, their teachers, and the school board. The government has authority insofar as its subjects are citizens; it does not rightly control economic activity and enterprises; the latter are subject to the owner, the director, the board of trustees, and the stockholders. The session or consistory of a church has authority over the congregation, but not over other forms of association, even if composed only of church members; the exercise of authority in such other groups rests with their independent committees.

The social relationships exist together on a basis of equality; the one is not subordinate to the authority and control of the other. Subjection to authority exists only within a relationship. Societal relationships properly stand in a coordinate relation to each other, not in a preferred or subordinate position.

The thesis defended here is of greatest weight for our consideration of the society of the future. The struggle against the totalitarian formation of society can be waged with any prospect of success only from this position both in principle and in practice. But does not the struggle against totalitarianism lie in a plea for freedom? Certainly, it does; but this freedom is first of all the freedom and independence of the different societal relationships against any totalitarian relationship. The liberty desired in practice and corresponding to man's inner liberty (which is untouchable from without) is guaranteed by the forms of society, primarily by the independence of the latter's various associations and institutions. When this position falls, a dictator need not fear any serious resistance from any quarter, because the subordination of various spheres of society is then already a fact. So eventually totalitarianism can gradually and quietly take over by appealing to the so-called "general welfare". Only a personal position then remains from which the battle against the power of an integrated totalitarian relationship must be waged individually. Such an
individual struggle for a proper balance between authority and freedom, in a deformed all-embracing relationship, has nearly always proved hopeless, and today modern technical and scientific means render such a struggle impotent before it begins.

The success of the Netherlands' resistance to National Socialism during the German occupation lay in the fundamental and practical maintenance of the sphere-sovereignty of the various societal relationships. Individual resistance led to deeds of great heroism and sacrifice, but the power of the resistance did not lie in the individual.

So if adherence is given to the subordination of societal relationships instead of to their coordination, the resistance to be offered to totalitarianism will be weak from the start. This is the weakness of socialism, and to a lesser degree of the Roman Catholic position. The Roman Catholic position distinguishes two spheres, the natural and the supernatural. The first is subordinate to the second. In the sphere of nature the state is the highest and most perfect relationship; in the supernatural realm of grace, the church is the highest. In the realm of nature the state stands at the apex of a hierarchy constituted by all other forms of society. Of course, the principle of "subsidiarity" (the idea of the higher relationship as a subsidiary for the lower) mollifies the fact of superordination; the state permits "its parts" to do what they can; it provides only such needs as the other relationships can not provide. But that does not change its preferred position of superiority. In the Roman Catholic view of the structure of society the state is the final organizer and the director of the common good in the domain of nature. The background to this view of the structure of society is the philosophical requirement of a rational construction of nature governed by the principle of the whole and its parts. It does not, however, fit the present problem, as we shall see. At any rate in the application of this view the first fortress against totalitarianism is seriously undermined. Nevertheless, one must remember that the church must keep a watchful eye and that growth from below is here of great significance.

The socialistic standpoint with regard to the aforementioned resistance is even weaker. The hierarchical collectivization of society is undoubtedly mollified by the principle of functional decentralization, the distribution of responsibility. Such only signifies, however, that power ought to be more or less centralized, depending on the circumstances. Authority is from above. The idea of socialization comes first and the decentralization is a movement from the top to the bottom. (We will not go into the fact that socialists do not under-
stand authority to be of divine origin. It is therefore a relative matter. Such a position is dangerous in itself. If authority has no basis it will be respected only in proportion to its power.

The state is here the highest organ of society. There is no limit in principle to its interference in other organizations. There is no reason for the government to respect the coordinate independent authority of other forms of society, such as business enterprises and schools. A totalitarian regime can take over a socialistically constructed society by simply carrying out the process of centralization step by step. The abandonment of the independence of a number of societal relationships in favor of the state is not simply a matter of theory in socialism. In practice in the name of the community, socialists employ various collective measures to introduce a hierarchical structure into society, a hierarchy with the state at the apex.

In principle and in practice socialism paves the way for a totalitarian regime. Amidst the well-meant pleas for liberty frequently uttered by present day socialists, one would do well to remember this fact. When the chips are down, the socialist, because of his own standpoint and because of the social transformation he has introduced, is forced into an indefensible position.

Whether or not the relationships of society are arranged coordinately or subordinately is a matter of practical and fundamental consequence. To minimize this difference because of practical considerations necessitating adjustment is to lose sight of the fact that the course chosen is decisive.

In defending sphere-sovereignty in principle and in practice, Christianity ought to remember that it is here that the decisive battle will be fought against totalitarianism and in the contest for a Christian society.

The writings of Kuyper himself on this subject sometimes present difficulties. One has the impression that they are caused by certain scholastic ideas. At times the state is considered to be higher than his so-called society and the family. Elsewhere the authority of parents is derived from that of the local civil authorities, in turn subject to state and federal authority, so that the state is all-inclusive. Such statements are clearly in conflict with the main line of Kuyper's thinking. The state is not above but coordinate to other forms of society. Why? Because every sphere ought to obey its own laws; each after its own kind, and according to its own created structure. This is the key to the problem of sphere-sovereignty. And this is the starting point of the Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven school of philosophy.
The authority within a given sphere is not derived from that of another sphere, such as the state or the church. It exists according to its own nature and by reason of the charge from Him who is absolutely sovereign, namely, Christ, to whom God has given all power in heaven and on earth (Matt. 28:18; Col. 2:10; Eph. 1:21; 1 Cor. 15:27, 28).

With Kuyper we conclude that on earth there is no highest power, no unlimited, absolutely independent authority. Christ distributes authority to the office bearers in the various aspects of life. Such owe responsibility directly to Christ. Their authority exists solely within the organization with which they are concerned.

Of course, there is a difference in value between the various organizations. Nobody would think of placing a football club on the same level as a state. Such difference is due to the order established at creation. Undoubtedly the church occupies a primary position in the arrangement according to the importance of societal forms. But as far as the authorities in these social units are concerned, this arrangement is not hierarchical but coordinate. The direction of a football club does not derive its competence from the government; it is, therefore, not responsible to the latter for the internal affairs of the club.

What is striking in socialistic literature is that it does not do justice to the different nature of a number of social forms in society. It has, therefore, no adequate basis for the recognition of the independent authority of such associations, and so can only control the relations between such spheres of authority in terms of the "general welfare". The ideology of the socialist does not permit him to admit the essential significance of the fact that the various associations of society, e.g., the economic, political, and ecclesiastical, have a nature of their own.

The Bible teaches us of such diversity as was present in Biblical times. Relationships of society are clearly in evidence. At times they are explicitly mentioned, e.g., in the letters to the Ephesians, the Colossians, and to Titus. Office bearers and subjects are addressed according to the nature of the associations in which their relation subsists; parents and children, masters and servants, rulers and citizens, elders and members of the congregation. What is most apparent is that nothing suggests any subordination of the bearers of authority of the different relationships, the one to the other. The independence of the authority, directly inaugurated by Christ, and the obligation to obey for Christ's sake, constitute the framework in which man is addressed within his communal relationships.

Of course the Bible does not give us a theory of sphere-sovereignty. To expect such would be the highest of folly. The term is nowhere to
be found. But when once aware of the creation-principle for the
organization of society, we do find in the Bible a self-evident
harmony with that principle; in agreement, of course, with the his-
torical development of social practice. The Bible addresses us
from and about its own time. It does not give evidence of the
variety which we know. Sphere-sovereignty is a principle, a guidepost
at the beginning of the history of humanity. It has to be brought into
practice, unfolded, in the course of history. If the exegesis is correct,
the text in Genesis, "In the days of Enos men began to call upon the
name of the Lord," means that an independent community of wor-
ship, the first church, freed itself from an undifferentiated family life.
In the course of history different associations of society split off and
become independent according to their respective natures.

From the Mosaic legislation and its proclamation, it is evident, e.g.,
that the community of Israel was then to a large extent undifferen-
tiated. But hundreds of years later when Israel has a king reigning
over the entire nation, including Samuel, the latter respects Saul's
office, but proclaims the Word of God to Saul with his own authority,
(1 Sam. 8:19; 12:14; 13:13).

The lesson of history

The course of history has not been as simple as here indicated. The
liberation of life and the formation of independent associations of
society have frequently been retarded by the rulers, chiefs, priests,
kings and emperors. A society so liberated has again frequently been
tyrannized and cast into bonds by some potentate. History shows
not only a continuous unfolding but also a retarding and reactionary
concentration of power. To many a culture, decline and fall has come
in such a phase of its history. Of course too great haste is also
possible. Perhaps this was the case when Israel asked for a king
(1 Sam. 8). The story makes it plain that such was a wrong desire
because Israel occupied a privileged and special position. By asking
for a king it gave evidence of having rejected God. In its folly it now
begged for the yoke of a king.

Kuyper arrived at the idea of sphere-sovereignty because he
observed in history that where this principle was violated, life was
brought into distress and society reached a dead end. Sometimes he
gives the impression that he dreads danger only from the state.
"Sphere-sovereignty" is opposed to "State-sovereignty": there you
have the long and the short of world-history. It will become evident
that even in his time the danger was not from the state, but from the
economic realm. Bavinck understood something of this in 1905.
Undoubtedly, however, Kuyper also viewed the concentration of economic power as a danger; he also saw a threat to the sphere-sovereignty of science by the church, in the Middle Ages and long thereafter.\textsuperscript{12}

Danger can indeed come from very different quarters. Bruno's imprisonment by the inquisition and burning in 1600 was mainly because of his scientific critique of the Aristotelian-Ptolomaic world theory held by the church. And in the same manner the sphere sovereignty of science was assailed when in 1663 Galileo was forced to promise never to teach that the earth moved around the sun. Sassen defends Galileo really only on the ground that he was later proved to be right. His condemnation is explained in the setting of the time, since Galileo assumed an individual position against collective opinions.\textsuperscript{13} In my opinion it is this latter point that needs to be criticized.

Kuyper was right in thinking that in history it was mostly the state that oppressed the various organizations of society. We think of Caesarism, the tyranny of Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin. In the last instance, however, we must be cautious, because at the center of power in communism, politics, technique, and economy are inextricably braided together, contending for primacy.

\textit{The religious background}

To understand the principles of the balance of authority and freedom, and sphere-sovereignty, it is necessary to trace their \textit{religious} significance. Only if such is kept in view, can a merely formal manipulation be avoided.

According to the first chapter of Genesis, God created nature in an orderly fashion, endowing each facet with its own distinct nature. He then created man in His own image. Man was created as a \textit{masterbuilder}. Man's duty was not only to maintain the creation but also to add to it by developing its latent possibilities. Man's official task was to cultivate the potentialities inherent in creation. Reflection on this state of affairs in the light of Scripture discloses much that is perplexing. And the fall into sin renders the situation still harder to understand. And yet a few things are intelligible.

Everything that is created is of a \textit{religious meaning-structure}, i.e., it has to serve God. It exists for God's glory and for His unsearchable good pleasure; and unto that end He has subjected it to His laws. Man is also subject to the latter, but God granted him \textit{freedom}, that he might be \textit{responsible} for his deeds. An important manifestation
of his freedom is that man may unfold the plan of creation. The wealth of creation forbids us to think of it as being rigid and simple. But it must be remembered that man in his freedom does not make anything wholly new; he unveils in the course of history such works as God has laid out for him at creation. In all probability man performs only part of this task and what he does is still faulty and misshapen, and there is sure to be a good deal of possible work undetected. Nevertheless, no other possibility is open to him than to follow the main lines of the plan of creation. In nature everything has its own peculiar character. Likewise what man constructs in the sphere of culture has its own peculiar nature. Sin may hinder the production of a sound structure; its infection may cause deformity. Sin may blind man to the latent potentialities of culture, but all that man does and leaves undone is directed by the structures of creation. He may establish a disorderly family, but it is still a family; he may form a totalitarian state, but it is still a state; a powerless church, nevertheless a church; an a-social project, still a project; a useless bridge, but a bridge; an insipid novel, withal a novel.

Among such structures the relationships of society occupy an important place. In his responsibility to God, man stands together with others. It is here that the idea of human community is encountered.

At this point one must guard against a dangerous misconception. Such a fellowship is not an equalizing collection, embracing all of humanity, or a race or nation. It is in such a sense that the alternative between the individual and a community is forced upon us; the individual is then secondary and the community is primary. Such a view commits idolatry with respect to the community (as aforetime — perhaps in America still at present — the individual was idolized), and it leads already in thought to a totalitarian society, in which the life of man is regarded as a service to the community rather than as a religious devotion to God. The criticism of this idea of a community is one of the main features of this book. Such an idea of a community would liquidate sphere-sovereignty.

A community is always qualified by a determining meaning-function. It is never something indefinite. Accordingly each relationship has of necessity a specific structure, and this structure depends upon the meaning of such a community. This holds even in experiments with groups. William Foote Whyte blames the failure of some of the experiments of group-discussion by the Research Center of Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan on a lack of group structure and of corresponding tasks. A community is always determined and limited by the nature of the activity jointly performed, e.g., family.
life, union work, technical production, scientific research. Such a limitation concerns the number of people constituting the group, the reason for their grouping, and the duration of the group. Man functions in a group in a qualified sense, without the loss of his personal identity. His personal identity is not to be merged in any single relationship nor in the totality of his relationships. Man does not exist for the sake of any form of society.

Within the limits of a lasting social relationship, however, man shares a common task. Such cooperation and communal living does not originate automatically. Affairs must be regulated and order maintained; unto that end, authority is instituted, “That we may lead a quiet and peaceable life” (1 Tim. 2:2). On Paul’s return after his circuit through Asia-Minor, he establishes order by officially ordaining elders over the congregations (Acts 14:23).

The bearers of authority in such a social unit do not derive their competence from their own volition, nor from the will of the people in their social unit. The Lord endows them with authority. On the other hand they don’t have such authority for their own sake, nor are they in every respect the link between the original source of their charge and their subordinates. They occupy their office in order that, in a qualified cooperation or communal life, men may come to the fulfilment of their function, to their cultural calling, in direct free responsibility to God, who calls them into His service. That is the key to the principle of authority and freedom. Authority and freedom constitute a balance, aiming in a constructive sense at the coordination of a qualified cultural mandate. Such a balance would moreover protect human labor in such a social unit from the permeation of sin, especially from individualism. It would ward off the arbitrary and improper use of freedom; and it would prevent the inversion of the order of authority and freedom through the usurpation of power. A despot does not understand that his authority ought to establish an environment in which, with the greatest possible freedom of action, men may follow their combined calling to carry out their qualified cultural task.

There is something more to be said concerning authority. It can be localized, it ought to have real power, and it may not be confused with leadership in general. Authority can be localized in a person, in a group or in a very complicated hierarchical structure. But it must always be distinguished from the people upon which authority is exerted. A so-called “democratic leadership,” that according to Group Dynamics theory diffuses all leadership through the whole group, has nothing to do with authority, leadership, or democracy. When
the discussion-leader in the afore-cited group-discussion experiments changes his rôle to a mere resource person, the group is confused and is paralyzed in its functioning. Democracy in a group or in a community does not mean that decisions are taken without an authorized leader, but it means decisions of the group under the guidance of a leader, provided a proper balance of authority and freedom is established. Leadership belongs to the created structure of groups or qualified communities, or, otherwise stated, it belongs to the freedom of men operating together in a qualified sense.

But to be effective, leadership ought to have power. Only if power is derived from a constitution can such leadership be called authority. The personal aspect is of course not irrelevant in the obedience to parents, the government, or a supervisor, but this obedience depends fundamentally upon the constitution by which authority is established as a delegation from the authority of Christ.

Even if such constituted leadership is not effective due to a serious lack of personal power or wisdom, e.g., in a factory, other, and in that case informal leadership will emerge and take over. Such leadership and, in general, leadership without a constitution, will depend solely upon personal qualities. It has no real authority, although it may be of use.

From the fact that each form of society is so qualified, that it is endowed with its own peculiar nature, (the qualified structure of the social units), it is clearly evident that the organ of authority in one relationship cannot rightly seek to exert itself in a relationship of another nature. In other words the authority in one sphere cannot rightly be transferred to that of another; it cannot rightly regulate the other sphere. Sphere-sovereignty is inherent in the created structure of things. And it is an expression of God's absolute sovereignty over His creation in Christ. The subordination of a qualified authority to another of a different kind, e.g., the subordination of parents to a consistory, of the direction of an enterprise to the government, deforms the order of creation. Moreover, it shifts to human institutions the responsibility the office bearers owe to God. The maintenance of sphere-sovereignty concerns the sovereignty of God over life, the authority granted to Christ.

This order of creation, moreover, restrains the influence of sin. The distribution of power in many independent forms of society prevents the concentration of power. And it is the accumulation of power that man is tempted to abuse. Popes and despots have taught us that much.

In practical life sphere-sovereignty also leads to a balance. The various organized units of society constitute an equilibrium of many
social forces. When one begins to attain preponderance and to endanger the independent existence of the others, forces are thereby aroused which tend to restore equilibrium. The process is (apart from the question of responsibility) analogous to the way in which disease bacilli activate forces of resistance in a body.

It should be clear that neither of these principles is the result of an abstract theory. They are fruits of Scriptural reflection upon the formation of society.

The relation between the various societal relationships.

Up until now only the independent existence of the various societal units or relationships has been treated. Such forms of society are, however, also related to each other. Lines of influence run back and forth, intermingling and inspiring each other. Well then, such influence is properly exercised if it conforms to the nature of the social organization exerting it. The church ought to remind the state, parents, and all other persons in authority, together with those owing allegiance, of what the Word of God demands from them.\footnote{The products of an enterprise and their economic value exert an influence, e.g., upon circumstances within the family. In virtue of their special calling with regard to their children, parents have a right to make demands in school or in the military service. The state properly takes cognizance of economic life by providing public legal protection in its commerce and business enterprises.}

There is, however, another influence. Each authority is responsible for the affairs of its own sphere. The protection and development of this sphere affects demands and conditions valid for other spheres. The state may properly develop and maintain national conditions favorable to an equitable commercial life, e.g., the guarantee of the value of its currency. The state exceeds its function when it interferes in economic life by determining individual conditions affecting credit that properly belong to the individual decision of the enterprise concerned. The digging of canals and public power projects, such as Boulder Dam, concern national conditions affecting the economic life, but also have a broader reach. For the digging of canals, and the reclamation and cultivation of inundated territory, e.g., are not limited solely to economic life; they enable life to unfold in all its rich variety of facets and relationships. Confusion arises on this point, because in keeping with the time, the content of the economic sphere is taken in too wide a sense.
Our society is at present so deformed that it is difficult to make our meaning completely clear. An example taken from a sphere that is still somewhat normal may help. Parents have the right and the duty to control and to regulate matters in their family, in order to make possible the free development of their children for their life's vocation. The state has nothing to regulate within a family, between families, or between a family and a business, because this is not in accordance with its meaning. It has its own domain to regulate; it ought to care for the public milieu by maintaining and cultivating public conditions favorable to national life (e.g., work on pavements, sidewalks, and the development of public territory). Consequently, among other things, the state, in keeping with its proper and necessary function, thereby provides the family with a structure in which it can function. The economic spheres for their part accordingly condition the family, e.g. with wages and labor hours.

Moreover, public authorities may be properly concerned with a family, with its relation to other families, and with the relation of family and industry. Their task is not with a family's internal order and affairs, nor with the external relations with other families in general, however, but with the establishment of justice. Even its preoccupation with justice is not universal. Not all injustice is a matter for the state. Only in border situations is it proper for the state to establish justice by interfering in the private lives of its citizens, as individuals and as members of groups; that is, in such instances where injustice and need would otherwise be intolerable (e.g., extensive unemployment, cruelty to a child, insufferable neighborhood rows, etc.).

Summarizing, we can conclude that the family is governed by its parents; and that the government of the nation acts in various border situations of the family. In the first place the government provides the public conditions for family life. Then the government has to act in case of an emergency caused by acts of injustice or by serious distress. The state may act, for example, in severe unemployment threatening a family with dissolution; the state may interfere to protect a family's right to exist, or to protect the rights of its members (e.g., in divorce cases). An emergency may also arise where it may become necessary to protect society against the family, as in the case of infectious disease. And in cases of cruelty the rights of a child may need to be protected by its removal from parental control. It is easy to understand that in some of these examples it is also possible for the government to have a right and a duty to act, viz., if the national well-being is at stake (unemployment, infectious disease, etc.).
The relation between the state and economic life should be conceived of analogously. The state ought not to regulate or direct economic life in such a way that it places its own authority above the authorities proper to the economic sphere. But the state ought to maintain and develop favorable national and local public conditions in which the economic sphere can properly flourish. And in borderline cases of distress, emergency or injustice, the state ought protectively to put matters aright. The government may have to deal with some intolerable distress or injustice concerning private persons or social units, and even at times with some menace to its own sphere.

I have yet to hear an argument, biblical or otherwise, in support of the contention that unlike the coordinate relation between the family and the state, the economic sphere ought to be subordinate to the state. An appeal to a factual situation is no argument for the correctness of the situation; it implies no more than that we must put up with it until we are able to restore the proper relation of coordination.

If a person has a million dollars, in general that is no business of mine, nor of the government. A man owes responsibility to God for his stewardship. But when he uses it to perpetrate an injustice, the government has the right to step in. And if an emergency arises the government may make a coercive appeal to such a person for assistance. If the government wants to go any further, e.g., arbitrary appropriations, an ideal society is not thereby obtained; man simply loses his accountability to God and total power is granted to the state.

Our exposition and the example cited here do not pretend to provide exhaustive instruction for general application. Such instruction cannot be drawn up. Every problem concerning the inter-relations between social groups is new. It requires continual reflection upon and interpretation of the peculiar nature of the social relationships involved.

And even if such reflection is successful, the question is still not solved. For example, even if we know what the authorities may rightly do and what they ought to forego, the question still persists, whether under the given circumstances the government ought here to exercise its right to interfere in the life of another sphere. There is always a spectrum of emergencies. And likewise, it holds that even if we understand the significance of authority and freedom in social relationships, it must still be determined in each separate instance where the balance ought to lie.

Man is continually placed before such practical decisions, connected
not only with particular circumstances, but also with the historical moment. After weighing all the factors, a *compromise* conclusion must be reached. Such is life, and luckily so; it would be of small interest if every solution to life's problems were written in a *field manual*.

Well-meaning practical people are, therefore, often inclined to trust their common sense exclusively. They uproot the guideposts of principles and rely on their keen nose. The risk of a keen nose, however, is that it can with equal ease adapt itself to a perfumery or to a cowbarn. Without the anchorage provided by principles we drift along with the stream of social events. But, someone will say, what is the use of a principle such as sphere-sovereignty? It may teach in a general way the nature of the state and of some other organized social units, but in a borderline situation, where decisions are made, the clarity of our distinctions grows vague. Let us answer with an example.

In a spectrum various tints lie between red and orange, concerning which it is impossible to say if they are one or the other. Such obscurity might lead us to the faulty denial of the existence of red and orange. But the little that can be said about such a borderline situation can be said only because of the distinction between red and orange.

*The degeneration of society*

A respect for the sovereignty of God over His creation is expressed — insofar as the forms of a community are concerned, and especially the lasting forms — in the principles of a proper balance between authority and freedom, and sphere-sovereignty. Such principles constitute the pattern within which man can attain his divinely ordained destiny in the different areas of life. The redeeming and re-creating work of Christ signifies for society its liberation through the realization of the principle of sphere-sovereignty and of the principle of authority and liberty. It is in this way that Christ wants to be its Sovereign.

On this earth it has pleased God that people living in the faith in His Son should actualize that society. When the tension of faith slackens, and spheres of life are withdrawn from the direction of that faith when unbelief gets the upper hand, that actualization will wholly or partially cease. The unfolding of society is then not only interrupted, but it is deflected toward deformation. The equilibrium guaranteed by the above mentioned principles is then disturbed.

Where the balance between authority and liberty is disturbed and
when authority loses power, the danger of confusion and revolution arises. When authority acquires power at the expense of liberty, the danger of oppression and tyranny threatens. Such situations are encountered in all relations of life, in the state, in the family, in schools, and in factories. It often happens, however, that a situation of confusion and revolution is abrogated by swinging to the other extreme of tyranny.

The equilibrium of forces corresponding to sphere-sovereignty is also frequently disturbed. Society then generally threatens to become collective or even totalitarian because of the preponderance of one of the societal relationships. And when a sphere loses its independence its internal cohesion is also lost. It then begins to disintegrate.

Such disturbances of the balance between the spheres may be occasioned through a particular sphere's abuse of power or by the loss of spiritual intensity on the part of various spheres. As to the balance of authority and freedom within the spheres, it may be caused by a concentration of power due to over anxious bearers of authority or by a shirking of responsibility on the part of individual members or citizens. Very often more than one factor is present.

In my opinion many do not sufficiently discern the principles in question and thus do not even notice if they are no longer in practice. There also exists the inclination to relate problems to the principle of authority and freedom, and to forget sphere-sovereignty. This is simply a cause of confusion; the importance of developments deserving attention is overlooked. Our present social order is primarily engaged in rendering relative the independence of the various forms of society. It is replacing coordination by subordination. This hierarchical collectivization, beginning with economic life, is leading to an all-embracing union through the state or even through a supemational organization. For the present it is especially concerned with economic life. And within this movement a directive tendency is now evident, a tendency that accompanies the disturbance of equilibrium between authority and freedom.

Much more can be said. A communal ideology is everywhere rampant. If, because of the community formation by the state the church should try to engage in the socialistic formation of society by providing a superstructure, so that a spiritual socialism may thus come about, it would also wander from the way. Reference to the Middle Ages, which knew such an all-embracing community, will not avail; what stood then at the beginning of the liberation of life now signifies a hindrance to such a liberation, and is a mere reaction.
Between medieval times and our own lies the Reformation, followed by the secularization of Western civilization; the latter has thrown the above named liberation out of joint. A hierarchical integration of the community under the guidance of the church will not help matters; on the contrary it can only remove the conditions of restoration. Under the present circumstances it can result only in a secularized spiritual bond.

One more observation. Collectivization is always accompanied by the formation of an elite group. Two classes of people arise: the thoughtful, provident, and responsible elite, and the looked-after and dependent masses. The position of the masses is an obstacle to any return to Christianization.

The appearance of the elite and of the masses is always a proof that the independence of the various associations of society has been lost, and the balance of authority and liberty disturbed. In a collectivized society there are two kinds of people. The one constitutes the elite and provides the leadership. Such are the organizers of today. In a Christian society the authority granted and sustained by Christ is all important; the person of the office-bearer is rather irrelevant. Sphere-sovereignty may also be viewed in this way. An engineer prescribes with authority to the man who mounts the machinery in a factory; but as the elder of a church, the latter may that very evening authoritatively admonish the engineer about his religious life. Likewise a minister may be admonished by a member of his congregation presiding at a political meeting. Christian thinking refuses to recognize an elite; it views the actual appearance of such as the derailment of the social processes.

As far as the actual situation is concerned, we live in a time in which the principles discussed are out of joint. Characteristic of our day is the shifting of the responsibility of freedom toward central control and the wrecking of the independence of the social relationships. The considerations of the following chapters will revolve around these problems.

The causes of this anti-normative development in society are at present to be sought in a perverse view of the function of authority. Some bearers of authority would make it absolute, others, on the contrary, would make it merely relative. An equal perversity is present in the current insight into the destiny of man and into the function of the organized units of society. In consequence man abandons his divine cultural mandate and his own freedom; he discards the freedom of relationships in which he works and lives. And we should bear in mind that every freedom results from the fact that man owes
his deepest responsibility to God. (I have in mind the mass-formation, the disintegration of families, and similar issues).

No authority is safe unless it recognizes, is rooted in, and is limited by the sovereignty of Christ. No freedom can flourish and be preserved except upon the foundation of the work of redemption of Christ (Gal. 5:1).

Of special interest in connection with the degeneration of society is the fact that the development of science and technique has already done much to bind humanity. It still can do much more. But already a few people in authority have an enormous concentration of power.

An observation

The relation between societal relationships of the same kind has not entered into the discussion. Insofar as these relations are regulated, varying situations are encountered, e.g., the autonomy of municipalities within the state, the agreement between churches in their synods, and the contracts and trusts of enterprise. Socio-economic organs for coordination in course of development in the Netherlands also acquire a regulating position in respect to enterprises. This relation may best be compared to that between churches and their synod. We may also think of the federative movement in Europe.

Except in the first instance, we may not speak of an over-arching societal unit nor likewise of the ordinary relations of authority and freedom. We must speak rather of a binding agreement entered into by parties of equal standing.

The main feature in all such instances, the meaning of such agreements, regulations, and the like, and of the super-organizations, ought to be that the freedom of the societal relationships involved, in view of the development of their activity, is served by these agreements.
Chapter four

THE HISTORY OF WESTERN SOCIETY

Das Gegenwärtige geht schwanger mit dem Kommenden.
(The present is pregnant with the future.)
Leibnitz

The reader who desires to hear about the future will still have to be patient. Our present concern is with past history, or at least with a small part of it; especially the recent history of Western culture as an introduction to our own time and that which is to come. Our interest is, moreover, restricted to the formation of society and to the factors that influenced the process.

The approach

The spread of Christianity marks the beginning of Western civilization, an event determining the further course of history. Two elements in that event are important to us. First, the proclamation of the equality of all men before God, a proclamation which in principle led to the disruption of the ancient division into lords and slaves, and, in the course of time, to the abolition of slavery, with its total right of ownership of human beings. The total character of slavery prevented life from unfolding according to sphere- soverignty. It prevented the appearance of a free type of man adapting himself to authorities restricted and determined by the nature and extent of the qualified relationship of society. It cannot be said that in every respect the balance of authority and freedom, taken in the sense previously discussed, was disturbed by slavery. For example, there often existed a great measure of free movement in the work performed.

In the second place, Christianity taught man his destination on earth: to live and to labor unto the honor of God. The practical significance of this second tenet is the respect for freedom and the desire to be free. Freedom is essential for the performance of the cultural task. This task consists in the execution of the command given to created man, viz., the realization of God's plan for the creation.

This Christian conception did away with the prevailing idea of ancient culture that nature was an animate enemy of man from which
he could be protected only in a static society like the city state, and that labor was a lower condition of life. In this society social success was marked by a proportionate freedom from work. As a person climbed the social ladder he gave himself in ever greater degree to leisure, sport, the game of war, meditation, and similar free pursuits.

The effect of both of these Christian tenets was the liberation of life and a dynamic attitude. The cultural ceiling was broken and new perspectives opened up. A new culture developed, a culture that escaped the pitfalls, the crevice, usually awaiting to engulf former pagan and static cultures in decline and fall.¹

Nevertheless, it took a long time, until after the Middle Ages, before Western culture really got under way. Many factors are responsible for this delay; it is fitting to pause long enough to glance at them.

Christianity had first of all to wage a heavy spiritual warfare to obtain the entrance of the gospel into the world of the Roman Empire. Further, the issue of the struggle was in the first place how to win the hearts of men for Christ. Social reform could only follow. The struggle was not made easier by Christianity's exclusiveness. Unlike pagan religions it refused to recognize other religions as its equal. Christianity claimed the allegiance of all humanity irrespective of nationality or race. Such pretention naturally led to the coalition of heathen religions in the battle against Christianity.

On the other hand the policy of Rome was to assimilate the religions of the different provinces. By removing them from their native soil and environment, Rome neutralized them. The historian Ranke points out that this policy deprived such religions of their strength.²

The victory of Christianity and its adoption as the state religion in 370 A.D., therefore, did not leave the Christian religion unharmed. The Christianization of Europe could now be rapidly and effectively accomplished. But the essential worth of the process was in inverse proportion to the speed of its accomplishment. From the conversion by people and tribe, the penetration of the biblical message and the reformation of the social order could hardly be expected.

Another factor of significance was that Christianity gained at the time of the decline of the Roman Empire. In 375 the Huns invaded Europe, the tremendous migration of nations began; in 455 Rome was taken. It was a time of decadence, wars, and crises.

Another noteworthy factor is that, for practical reasons, at an early date Christianity sought to adapt to its faith elements in heathen religions and in Greek philosophy. Until the time of the Reformation the church had to wrestle with the problem of the relation between faith and reason. It was the claims of reason that were the cause of
derailment. Especially prevalent was the heathen idea of a higher, super-sensible sphere and a lower material sphere, the region of all that is perishable and often also of evil, from which man ought to be delivered. The contemplative life was considered more important than the active one. Such is still the case within Roman Catholicism. It is readily understood that in such a spiritual climate the degradation of manual labor, and of labor in general, as encountered in antiquity, was not at all, or at least not wholly overcome. This synthesis with antiquity also led to the introduction into the Corpus Christianum (i.e., the Christian world) of the distinction of two classes of men: clergy and laity. Later on it subsequently gave rise to a certain imitation of the Greeks in the establishment of monastic orders, with their ascetic ideals. And finally it led to the theory of the natural and supernatural, a view that continues to hold sway within Roman Catholicism. This latter scheme of nature and grace once more relegated cultural activity to the second plane. The Calvinistic Reformation finally disrupted this scheme by its elevation of commerce and industry, and the way was paved toward a rich cultural development.

Finally, the rise of Islam was very significant in retarding the development of culture. Between 650 A.D. and 700 A.D. the fanatic Moors conquered three fourths of the coastal region of the Mediterranean, which remained in their control until the eleventh century. The Belgian historian Pirenne has shown the catastrophic consequences of this conquest. Roman culture was of the cities, based upon the Mediterranean commerce. Such trade was now paralyzed; gradually life in the cities became untenable. The center of society was removed to the rural areas. Feudalism arose with its large landed estates, knights, serfs, and other subordinates. Agriculture took the place of commerce. Industrial arts and crafts languished in decadent cities.

The awakening

Only in the later Middle Ages, between 1300 and 1500, did the general condition of life again become such that cities could once more flourish. The merchants gave the impetus to this revival. The old commercial cities, Venice and Genoa, had, as early as about 1000, rediscovered the overseas route to the world center, Constantinople. Flemish cities later blossomed to great prosperity. The merchant class, mainly composed of runaway serfs or adventurers, ever extended the bounds of their trade journeys. The merchants' demand for products again gave rise to thriving crafts. The need of a centralization of production, felt by the merchants, and the demand for skilled labor,
brought the _guilds_ into existence. At the close of the Middle Ages the guilds were important structures which we must discuss briefly.

In addition to the power of the great landed estates and of the church, the cities witnessed the concentration of the power of the guilds. In the ensuing struggle of the guilds against the landowners and the church, the guilds were finally to gain the upper hand. The union of tradesmen in the monopolistic guilds, with their rigorous social regulation, had a very favourable influence on the training of the craftsmen, on the quality and control of the products, and on the promotion of social justice and peace in society.

What was remarkable about the guilds was that they embraced much more than mere technical economic activity. Their program included all manner of interests. Through the guilds people were represented politically, in the city government; police service was regulated by the guilds; festivities and funerals fell within their scope. The guilds even had their individual altars in the church. The concentric collectivization of the rising civic or third estate (that of the burghers) around trade and industry as the foundation stones of their prosperity was an obvious process. Thus they became societal relationships, which integrated various activities. For this reason _sphere-sovereignty_ did not come into its own in them.

The favorable qualities of the guilds were offset by the harmful fact that by their hold upon the whole of life, and by their gradually developed, rigid network of regulations, they checked historical progress. This check was no hindrance as long as there were no impulses for development. But when trade and technique began to develop and open ever new outlooks, the guild-structure became an obstacle. The rise of social tensions proved that the guilds could not keep pace with the expansion. The original intention that every craftsman was to become a master, could not be realized. Especially in the larger guilds of the weaver industry, there arose, therefore, a permanent class of workers who frequently went on strike. Nevertheless, the guilds retained their influence for a long time. It was not until the close of the eighteenth century that they were everywhere completely disbanded.

The guilds shared the conservative and collectivistic character of the church and the feudal communities controlled by the nobility. The church, feudal associations, and the guilds struggled among themselves for influence. And yet the most important phenomenon in the period following the Middle Ages was the liberation from the bonds in which these powers held life inclosed. The new age is the age of the _unfolding of the sphere-sovereignty of the different spheres of life._
A parallel movement occurred on the spiritual level, viz., a process leading to the disruption of the church of the Middle Ages. Out of the latter arose humanism and the Reformation. Spiritual unity and spiritual life were broken into three fundamental divergent streams.

In the course of events the social and the spiritual processes were interdependent, and influenced and stimulated each other. The Reformation, especially that of Calvin, was the great stimulant for a dynamic cultural attitude, and a religious justification and rehabilitation for trade and industry. In that time humanism exercised a much smaller influence upon the general course of events than is often supposed. In contrast to the Reformation, which was a popular movement, the Renaissance and humanism developed within the higher circles of society with the exception of Italy. Not until the end of the seventeenth century did humanism acquire an increasing significance for the course of human life. From that time on, and especially in the nineteenth century the influence of the Reformation upon society gradually began to diminish.

After the Middle Ages new traits appeared in Western humanity. These traits were manifest particularly in commerce, technique and science, and gave to man himself, to his personality, a greater significance in society than he formerly had. His urge to do research, to build, to invent and to venture were awakened. Such strongly dynamic traits were stimulated by the growing conviction that man is called to control and to develop nature.

In each of these three spiritual currents, albeit on very different ground and for widely divergent aims, is in evidence the idea of control and progress, so characteristic of Western culture. The Faustian man, the Prometheus, who stole fire from heaven, predominates in the picture of Western civilization. Man, who previously adapted himself to nature, now made room for the man who adapts nature to his hand — from the defensive he goes over to the offensive, driven either by religious humility, or by humanistic arrogance.

Prosperity and decay

As we have said already, humanism gradually took the lead in practical life. The "Aufklärung" and the French Revolution were humanistic victories. They stood at the beginning of the individualistic society, because at that time the individualistic spiritual movement of renaissance and humanism conquered the field of practical life. It is therefore incorrect to view the period before the Middle Ages and the seventeenth century as a homogeneous whole, as is done, e.g., by
Mannheim, Burnham, and Riesman. Mannheim distinguishes this period as individualistic from the collectivism of the times before and after it. According to Burnham medieval feudalism was replaced by modern capitalism, and the latter was followed by the managerial society developing in our own days. And finally Riesman argues that there has been a continuous change from a type of society in which men were ruled by tradition via a society in which they were directed by their own inner motives ("inner-directed"), towards present day society in which they are directed by others ("other-directed"). The secularized conception of history by these authors is the main reason for their confusion. They have no eye for the religious meaning of life in the time of Reformation, a meaning that Western culture has since lost. And owing to that fact they do not observe the essential difference in motivation, causing an essential difference in the forms of society for the time of the Reformation and the nineteenth century; the former was neither individualistic nor collectivistic, differing in conception and practice of authority as well as in the meaning and form of community and of man's freedom. In the nineteenth century a society arose according to a man-centered view of life.

At the time of the French Revolution, Western civilization came in contact with an event of no lesser significance: the rise of modern industry. The latter was the fruit of the exertion in the domain of trade, science, and technical craft in former centuries. The new period is really marked by the meeting of science and technique. Since that time there has come into the foreground the application of science to practical problems, an application first made in the technical and later in other spheres. Technique in turn flourished greatly when its problems were tackled with scientific methods. In itself, however, this was not yet sufficient to produce modern industry. Another factor was needed to coordinate and stimulate technical activity, by the demand for technical products. The old handicraft was wholly unfitted. The large scale enterprise led by men of a progressive, bold, and adventurous spirit, was able to catch hold of this development. All that such captains of industry asked for was the removal of social obstacles depriving them of their freedom of action to expand their plants and to extend their markets. Such a general social condition stood at their disposal in the nineteenth century. Industrial enterprises quickly came to great prosperity. Their capacity grew steadily and their influence upon the life of the community constantly increased.

The appraisal of this development is not a simple matter. It would have to take into account a technique advancing by leaps and bounds;
an impetuous economic life, springing up more or less chaotically; and a complex of social evil that speedily fastened upon the body of society, like barnacles upon a vessel at sea. The question is, however, how are we to evaluate this new society as a whole? How do the light and shady aspects balance each other? How ought they to be related to one another in the light of that period?

Did Western civilization, at the opening of the industrial age of the nineteenth century, miss the boat? Was it switched to the wrong track? Must the causes of the colossal problems whose solution we must now work out, be sought here: the problem of national-socialism and communism, the problem of the radical change in the social structure and of the decadence of our culture? Many think that the source of our perplexities lies in the social abuses of the previous century.

But granted that this be so, the next question is, who was to blame for these social evils? What caused them? Such questions are usually answered by putting the blame on the economic plutocrats, the capitalists. By their greed they allowed the laboring class to be starved. Others regard the capitalist as a consequence rather than as a cause of the difficulties. Capitalists were but an accompanying phenomenon of the social system that arose in the previous century; the system of free enterprise, which led to the exploitation and oppression of the weak.

It may indeed be presumed that the cause of our present social problems and conflicts ought to be sought in the period in which our society took such a decisively new course, the period of the rise of modern large-scale industry.

But when I grant that to cope with the distress of our time we must reach back to the social derailment of the past century, it must be added directly that such an explanation of the source of our present distress is superficial and onesided. Its superficiality must be overcome by bringing the spiritual development into the discussion. The de-Christianizing of life in the last century, and even earlier, has greatly influenced the course of events. Whoever ignores this fact limits his causes to the surface, and fails to find a remedy.

The given presentation of the state of affairs is one-sided in that it ignores or minimizes the improvement in the conditions of life in the nineteenth century, which concerned all social groups, and which may be deduced indirectly from the enormous increase in population. From 1800 to 1940 the population of England increased 4.5 times; of Germany 3.5 times; of Italy 2.5 times. In the light of our present problems, some are disposed to underestimate the positive side of the nineteenth century. And, on the other hand, by pointing exclusive-
ly to the social needs that then arose, these critics take too light a view of its problems and difficulties. The social needs of the nineteenth century certainly stand out most, but there were also dangers lurking in the structural changes of society. In general such social distress has practically been overcome in Western society. But in the light of the principles discussed in the previous chapter, the change in the structure of society is what causes the greatest difficulties in the twentieth century.

There is something more to be said, for when the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are compared with prior periods, a striking contrast appears. Formerly, society developed slowly, traditional forms dominated (even in times of revolution). But since the rise of modern industry everything in society has begun to move and seems to be subject to rapid change and progress. Not only the nature of the change but especially its tempo confronts us with exceptional difficulties. The demand to adapt to constantly and rapidly changing situations, and even to appraise and to direct them, adds entirely new dimensions to the cultural task of humanity.

To name but one example, consider the question of education. Rules of conduct, morals, and manners with which parents were familiar in their youth could formerly be applied, in the main, to their children. Such transmission is now no longer feasible—a significant background for the disintegration of the family bond.

There have been two periods in which the tempo of change was accelerated even more considerably: the first half of the nineteenth century, and the recent past, not yet at an end. We shall now discuss the first period.

The social problem

To simply blame the social derailment arising with the flourishing of industry on those directing industrialization, viz., scientists, technicians, and especially men of enterprise, is to overlook the problems brought on by the acceleration of cultural development.

These people were overwhelmed by the results of their own enterprise. Seizing the chance to expand their activity with courage, perseverance, and penetration, they took the risk in a sudden new world of tremendous perspectives. To their amazement no limits seemed to be imposed upon the expansion of their undertaking. But on the other hand, they were constantly balanced on the very verge of an abyss. The risk of utter ruin accompanied their every step. Many vanished from the scene; only a few managed to persevere. Such facts dominated
the life of the entrepreneurs. It was a matter of life and death. They were ever and again ready to assume the risk of success or failure.

In consequence the life of the community developed tremendously. Floods of workmen moved from rural areas to the cities. In the industrial districts of England, during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, cities increased their population three to eight times over. Sometimes the workmen came from afar, e.g., the many Irishmen who for work and shelter migrated to the English industrial regions. The cities had to provide for countless new inhabitants. The situation was beyond control. Even exceptionally humane industrialists could not in a short time provide so many with adequate living and working conditions in the factories and mines. Work and men were in abundance, but that was all. The rest had to be improvised amid an impetuous expansion of the population and business. They made a virtue out of necessity. Emergency housing and factories were found. The rest and stability necessary to improve the temporary arrangements was lacking. Finally, the status quo was accepted as a matter of course and considered reasonable. It is well to remember, however, that the situation of the new citizens was often not any worse than it had been previously.

And those in possession of the new economic power were, moreover, usually men whose early environment and training did not equip them to reform society harmoniously. The successful ones knew how to maintain their own business, and in the early stages they were often producers and inventors. But they were entirely at a loss how to deal with the problems of a community of working people.

When the circumstances and the time are considered, the question of blame is not so simple as it is ordinarily represented. But excuses do not detract from the great injustice committed against the workmen and their families. To be taken by surprise by unexpected conditions, and lack of training to cope with problems, is a mitigating circumstance. But it is not an excuse for allowing a merciless situation to become permanent, and in many respects to become even worse. However difficult it is now to appraise that situation, generally speaking there can be no doubt that working hours and conditions, wages and housing, and especially the destiny of women and children, cannot pass the test of unbiased review and criticism.

The situation was aggravated when these abuses were defended by the liberal theory that society could develop only by running its natural course; providing society be allowed to unfold freely, nature would ultimately iron out all of society's failures and faults. But nature had very little to say in the matter, and equally little, the pious
touch lent to this doctrine by the slogan: "God helps those that help themselves; that is the basis of all religion."

Decisive for the course of events were the norms that were applied as well as the motivation. In this respect the situation is clear. The malformation of the social structure is to be blamed upon the exaggeration of the economic aspect of society. The nineteenth century is, in a social sense, the century of economism. Money was the measure of the value of everything. In keeping with the task given to man at creation, human work is, in its essence, the service of God. It was now debased to an economic commodity, of no other value than its corresponding monetary worth. The laborer who should have been treated as a fellow man, a co-worker, was exclusively regarded from an abstract economic viewpoint, even when something was undertaken for his good. Christ's great law of love did not seem to count here.

While making due allowance for exceptions, and with the reservations discussed, the captains of industry, the men of big business in the nineteenth century are to a considerable degree responsible for the intolerable social misery of their laborers. When the interests of their subordinates were concerned, many industrialists gave evidence of a callous, selfish, loveless mentality, a mentality still encountered in our own society, behind the gabble of benevolent phrases and sympathetic gestures. And such is found not only in big contractors, nor is it solely a feature of modern times. Calvin teaches us that also in this respect there is nothing new under the sun; and that we have to beware of foolish reactions.8

It is easy to go astray in our judgment. The wrath of socialism may have been justly brought down upon a great social injustice, but socialism, in its turn, was all too ready with its scheme of the wicked capitalists and the noble proletarians. Such a generalizing scheme is generally unfair; it is even dangerous. We might flatter ourselves with the vain hope that once the account with the capitalist is settled, everything will henceforth go just right. Fortunately experience has now taught many socialists to discard this dual classification; human wickedness is no longer the exclusive property of the capitalists. That is a gain of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the original socialistic antithesis of capitalists and proletarians is not simply a tenet of socialists; it is deeply rooted in popular opinion. It reveals itself repeatedly in conversation, writing, and social planning.

What we forget is that the industrialists, who rapidly rose to prominence, were men subject to like passions as we. The difference is that they were exposed to a great temptation, to which many
succumbed. They were tempted because there was no *counter balance* to their growing power and riches. They took full advantage of the situation, ignoring all other values. There was no bridle to their enterprise other than market and competition. And in their greed for gain they were blind to all forms of human distress about them.

The workmen fell prey to their excess. The price that humanity had to pay for the enormous progress of its culture was *man* himself; the workman in the factory, trampled under foot; and the industrialist, whose vocational life is derailed. In addition humanity had to pay with the *deformation of society* and the increasing loss of a Christian social order.

Those in power in the last century thus provided the basis for the equally dangerous constructions now proposed by social utopians and seekers of security.

The development in the nineteenth century is a slow motion picture of what has taken place in Communistic Russia since 1917. The Russians are in a hurry to catch up. Man must again pay the toll; such development is at his expense. But the injustice now done to him towers high above the social injustice of the nineteenth century. The increase in injustice is not solely a difference in tempo. Formerly the events and the struggle for economic power of individuals took man by surprise. In Russia he is deliberately trampled underfoot as the result of a conscious intentional totalitarian effort; the injustice done is a part of the planning.

Some blame our difficulties not so much upon the great industrialists but rather upon the *social system* of the nineteenth century. Such a reproach is the final word of socialistic criticism of society. The conclusion is obvious. Our problems can be solved simply by replacing a capitalistic by a socialistic society; by exchanging free enterprise by controlled direction and planning from above. This brings us to the heart of our discussion, but we shall restrict our remarks for the present to a single observation.

It is necessary to distinguish sharply between the method, as such, employed in the last century in business and industry, and its deterioration into what I have called *economism*. Disapproval of the latter is legitimate, but to reject the method of free enterprise as such is to disregard the nature of economic life.

The preference given by nineteenth century industrialists to *enterprise* rather than to a desire for *smug security* was in itself a good
thing, conforming to the mandate of creation. Likewise, the acceptance of personal responsibility and of risks is preferable to the transfer of that responsibility to a collective and in fact to an elite, and the abolition of risks. In this sphere, at least, such people understood man’s destination on earth and what is a necessary condition for the growth of culture and civilization.

But the objection is made that industrialists were concerned solely with their own profits. Serving is then opposed to earning. Hardensett, for example, praises an engineer as an altruist who lives to serve, but degrades an industrial enterpriser as an egoist who only wishes to earn. Verkuyl makes the same distinction. In the capitalistic community the emphasis is supposed to lie on profits. In his view the alternative is: Are we to secure the highest possible profits, or are we to satisfy human needs as well and as cheaply as possible? And Verkuyl concludes that only a directed, planned economy, is in harmony with the prayer: Give us this day our daily bread. The error in this reasoning is, as I see it, that between serving and earning there need be no contradiction, so that the method of free enterprise, as such, does not stand in the way to serving one’s neighbor. On the contrary, the freedom of enterprise, which Verkuyl would push to the background, is the necessary — though not all-sufficient — requirement for maximal service.

Whatever may be the grievances against the mental attitude of many industrialists, for a long time serving and earning run parallel. Even though their relation is often awry, the great majority of proprietors are concerned with more than profit; they also consider the services their enterprise must supply. Moreover, in profits there is always implied a portion of service to the welfare of the enterprise and hence to the benefit of society. To foster a better attitude than that of an individualistic capitalism, we must rise above the dilemma of earning and serving. The real meaning of human labor is service to God; such ought to appear in the fruit accruing to the individual and to his neighbor, and in the ensuing harmony between them.

The church and the social problem

The church is often numbered, with the capitalists and the social system, among the culprits of the last century. It is accused of being blind to social needs and conservatively in cahoots with the ruling and property class. The church is, therefore, deemed responsible for its own apostasy and among others for the rise of communism. Such
charges may be heard especially from churchmen themselves, e.g., Barth, Brunner, Dippel, Banning, Stryd. 11

Much indeed may be blamed on the church, and on church people, too, for that matter. Wanting in its protest, falling short in love, the church behaved as one that has arrived; in brief, it was the church of all ages, and if it had not been the property of Christ, it would have gone down ingloriously.

But the accusation is made so systematically, with such generalization and one-sidedness that we cannot help asking if there is not something hidden behind it. Such seems to be the case. I would therefore point out a few things.

First of all, such onesided criticism loses sight of the fact that the church was also caught by surprise by the tempo and the radical character of the industrial development. And within the church, people were also easily disposed to think that there was no other way out. Moreover, the prevailing distress was estimated by comparison with social conditions of former times. Hindsight is always easy. We would do well to put ourselves in the time in question. And in addition, the churches were usually much occupied with serious troubles and schisms. 121 And some churches were themselves oppressed, e.g., the Seceders of 1834 in Holland. 13

Before such general charges are made, evidence should first be brought forth to show that the pulpits of the day were completely without protest against the iniquities of the rising industry. Proof to the contrary is more readily forthcoming. Apart from this the critics of the church ought at least to point to an array of nineteenth century Christians who sounded the alarm, e.g., Maurice, Kinsley, Wichern, Stöcker, Von Ketteler, Von Vogelsang, Da Costa, Groen van Prinsterer, Heldring, Kuyper. We are inclined to presume, moreover, that a greater number of less known Christians also spoke out against the prevailing social conditions.

It is not my intention to create the impression that the church did what it could. Far from it. One important cause of this was to be found in the subordination of the church to the state in countries where it had lost its independence, as in Russia, or in Lutheran countries; or in England in the case of the Established (or Anglican) church, and in the Netherlands where the Dutch Reformed church was under the domination of the state from 1816 onwards. An independent formulation and critique of the social situation, which in such a case had to be directed against the state as well, was practically impossible.

I am especially struck, however, by the fact that when the church is reproached in this connection, many assign to it a much broader
task than it then had, and in the light of its qualified divine call in my opinion ought to have. And further, the church’s critics frequently forget to mention the fact that the steady advance of the denial of the Christ of the Scriptures had produced decay and impotence in the church of the nineteenth century. Bearing this in mind it is a striking feature in such criticism that the secular world is always excused; humanism, socialism, and even communism are held up to the church, that it may learn how the social problem should be handled. To ease the pain the observation is offered that if the church would really tackle the question, it would do it still better. Finally it is striking how easily the message of Christ is reduced to a gospel of social justice.

This reflection is closely related to a couple of conceptions: the Christian commiseration with those who suffer from social injustice, the dialectical theology, “break-through” propaganda (the de-Christianization of hitherto Christian organizations), and the high church movement which looks upon the church as a national, all-embracing institution.

When irrationalism obscures the clarity of the Bible concerning the congregation of believers, and when the radical all-inclusive character of the biblical message and the effect of apostasy is forgotten, it is not difficult to cling to the idea of a church for everyone and to eradicate the boundaries between the church and the world, between Christian and so-called neutral activities. Then the sympathetic concern for social problems, and the anxiety about the cultural decline, point the way to the localization of those certainties without which even irrationalism, although inconsistent on this point, cannot get along. The church becomes the fulcrum, social justice becomes the goal, and socialism carries the standard of honor. Some would add characteristically dialectical statements in which the exception becomes the rule, e.g., “A man who turns his back upon the church, may by that very attitude be saved religiously”; or: “The church must learn from socialism”; and also: “A humanist may very well be a better Christian than the man who goes to church twice every Sunday.”

Of course not every follower of Barth or every adherent of the above mentioned neutralization and secularization of organized life ascribes to such reasoning. The taste for paradoxes is specially reserved for extremists. Many join up only in part; not a few just walk along, likely from sentimental considerations. Still I think such views as described above are the prevailing opinion in the Netherlands. Their adherents have in view such a tolerant, benevolent church, unlimited in its task,
that the church of the previous century must indeed have been the chief culprit in the social misery.

A great deal of what we have discussed here is typically Dutch. In the U.S.A. the idea of a Christian organization (or, more generally, an organization based upon a particular view of life and the world) is something unknown. One of the most important reasons for this lack of explicitly Christian organizations is the strong sense of solidarity prevailing among Americans.

*Siegfried* lays great stress on this trait in the American character.\textsuperscript{14} It is due to necessity as much as to the desire of the people to be a nation in spite of the diversity of origin among Americans. Their sense of solidarity is intensified by the fact that they are a young nation, an enthusiastic and dynamic people.

On the other hand, *Davenport* holds that all this is in America only a system, and that, unlike the people of France and England, the Americans do not form a real community.\textsuperscript{15} When we introduce the distinction *Lewin* makes,\textsuperscript{16} the contradiction between *Siegfried* and *Davenport* is more apparent than real. *Lewin* compares Americans with Germans. But in my opinion the comparison holds for the whole of Western Europe as well. An American easily makes friends, but his friendship remains restricted to the peripheral layers of his personality. The approach to the most intimate sphere of man seems to be much more difficult with an American than with a German. During my journey through the United States, I repeatedly tried to establish contacts on the most fundamental level, and these attempts continually turned out to be a failure. My acquaintances were more or less embarrassed by my procedure. With respect to the subject in hand the important point is that the American evidently keeps his convictions (apart from the question whether or not they occupy his mind consciously) outside of his social contacts. Thus no fundamental differences of opinion come to the light of day, and no motives are created to base activities on a view of life such as forms the foundation of a Christian organization. The question whether this reserve is the cause or the result of a strong (but more or less superficial) sense of solidarity may here be left undecided. There will probably be some truth in both views. But the effect of this state of affairs is that in America the personal outlook as well as religious belief are hardly recognizable, or not at all, as the real driving power of culture. With most people Christianity gives the impression of being a matter of sentiment. Whatever advantages this feeling of solidarity may have, we should not be blind to the danger that at a time of a more and more serious loss of faith, and of an increasing process of de-Chris-
tianization, this reserve with regard to the most fundamental motivation of human activities may prove to be the Achilles heel of the American way of life and of the American community.

Noteworthy is the fact that many Christians who turn to socialism seem to discover in the Bible only one subject: The social problem and the demand for social justice. This theme does indeed play a great role in the Old and New Testament, and yet it is but one of many (Ex. 21; Gal. 5; Col. 3). Besides, it is a derivative motif. The Bible does not view social injustice by itself but as the consequence of a greater evil, the source of all evil, namely, that men do not fear God, do not keep His commandments, and bow down to idols (e.g., II Kings 17) (at present the idols are: man and society). Such is the fountain head of life’s errors, the source of humanism, irresponsible capitalism, social distress, and the impotence of socialism.

Of course, some may argue, we have not forgotten the root cause of our difficulty. But the fervor of their argument and their systematic neglect of certain aspects of the problem make me fear that this knowledge is cerebral and that their heart lives in the social issue only. Such are aroused by transgressions of the eighth commandment, “Thou shalt not steal,” and of the tenth, “Thou shalt not covet,” viewed as a commandment meant for others. The level of the socialists is thus indeed reached, but the gospel is forgotten, a message inseverable from the exordium; “I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee up out of the house of bondage.”

Allow me to put it most boldly. The whole social problem is of absolutely no importance when compared to the command to fear the Lord. Any Christian who places human relationships on a par with the relation between man and God, or regards the human sphere as separate and independent of the latter relation, thereby discloses that his Christianity has been infected by humanism.

The command, “Love thy neighbor”, is a Christian precept, but when detached and removed from the framework of the great commandment: “Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart...” it ceases to be such, in a very real sense. It is likewise erroneous to think that compliance with the command to love one’s neighbor is at the same time a fulfillment of the chief commandment to love God. Otto rightly opposes any absorption of holiness by morality and the consummate good. Indeed our age lacks a real sense of creatureliness (Kreaturgefühl) as well as a sense of the “mysterium tremendum” (the frightful mystery).¹⁷

The humanizing phenomenon is so frequently encountered. In it the call of God and the obligation to serve Him as an individual and
in a group is replaced by the call of the other man and finally by the
call of man himself, of his needs, the only source of his motivation. 18
The process of humanizing reality has also influenced Christian
circles. When Sargent, considering the challenge to the church, looks
for basic concepts of the Christian action, he states: “The first of
these basic concepts is the Biblical idea of human dignity and
individual personality.” 19 This is, however, an unbiblical statement
of man and a mere profane view of life.

Consider also a few quotations from Kuylaars: “Labor is a
realization of self.” “In industrial enterprise the laborer is central
and primary. Capital is simply an aid; it occupies a secondary position,
together with those who supply it.” 20 This statement is intended as a
reply to liberalism but this answer is wrong; the laboring man is not
central. In this case the fruits of labor as the fulfilment of the
Cultural task are central. Another proposition of Kuylaars is: “The
freedom of man must be defined as: The active determination of the
will to self-possession.” It appears to me, that with Kuylaars, and in
general in Roman Catholic circles, this abstracting and making
independent of the human, as over against the religious relation
shows itself more or less systematically and is related to the autonomy
of the natural in the scheme of nature and grace.

Van der Ven further illustrates this point of view when he says
that the aims and purposes of the communal life must be directed
toward man.

Aberrations of this kind are surely not innocent. They put Christians
on the wrong track in their planning and deeds. For example,
Pedersen states that: “If ever peace and righteousness are to exist
among men, then their material necessities must be satisfied, so that
distress and want shall disappear. But this can be done only with the
help of technique.” 21 Peace and righteousness, however, come when
man is reconciled to God. Both may be present even when distress
and want exist. Both may be lacking, as in today’s secularized world,
when distress and want are in fact relieved. Such is the Christian
outlook on life, the direct opposite of socialism. Such ideas as those
of Pedersen lose the message of the gospel and eradicate the latter’s
differences from socialism.

Perhaps it is not in order but at this point I feel constrained to
acknowledge that in criticizing certain opinions of another, one
always has the disagreeable feeling of not doing full justice to the
whole of the other’s viewpoint. There is, after all, no alternative. The
reader will have to keep the fact as well as the inevitability of such
one-sidedness in mind, especially in the choice of illustrations.
The structural problem
The social problem, the distress of the working class, provides a very important introduction to the social development in our age; but it is not the only factor that played a rôle. We shall now discuss a matter of even greater concern: the structural alteration of society in the nineteenth century, which has left more enduring marks in our society although the social problem generally continues to receive far more attention.

I refer to the concentration of power in the economic sphere, the influence of which upset the balance between authority and freedom in large-scale industry, and played havoc with the balance of power among the various social units in accordance with their sphere-sovereignty. Both phenomena are closely connected with the economistic attitude of the nineteenth century; and both arose, together with this attitude, in a suitable environment. In the economic field the potentialities in technique and science made possible a mighty concentration of power, and on the other hand the de-Christianization deprived the industrialist of the proper mental attitude to restrain the process of power formation. Moreover, the means of restoring any counterbalancing force were lacking; increasing secularization contributed to the weakening of spiritual resistance. The latter concerned both the other societal relationships and the subordinates within big industry.

The structural development within industry
Ordinarily the nineteenth century is described as individualistic and the twentieth century as collectivistic. To do so is only partly correct. Individualism was characteristic of the economic procedure of the captains of industry (outside the industry). A closer examination reveals a collectivistic trend within the industry of the nineteenth century. That tendency was connected with the fact that the balance between authority and freedom in the industrial enterprise was being slowly but unmistakably disturbed. It concerned the relation of the industrial leaders to the workmen. Or, more precisely, the relation of the freedom of action of the latter in the performance of their labor to the sum total of the imposed regulations with which they were bound to comply. The issue is then free responsibility in labor.

At the beginning of the industrial period that relation was not extensively disturbed. Modern technique was still in its infancy. And scientific management was so little employed that the direction of the actual work still had to be left largely to the workmen.

Originally nothing was said about regular time schedules. It was
quite common for a factory hand to take free days off, even when the factory was loaded with orders. Here and there men worked thirteen or fourteen hours a day and would then take off from Saturday noon until Tuesday; or even longer. And this is only an illustration of the situation. Industry was in its first stage; improvisation prevailed above system; spontaneity above orderliness.

As industrial undertakings became more massive and the relations in economic life began to crystalize so that competition became a question of serious consideration, the masters of industry began to bestow attention upon internal order. To that end they sought the assistance of scientifically trained engineers, who came in ever greater numbers from the polytechnical schools. The alliance of technique and science now yielded a new harvest. The second phase of the industrial era dawned. The first was concerned with an attack upon nature in order to control the manufactured article. The attention of the new technical scientific approach was now focused on production accomplished by man. The second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth have sought to bring about a rational and economic condition of labor, in cooperation with a hierarchy, thereby making possible effective direction and control. At present, such control is exercised by economists and sociologists, in addition to engineers.

The change that took place at this stage is of great significance for the balance between authority and freedom in the industrial undertakings. The economic onesidedness of the change led to the disturbance of this equilibrium in the big enterprises, in the sense that freedom in labor grew constantly more restricted, and the competence to make decisions about work were transferred vertically and placed in the hands of management. The workman was increasingly deprived of personal care and responsibility for his work. Increasingly his thinking was done for him.

Such a course was taken because with a wider compass and range of the units of production, the planning and ordering of production must needs become stricter. The excess of this development, which first got a good start in our century (Taylor, Ford), came about because there was an eye only for isolated economical motives. And such was possible because of modern science and technique.

Worthy of note is the fact that this question is treated so lightly. The reason may be that the dictatorship over labor arose noiselessly; and while it deprived the workman of his freedom of movement, it freed him also from disagreeable details of his work. Besides, the relief from responsibility has ever been welcome to man, who by nature is disposed to take it easy.
The seriousness of these facts, however, is undeniable. Recall my discussion of authority and freedom. Authority exists that man may fulfil his most original vocation in an orderly social manner: *To live and labor in liberty, with direct responsibility to God.* But in the aforesaid development, industrial authority pushed itself between man and his Creator. The domain of responsibility in freedom was narrowed ever more severely and crowded with regulations imposed by the managers, against which only a constrained responsibility of the workman could exist. The difference is crystal clear if the work of the man in the smithy is compared with the task of a man at the conveyor in a factory.

Of critical seriousness is the fact that in our day so much attention is fixed upon the social problem, while we have to do with a much more serious question: the distress of labor itself; a problem in contrast to which the issue of wages and prices vanishes to a nonentity. That Marx was angered over social injustice and that he distinguished between workman and employer, and placed them in opposition, was correct for the first half of the nineteenth century. But thereafter these aspects of the social relations have steadily lost their significance. Industry introduced regulations for the internal ordering of labor, and outside influences began to operate, which gradually relieved the social distress. For the ordering of labor it became necessary to call into being a whole series of functions between workman and employers so that the contrasts between these groups really decreased, thanks to the intermediate functions that came about. As stated, in this way the extreme ordering gave rise to an entirely new problem: *the enslavement of labor.*

Whoever overlooks this problem and still devotes all his attention to the social distress and the contrasts between the worker and the capitalist, will be rightly accused of conservatism by posterity in their view of history a hundred years hence — if posterity will still be able to utter accusations. Posterity will say of a man of 1950 that he was stubbornly occupied with the problems of the nineteenth century, while overlooking the issues of his own time. Of the church, they will say that its newly awakened social concern came a hundred years too late and was already out of date. They will accuse the church of forgetting to protest against the spiritual murder of labor, even as we blame the church of a hundred years ago for generally forgetting to protest against the social injustice done to workmen. Posterity will charge the church of 1956 of being in league with the new powers, the socialist elite.
Structural development outside of industry

Not only was the internal balance of the industrial enterprise disturbed, but the same thing happened to the external equilibrium between it and other societal relationships. Since the middle of the nineteenth century this balance was replaced by the domination of the economic social units over the other societal relationships. The economic relationships continued to expand through technique; their influence upon the life of the community increased; the standard of value in economic life, money, increasingly became the measure of value in all of life.

As a result of centuries of development the various social units had achieved their mutual independence in the nineteenth century. But then a remarkable phenomenon occurred, a movement arose which formally preserved this hard-won independence, but which factually cancelled it and replaced it by an ever increasing subordination of all other relationships to economic organizations. On a positive process of development was projected a decadent tendency to decay. The domination of the economic sector and of economic motives concerned especially those relationships in which the worker functioned, particularly his family life. But the influence of an aggressive industrial life made itself felt elsewhere as well. The first trade war was the one between England and Holland from 1652–1654. Again, in a later century, wars were of this character through the rise of large-scale industry, and this economic character was even more strongly emphasized. International political relations were strongly determined by economic factors. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, matters of war and peace were increasingly decided by technical and economic balances of power. Raw materials and spheres of trade became the spoils of war.

Within and beyond national boundaries governments were made subservient to the maintenance and expansion of monopolistic interests acquired by big business. Economic life, technique, and science inclined to wipe out national boundaries, confronted the national authorities with accomplished facts, and brought them into forced situations. Behind the curtains of conventional politics sat the men who, through their financial power, knew with increasing success how to have the political game played according to their own hand. The situation is frequently exaggerated, as if the politicians were but mere figureheads for bankers and business men, but still the latter had undeniable and great influence upon the course of events; the more so because with some justice they could plead that their business interests were also a part of the interests of the nation.
Of the other relationships of society the church merits our attention. Its position was certainly not a dependent one. And yet in a certain sense it had to yield to the new powers. For all sorts of reasons it lost the great spiritual influence it had formerly exercised over the community. It was no longer able to give forceful and effectual direction to the spirits of the time; it could only stand and watch the passing parade of social events.

The powerful position of the economic aspect of life did not go unchallenged. Where the oppression was greatest, the forces of resistance became manifest. The labor movement began to organize against the power of the captains of industry. This subject falls outside the scope of this book, so that I shall limit myself to a single factual observation.

From the start, the attention of the socialistic labor movement was understandably occupied with the economic position of the workman; with which his social distress was most intimately connected. And furthermore, according to Marxian doctrine, ultimately economic conditions were always decisive. (It is worth mentioning that by these conditions were really meant the control as well as the level of production. And technique is the core of production.)

Marx's appraisal of the situation did not induce him to attempt the gradual improvement of the worker's lot. Such was impossible in his theory. The only course open to him was the struggle for power between organized labor and management; the control of the means of production was at stake. The aim of the struggle was not to restore a disturbed equilibrium but to reverse the position of power by the annihilation of the oppressor and the seizure of power by organized workers in their own interest. Marx's program did not include the rehabilitation of labor in the then existing society. The status of the laborer would inevitably become more and more humiliating. He was, and would be, increasingly subordinate to financial power and the machine. The dignity of labor would come about only in the socialistic society after the great revolution.

Marx and his followers championed the rights of the workers in a one-sided and exaggerated manner. He was one-sidedly concerned with economic power and not with the dignity of labor. By not seeking to restore the proper relations within society and by seeking a complete disruption of these relationships, namely, a revolution both in the positions of power and in the structure of society, the Marxists were guilty of exaggeration.

The merit of the Christian trade union was that it did not desire a
break between the leaders and labor; instead it desired the restoration of the communal mind and proper relations in economic life. Its immediate purpose was to gain respect for the workman as a human being.

The errors of the old socialism have avenged themselves. It is true that to a large extent the new socialistic movement, which aimed at changing the existing society and, therefore, split off from the radical communistic movement, has revised both errors, but it has not fully corrected them. (Compare Bernstein, Kautsky, Jaures.) The socialistic movement has always remained something of a hybrid with respect to revolutions, political strikes, and class relations both within and without industry. It has never entirely abandoned Marxian ideas. One of Hitler's strongest points against socialism and communism was his propaganda for the restoration of the dignity of labor. This is important, as much of a workman's life is made up of his labor. And if Marx was followed, the improvement of labor could be expected only in the communistic society still to come. Hitler's slogans, therefore, appealed to labor's self respect, something that had been so long lacking.

The Communist and the socialistic effort to change radically the structural nature of society, whether by revolution or evolution, may properly be called the great error of the age. We shall have occasion to refer to this point repeatedly.

The response of the twentieth century to the challenge of the nineteenth century

We are now in a position to give a more general account of how the twentieth century reacted to the society of the nineteenth century. We have seen that in the nineteenth century the great industrialists had gradually attained to such a powerful position that the freedom of their subordinates in their labor was increasingly constrained. Moreover, the economic aspect threatened to dominate all other areas of society.

The first distortion, the loss of freedom, extended itself into the twentieth century. However, two correctives made their appearance to deal with the distorted relation between authority and freedom within industry. The first of them tended to dismiss the problem. If there need not be any freedom for the factory or office worker, it was possible and even proper to complete the automation of labor. Then, on the other hand, in the last twenty years or so the justice and utility of recognizing the factory worker as a human being also in his work
has dawned upon some people here and there. The attempt is made to treat man as a personality rather than as a mere function.

As to the situation outside the factory, there came a strong reaction to the threat against sphere-sovereignty. This reaction arose especially in the societal relationship whose independence was threatened most by economic domination, and whose nature made it best suited to offer a strong resistance, viz., the state.

In the given situation a government could preserve its independence in two ways. It could break up and spread the concentration of economic power or it could assume economic power itself. To follow the first course would be proper; it would lead to the restoration of the balance of social forces, to the maintenance of sphere-sovereignty. The second course is similar to exorcising the devil with the aid of Beelzebub. The equilibrium disturbed by economic forces is restored insofar as the state is concerned but the price that is paid is a greater disturbance of the balance of all society. A combination of economic and political power is simply substituted in the place of economic supremacy.

Undoubtedly, at times the first course has been followed, e.g., the anti-trust laws in the United States. But as a whole, governments have followed the second path slowly and surely. Step by step the twentieth century has entangled economic life with political power. The government has matched its power of the sword with economic power. This process really began in World War I. It was accelerated in the crisis of the 30's and in World War II.

The circumstance noted a moment ago explains why the political and economic aspects occupy such an important place in this book. It will presently be evident that this circumstance also necessitates an examination of the social, the technical, and especially the scientific aspects. I do not mean to imply that the other aspects are less significant, but the modification of society is accomplished first of all in the above named facets.

The significance of this development is that society gradually acquires a new structure. Individualistic divergence is replaced by a collective one. The economic regime, economism, is being replaced by a strong organization as the dominating tendency in society. This situation is characterized by the striking term "organocracy." Planning, regimentation, direction, bureaucracy, and a scientific and organizational elite characterize this phenomenon. The conception of organocracy demands a full explication, which, however, must be postponed. At present we have defined it in only a general and summary fashion.
In connection with the question as to how far the government was free to choose between the two paths open to it, our concern is to determine what caused our society to follow the second dangerous course. In the first place the state found itself in a forced emergency; in the second place, the necessary conditions for taking the new course had been provided. And then there was an excellent example to follow. Finally, to many this course seemed feasible to attain their ideal of society. The influence of these factors varied in different countries. They were worked out quite differently in Nazi Germany, communist Russia, and in the United States; but the trend was the same everywhere.

The stress of circumstances that induced the state to take action has already been considered. The vicissitudes inherent in economic affairs since the expansion of industry wrought consequences the influence of which penetrated deeply into the whole fabric of life and tended to disorganize it. I refer to crises, strikes, and monopolies. And yet with regard to these factors the existing powers were still free to select between the two solutions mentioned. The authorities were also free in the choice of a line of conduct with regard to the problem of the influence of big business upon politics which threatened the independent functioning of government.

The international tendency of business compelled the authorities to interfere in economic affairs. They had to impose certain rules and restrictions in connection with the question of raw materials and the protection of vital economic issues. In addition to all this the measures that had to be taken in order to solve the social problem gave the government an indirect influence upon economic management.

These factors in themselves were not a sufficient motive for an intimate intertwining of politics with economy or business. The self-control of the authorities and the proper comprehension of the peculiar character of economic life would have been sufficient to guarantee the independence of the latter. The issue was how far did government want to go; whether situations intolerable from the viewpoint of public justice, were to be corrected or whether everything was to be directed. A choice had to be made between correction and direction.

The situation was different in the case of the war-problem. The national effort and program for the preparation and conduct of a war today demands the inclusion of the means of production, which constitute an essential part of economic life. Insofar as a war demands this inclusion, economic life, as such, is to a large degree reduced to inactivity. The government draws up comprehensive instructions for
the control of production. A considerable area of the economic sphere is then closely annexed to the political sector. In the last few decades this situation has occurred twice for a long period, and between the two World Wars, to a lesser degree, industry and government remained in close contact. It is, in addition, the aftermath of this state of affairs that is important, because the strong restraints and restrictions of wartime are removed slowly in time of peace. Besides, in a period of transition the national interest makes such restrictions of economic life indispensable, e.g., to prevent inflation.

What enables the state to assume economic power, i.e., to take over the free enterpriser's power of economic decision, either in part or wholly? What conditions must be fulfilled and what means must be at its disposal? Government control is accomplished only after a great variety of economic activities are harnessed and directed from a common center. The control of such a center is much more comprehensive than the superficial direction given to economic life, for example, in the time of the guilds or in the time of mercantilism. The present concern is not with a number of mere restrictions but with such a concentration of competences as will enable the state to control the most important aspects of economic life and its principal lines of development in the future. Such extensive control is now possible for the first time. It is possible because of the use of technique and science for the integration and central domination of economic life. The development of technique has made it easy for the government to occupy the vital positions of economic life and virtually of the entire community, e.g., raw material in mines, electricity, water, gas, transportation, and communication. Of greater importance is the fact that in the future the modern means of communication enable a government to place an extensive community, an entire country for that matter, under drastic restrictions. Orwell has given us an imaginative description of such a situation.

Science is also indispensable for the seizure of power. Something must be substituted to replace the free initiative of industrialists, markets, stock-markets, exchanges and boards of trade. A system accurately regulating production and distribution renders freedom superfluous. It is possible only in a modern nation to discard freedom, if science can analyze the problem, and draw up a scheme of production and distribution, as well as a method to put it into effect.

The state need not go far to find a model for the direction of economic life, and for that matter, of the entire community. Big business and industry provide the pattern. In the second half of the nineteenth century and especially in the twentieth century, science and tech-
nique showed how proper direction can adequately control the process of production, although not without upsetting the balance between authority and freedom in industry. It proved to be feasible to control production so completely that the management could remove all risk and surprise.

It is quite understandable, therefore, that the Technocrats imagined that they could deliver society of its infirmities by resorting to the method applied in industry. Also socialists have always looked to science and technique for the realization of their aims after the model of a severely controlled large-scale industry. The social organization which they envisaged was in fact simply a continuation of the organization of modern production. Socialists have always sought a scientifically directed, and technically integrated collectivity, systematically constructed in such a way that the functions of society and individual responsibility are placed under central direction or control.

With this description we have reached the fourth cause determining the government's line of conduct, viz., especially the socialists' ideal of human society. It is the ideal offered to us in the utopias we have discussed. In both cases the motive is the desire to abolish want and distress. In general this motive concentrates on the problem of social security, and at present, in particular, security against unemployment and crises.

The attempt is made to realize this ideal by a proper organization of society, an organization in which no account is taken of the diverse natures of the various societal relationships. The independent existence of the latter is ignored. The socialist puts his hope in the power of organization. His hopes have risen greatly since he has seen to what extent organization can be perfected with the aid of a technical scientific method.

We should be keenly alive to an important difference between socialists and many utopians. The socialists, including Bellamy, are of the opinion that collectivization is the result of an inevitable process that society must pass through. This notion must not be taken too lightly. It is undeniable that technique has an integrating tendency, and in addition to its atomizing and equalizing process science, because of its very nature and its application to the social conditions, may lead to collectivity. In this sense science enables an organized community to centralize its functions and to extend its scope. To what extent technique and science inevitably lead to a collective way of life will require our attention subsequently.

It is especially the historical tendencies in society that are frequently referred to for the purpose of illuminating the inevitability of the
modern course of affairs. This brings us to our first consideration, viz., when the society of the nineteenth century is scrutinized, it discloses strong impulses with respect to the forced position in which the state found itself toward the formation of its collective opposite. In other words, it displays the tendency to continue or to extend the process of the concentration of power within industry and in economic life in society at large. But such a situation does not prove the necessity of some kind of social automatism. One of the strongest arguments that the latter would be necessary is the statement that the structure and development of nineteenth century society had itself been inevitable. But such was not the case. The form of the nineteenth century social order was brought about under the influence of the struggle for power of the great industrialists in a time of tremendous industrial expansion. Had a truly Christian mind been operative at this time, things would have been quite different. The idea of unavoidable development of society rests upon the presupposition that society is dominated by the struggle for power. Such a thesis is central to the theory of Marx; it transcended the doctrine of the class-struggle in the view of Nietzsche who introduced it as an irrational vital motive.

To the socialists, however, a planned and regimented society is not only a necessity, it is also an ideal which they seek to realize. This position labors under internal contradiction, already in Marx, which reveals the close kinship of the socialists to the utopists of all ages.

A survey of the four factors that induced the state to a complete or partial seizure of power in economic life will bring to light that the first two, compulsion and the use of technique and science, provided the social circumstances for the new development. The fourth factor, the ideal that men sought to realize, concerns the spiritual aspect, the perspective of a belief concerning life. The proper treatment of our subject demands that we consider both aspects. It is extremely difficult, however, to acquire a proper relation and proportion between them.

The relevant factors differ from one country to another, and therefore the speed of their actualization also varies in each instance. The importance of the spiritual aspect may be gathered from the acceleration of the process in Germany and Russia under the influence of the collectivistic ideology of national socialism and communism.

There is also a noteworthy difference between America and Western Europe. In the former, technique and science are in a more advanced stage and the formation of economic power is greater. In general,
Europe is in a more favourable position, and yet the process of collectivization, at least in regard to the seizure of economic power by the state, is further advanced in Europe. The difference in the spiritual climate between America and Western Europe accounts for this fact. The enthusiasm and the dynamic attitude of young America, its spirit of daring and doing, its belief in progress, its preference for personal responsibility, the absence of the Marxian ideology, counteract the transfer of power to the state. Europe, on the other hand, is in many respects so weary of the struggle and so disappointed that its desire for security preponderates. But one should not draw hasty and erroneous conclusions from these facts. For America is far from a solution of its problems. The evil of the nineteenth century society, the arrogant formation of power on the part of big business, is even more strongly in evidence there. And the reverse side of the medal, viz., the disintegration of a part of the population, its spiritual pauperism and its alienation from social cohesion, are assuming ominous proportions. Some have estimated that one third of the city of Chicago lacks social cohesion. American society is, in this respect, a slumbering volcano.

In Europe as well great differences prevail. A communist in France is often a small property owner, and the degree of freedom enjoyed by a Frenchman causes him to compare the conditions in Holland to communism. A main reason for this is of course the density of Dutch population, although Dutch perfectionism and the influence of socialism in government also play a rôle.

In summary we may say, therefore, that in a social sense the twentieth century is in a marked degree the consequence of the nineteenth. Both centuries are each other's counterpart; both are aberrations of a normal situation. The nineteenth century is distorted in an economic sense, the twentieth in an organocratic sense. In the nineteenth century the freedom and the favorable circumstances of the workman fell prey to the formation of power by the industrialists. At the same time the independence of the other societal relationships, such as the state and the family, was threatened. In the twentieth century, following the example of large-scale industry, the organizational formation of power by the government in communal life, disrupts the sphere-sovereignty of the other societal relationships. This process begins with the government's control of the economic process and thus inaugurates the totalization of society. Such is accompanied by an increasing disturbance of the equilibrium between authority and freedom in the collectivized social set-up.

To be able to combat this process one must keep in mind that both
principles are violated. Such violation will proceed as follows: the state first gradually seeks to secure the control of economy. Then the independence of other societal relationships will be liquidated step by step. Finally the state will be in a position to concentrate its functions and the means of power by distorting the relation between authority and freedom and extending the domain of the former.
The structure of modern society is unintelligible without an insight into the function of science and technique. These two are its cement and framework, as may appear from the fact that they determine the exceptional character of our age. There is general agreement about their importance among philosophers of culture, though sometimes mention is made of only one.

I have already discussed science and technique at great length. I shall now restrict myself to what is relevant to our subject. The scientist seeks to acquire a special theoretical knowledge of reality. Technique is the building of reality. This must be qualified. Technical construction is accomplished by means of tools; nature provides the material to be worked.

Consequently, technique and science are both concerned with culture, i.e., with man as a molder and an arranger, and with the results of his labor. In human activity it is necessary to distinguish between what exists in fact and what ought to be. In other words, technique and science are normative: they do not form a neutral sphere or domain. Unlike nature they are not simply given. Man may err and fail in technique; his formative work may be all right, or it may be all wrong, with a series of gradations between these two extremes. Likewise in science man may attain results that form a scale of gradations between truth and error.

A special form of anti-normative activity occurs when the man of technique or of science becomes too arrogant and greedy. He is then inclined to absolutize theoretical truth and to remake society as though it were a mere object of technique: in other words, he succumbs to rationalism and to technocracy.

This state of affairs is of great importance to us. If technique and science are bringing strong pressure to bear on social life towards the formation of a collective society, such a society is nevertheless in no way our predestined fate. Then it is possible to discover in how far technique and science have gone astray, and to try and introduce
corrective measures. Such an attempt might be considered as an academic question, because it is impossible to return to the beginning of modern technique and science and to start over again. Such a procedure is absurd indeed. After a century and a half it is impossible to discover what might have been the result of a sounder development. Humanity must proceed from the point of history that it has now reached.

But, though the possibilities left us are very much more restricted in number at present than in the past, it always remains possible to trace a new course of future action with some promise of remediying the present results of the errors and deficiencies of the past.

*Technique*

If we contemplate the works of modern technique: impressive speed, enormous energies, mighty edifices, the varied selection of exquisitely refined products, the victorious achievements of the technique of the means of communication, amazing precision, and then compare their producer — man — with the product; man then appears so insignificant and incapable that the words of the eighth Psalm come to mind: “What is man that thou art mindful of him?... Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels... Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou past put all things under his feet.”

The secret of human supremacy is man’s ability to make and use tools, the instruments which he places between himself and nature. With the aid of instruments we force nature to serve us, we form nature according to our desires and wring from it the hidden treasures with which it was endowed at creation. And thus the expansion of human control, viewed historically, may be understood in terms of the progressive manufacture of tools.

The results of this development introduce a new milieu for society; an artificial, technical setting devised by man. This technical milieu is interwoven with the natural environment; together they constitute the circumstances of human life. But from the human point of view the technical and natural environment present also a contrast, a contrast between what is mighty, threatening, fatal and fickle, namely, nature, and that which is known, controllable, and trustworthy, namely, technique. This contrast is hardly known to us any more, for nature has been nearly conquered. On the other hand, technique is now a threat to us. In Greek philosophy, however, this antithesis played a leading role. It was dominated by the conflict between form and matter, between human existence and being, between theory (al-
though taken in a wider sense than intended at present) and physics (nature), and the attempt at the reconciliation of these opposites. To the ancients nature was not the scientifically known and the technically controlled field that it is to Western man. Nature to them was animate, capricious; it was looked upon as a danger to man, a threat to his very existence; and by technique man sought to conquer it.

And yet even from the beginning another factor was of greater importance for technical activity. Ortega y Gasset has made the subtle remark that mere existence, being in the world, was subordinated to the desire of "a feeling of well-being on earth." Technique provides with an abundance.

But even this statement is not exhaustive, for prosperity is not the last word. Humanism has made it difficult for us to come to grips with technique. To understand the latter we must in a religious sense break through the vicious circle of man's mere well-being. Modern man has become self centered. It is to be remembered how recent it is that man became blind to the real perspectives of the present life and world. This secularization of life is unique in the history of the world. Even Christians wrestle with it, not with respect to their heart, but insofar as it concerns the reality of their life, e.g., in technique and science. Many Christians achieve only an intellectual victory over secularization. Even in pagan cultures all of human activity was conceived of in its (pseudo) religious destination. And at the beginning of modern technique its founders were deeply conscious that God had called them to perform a task within His creation. They thought of their inventions as a contribution to His glory; their mastery was a stewardship. The loss of this religious attitude has ushered in the disintegration of life. Its recovery is the only chance for the future of Western civilization. The Lutheran Bishop, Lilje, asks the pressing question as to whether or not we can rise above the tremendous iron stadium of the culture of the occident to the reality of God, or whether under the grasp of its iron hands we have no longer any time for the hunger and the thirst of our souls.

To my mind this question must be stated in an even broader fashion. It is not merely a matter of the hunger of human souls for the religious bond with God. Our entire culture yearns for this perspective. A path must be found not outside of technique but through it. And the divine light will shine through technique if man will recognize that the standards established by God also apply to technique as such, and if man will turn to God, their author, whose law is its light.

It would carry us too far afield to consider at this point the concrete practice of technique. But I will stress an essential point and give
an example that will elucidate this question, at least with regard to one of its aspects. This is really a point that requires the recovery of a correct insight first of all. Or, to put it in a different way, it is the point that the modern view of technique has ultimately reached, viz., the denial of the fact that technique is bound to norms. In the prevailing view technique is held to be neutral.

It is usually maintained that technique as such is neither good nor bad. Only when it is applied do we encounter norms. In a variety of forms we encounter this conception, e.g., in Rickert, Scheler, Spranger, and Jaspers. The Roman Catholic, Pedersen, makes the scholastic distinction in the practical capacity of man between the “agere” i.e., action of the will and the “facere”, i.e., the actual performance as it enters into technique. The latter then is supposed not to be related to moral evaluation.  

But Brinkmann shows keen insight in observing that this idea of the neutrality of technique offers a point of contact to nihilistic trends. For the postulate of neutrality provides a starting point for fatalism, or for a struggle for arbitrary power.

Let us try to decide whether the theory of neutrality is valid. Suppose a technical draft is being made for a road crossing. Such a crossing is a source of accidents to high speed traffic. From a comparative study it is, in principle, possible to estimate the probability of accidents arising from a specified construction. Usually the smaller the probability of accidents the costlier the project. It is impossible to construct a crossing that is perfectly fool-proof, so that a choice will have to be made by determining a certain proportionate relation between risk and costs. It will be clear that this choice is bound to norms. Perhaps a story told by Duhamel may be instructive. In his book on America “Scènes de la Vie Future,” he tells how railroad companies considered whether it would be cheaper to improve the safety conditions of their crossings or to pay the costs of higher insurance, and came to the conclusion that it was cheaper to pay the premiums and leave things as they were. This is an economic solution of a technical problem.

I have chosen a striking example, and it would require a lot more reasoning to demonstrate the norm-bound character of technique in its other manifestations. But this character can be shown to exist for every technical project. It must be kept in mind, however, that the alternative is not that between the extremes of good and bad only. The situation is not such, as Dessauer thinks, that technical errors are always punished in a spectacular manner, such as the collapse of an ill constructed bridge. On the contrary, there are many nuances be-
tween these two extremes. There are ever so many alternatives, ever so many variations of errors.

To give an example, I would refer to the method of production in which use is made of a so-called “conveyor,” and which we shall discuss presently.

Science

From one perspective the knowledge supplied by science is a form of power placed at our disposal. Knowledge gives us a sense of superiority over the things we know, a certain confidence in our handling of them. And especially our confidence in the near future or in the remote future is involved. It is true, the foretelling of that future is out of the question, but all that we do and do not is oriented to that which we confidently think we know about the future.

What we have said holds for all our knowledge, even for practical knowledge. But the peculiar feature of scientific knowledge, of great import to our research, is that it is not bound to immediate experience; nor is it circumscribed by the here and the now. It distances and frees itself from the immediate, acquiring a certain independence, whereby it assumes a general form and a more comprehensive sphere of validity. The manner of its origin and the general form into which it is molded, render possible not only transmission to that wider area, but also transmission from the past through the present to the future. Scientific knowledge is enduring. And then it is of great importance in both cases that from the way our knowledge arose we are able in its transmission to account for its specific value as well as for the circumstances in which it has validity.

It is understandable that scientific knowledge supplies man with a much greater power than practical knowledge does, for example, the knowledge a farmer has concerning the qualities of his soil.

This advantage is balanced by disadvantages arising from the manner by which science arrives at a more comprehensive enduring and reproducible knowledge. For the scientific method is that of a systematic analysis of reality; it proceeds by abstraction, that is by omitting and passing by many particulars. It is true that analysis is followed by synthesis, but such a synthesis is artificial. The process of synthesis is not without value, but the continuity of reality can never be constructed from the scientific picture. Science atomizes the infinite coherence of reality, and it eradicates its rich diversity.

Among other things, it is in these blemishes that it hides its dangers. For if these defects are overlooked, scientific knowledge will be con-
sidered as complete and unlimited, at least in principle. Such a notion dominated the science of the nineteenth century. That nineteenth century science did not seek pure knowledge based exclusively on facts (positivism), but strove to achieve the absolute control of reality by the application of such knowledge, will have our attention presently. In any case the nineteenth century was presumptuous and arrogant, and when in our age things turned out differently, strong reactions set in.

Bergson, for example, wants to rescue reality from the superior power of science by splitting it into two areas, the animate and the inanimate. The latter is then supposed to be the domain of science. It is here that our calculations and reason have absolute control. But science has nothing to teach us about the animate realm, which can be approached only by instinct and intuition.

Such a division, however, is wrong. There are differences in science dependent on the difference between the organic and the inorganic areas. But such does not imply that science is blind to the animate, or that it can completely chart the inorganic field, or at least do so in principle. If life cannot be grasped by science, this statement also holds for the irreversible change characteristic of the inorganic, and no less for the peculiar nature of each inorganic thing, and for the continuity of space.

As a matter of fact the pressure of facts in the nineteenth century gave rise to a more modest conception than the classic idea of science outlined by Laplace (see Chapter 1). The causal interpretation of reality — if the causes are known the results can be calculated; if the present is known, the future can be controlled — has been replaced by a probable description of reality. What does this mean?

The obstacle to the classic theory, the ideal of Laplace, was that the peculiar individuality of things could not be comprised in the theory. When a gas has a certain temperature, this temperature bears a direct relation to the velocity of the molecules of that gas. But for every molecule there is a different velocity, and there are so many that it is absolutely unfeasible to bring every molecule into the calculation. How then shall that relation be fixed?

Consider another illustration. If we toss a coin once, it cannot be predicted whether it will land heads or tails. When cast up twice, it is not at all certain that once it will be heads and once it will be tails. With ten throws the deflection from the symmetry of 5-5 will be less. At a thousand casts the proportion between heads and tails will be very nearly a unity. The greater the number of tosses the nearer the regularity. The law of large numbers, therefore, enables us to pre-
dict results on the basis of the increasing regularity. But these forecasts have a character of probability; and that is the new feature. If, e.g., we repeat a thousand throws several times, the proportion between heads and tails will be different from instance to instance in a manner unknown to us in advance. But we know that they will all group themselves around the ratio of five hundred heads and five hundred tails. There is little chance of great variation from a one to one ratio. A proportion of 600-400 is rarely encountered, one of 900-100, practically never.

In the case of large numbers there is an order in the phenomenon that enables us to determine the chance of the occurrence of a specified instance. Once we have a firm hold on this order in the spread, we can again calculate; the individuality of things only hinders in that we know nothing beforehand of the individual case. Our forecasts no longer have the character of certainty but that of a chance percentage. Laws now become statistical laws. In like manner it is possible to suppose a regular spread in the countless velocities of the molecules of a gas, and upon the basis thereof — in connection with the relation between the temperature and the magnitudes, to be derived from the curve of the spread — to calculate further.

Probability theory may be applied to all sorts of homogeneous groups of individual things which are not known individually. It enables us to make probability forecasts and eventually to use the method of samples: on games of chance, anticipated errors in measurements, boxing bouts, heights of men, average ages, diseases, crimes, accidents, harvests, wages, the number of children per family, taxes, intelligence quotients, the tides, variations in production, eyesight, etc. And all sorts of conclusions may be deduced from it; insurance premiums, size of dwellings, of schools, of hospitals, of institutions; profit from business, estimates, production types, etc.

In addition to this aspect of probability the certainty of causality of the classic theory — or determinism — has also suffered a loss in another respect, and this loss was of a more fundamental importance. Next to the individuality of reality its continuity also enters in. For the classic theory the forecasts required that the facts be accurately known. For example it was assumed that from the location and velocity of all the material particles of an isolated system the location and velocity of all those particles for every future moment could be determined. But we have seen that we can get no farther than an average for many particles. In addition to that, the theory in our century has shown that location and velocity can never be established with absolute accuracy; and that in proportion to the more accurate deter-
mination of the location, the magnitude of velocity is less accurately ascertainable Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation). This result was connected with the discovery that the individual particles of physics evidently have both a particle character and a wave character. This fact led to the establishing of the laws of probability for, e.g., the location and the velocity of the individual particle. Though of great philosophic significance for the general conception of science, this state of affairs is of practical import only for the domain of the very minute particles, the micro-physica. We may therefore let it rest here.

The step from the limitless ideal of classic science to the more modest statistical laws is no doubt a great gain.

Of special significance for our subject is cultural science, which in its field of research meets constructing and arranging man. It includes such sciences as technology, sociology, economics, ethics, theology, jurisprudence, etc. It is here that science encounters the freedom of man, the liberty of choice and of decision to go one’s own way according to one’s own conviction. The great question is then: What is science to do with this freedom? The reply to this inquiry will prove to be of central significance for our investigation of the future social order.

Well then, science can do nothing with freedom, because it is at a loss to know what to do. To quote Jaspers “Für wissenschaftlich-gegenständliche Welterkenntnis gibt es keine Freiheit” 8 (“For scientific objective knowledge of the world there is no freedom.”) Exactly! For science pursues the order of things in their actuality; it traces the laws which hold for the various aspects of reality. Wherever science seeks to control freedom, it slips out through the meshes of its formulations. Freedom is a fundamental limitation of science.

Science can but grant freedom recognition and then respect it at a distance by allowing it room. When freedom is denied, because of the belief in a totalitarian science without limits, an erroneous path is taken (Marx, Freud, Burnham). Science then becomes entangled in internal contradiction. For if freedom is short-circuited in a theory, then man, the inventor of this theory, as a part of reality, is also conceived of as determined. From this position it is even impossible to raise the question as to whether or not the theory is itself true; for this question is entirely meaningless in determinism. And in addition, even on the level of a view of life and the world, there arises an unsolvable tension. The kind of humanism that considers man as possessing an independent supremacy over reality will liquidate man’s
position at the very moment it tries to realize this absolute sovereignty by means of a totalitarian science. It will make him a toy of a predetermined fatalism instead. In the irreconcilable opposition between the ideal of personality and the ideal of science, Dooyeweerd correctly sees the all-controlling internal conflict of humanism.

The liquidation of liberty in science is, however, more than a theoretical error. It is an error which involves great danger. As an example of such a danger, suppose that an investigation discloses that Christians belong chiefly to the middle class of society. We could then draw scientific conclusions in two ways. The first is that faith is the consequence or result of man's social position. The second is that in a social sense believers tend toward the middle classes. The first conclusion rests upon the absolutization of a sociology in which there is no longer room for man's free responsibility. Here everything is explained. The second and accurate conclusion leaves the source of faith out of the discussion, e.g., such as man's responsibility for his choice; it puts faith first. It simply seeks to discover why believers from their view of life have preference for and inclination toward the middle classes.

Another weakness of a deterministic conception of science is that it has no place for God's leading in history. At best it would be compatible with the conception of a God who confines himself to creation and now lets history run its course like a watch. But on this standpoint, when we leave God out altogether, nothing changes. Bernard Bavinck, therefore, correctly observes that such a view must consistently lead to atheism, as is evident in the nineteenth century.

In this respect science also displays its arrogance. For reality, including nature as well as culture, is eternally present to God's dominion. "In Him we live and move and have our being," says Paul on the Areopagus in his speech to the Athenians. The Bible says that from Him and through Him and unto Him all things exist; and this has a deep meaning in this connection. Reality and our acts exist on the foundation He has laid, because of His direction, and they find their ultimate meaning in Him.

But here we are confronted with the difficulty that arose in the first chapter. It is concerned with the question as to the relation between the order of reality enabling science to proceed with its task, the freedom of man, and the providential leading of God. Is God's leading to be equated with an order of the same character as the laws of science? Surely not. Such an automatization of reality shrinks it to a time-piece. Are we then to conceive of God with Karl Barth as the wholly other, entirely disassociated from the observed
order in the cosmos, the orderly course of history? Such an exaggeration, derived from the philosophic theme of eternity and time, is also in conflict with the scriptural data which reveals in so many ways the manner in which God directs and will continue to direct our life.

All three elements ought to receive our recognition: The order and the laws, enabling us to recognize and build upon God's faithfulness; our freedom, by which our responsibility is established; and God's leading which gives power to our prayer and prevents our actions from becoming arrogant.

There is really not much more to say about this matter; it pertains not only to the presuppositions of philosophy, but also to our view of life. It is certainly impermissible to place these three elements on the same level and assign to each of them its proper sphere. God's leading is superior; it penetrates into human activity and projects itself upon the order discerned in reality. Nor is it true that nature is the domain of determinism, and culture the domain of freedom. With his freedom man penetrates into nature, unfolds it; so that its laws as known in science ever fall short of the refinement discerned in its unfolding. In the same way scientific laws will always fall short of what God works in nature from moment to moment. And on the other hand, man in his freedom does not rise above the laws that God has ordained for him; but his freedom manifests itself meaningfully only in a thoughtful obedience to them.

The application of science

So far we have spoken only of the knowledge that science offers us. Theoretical science is meaningful in itself. Contrary to the pragmatists' view, its value is not determined by its utility; it is merely a system by which man acquires power over reality.

But, although science is more than its utility, and in the proper sense of the word it is even something entirely different, its results can be assimilated in our actions. And in consequence of the latter characteristic, it grants man a tremendous power over the present and the future; a power that enables him the better to fulfil his divine calling given at creation. But it is also a power that leads him into great temptation. The Faustian man in Bacon dreamt of knowledge that is power. Knowledge is a means to look ahead, and then this foresight used to dominate life and the world, became Comte's device centuries later, when science began to be applied in practice.

So it is necessary to pay attention to the gain obtained in this application as well as to the danger of the abuse of power in it. Such
a gain in the control of reality is encountered in technique, which as a result of science has progressed to automation. We might speak of a process of spiritualizing of labor.

But man errs when he seeks in science a security that supposedly furnishes him with independence. Man errs when science is interposed between man and the promises of God; when it would render superfluous the certainty of the world's redemption through Christ, the security of life in His power.

Any one who expects redemption from science must deem the Christian, who cherishes no such expectation, a person not yet full grown. A Christian must then be somebody who still retains a remnant of the primitive, of the fear that fashions gods, of the mind that begets intolerance, stakes and fagots. We must not imagine that the redemptive hope in science has disappeared: for, though with and through our superior science we have landed at the lowest point of our civilization, such a conception is still nourished down in the heart, and not seldom on the tongue, of the humanist who has not yet become the prey of his doubts. "He that sitteth in the heavens, shall laugh."

Overestimation of the task of science in practical life is, in my opinion, the most disquieting symptom of the society of the future.

We must not imagine that Christians escape this illusion. The conflict between the certainties of faith and science is, especially for the intelligentsia, a source of tremendous difficulties, which, alas, are often solved by separating the two realms and surrendering in one of them to the regime of science. Such is the case where positivism is followed and the domain of science is regarded as neutral with respect to values, and the independence of science is posited with respect to the Christian faith. It is difficult at the present time to follow a Christian course in science. Nevertheless, instead of accepting the independence of science as a basic position, the Christian should at least be troubled by the unanswered question about the meaning of the fact that Christ is the Lord of science. For Christ wants us to acknowledge Him in our scientific labor and knowledge. (Cf. In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, Col. 2:3.)

It is very salutary for our faith to discover that the basic motive of humanism, a humanity that redeems itself and progresses to the sovereign domination of reality, is itself projected into modern science. To many humanists modern science is pre-eminently the means of self-redemption. Then it will be seen how such arrogant presumption is manifested in the methods and results of humanistic science and how in practice its power is abused. Naturally, this is worst in its application to human life.
What is the significance of the abuse of power on the part of science when man is concerned? I have stated above that freedom is a fundamental limitation to science. But this statement refers to our knowledge of existing reality. Our thesis is essentially changed when science is applied to the formation of a future reality. Science then lays down the law to reality; if it errs in the sense described above, the error will not remain limited to science, as such, but it will lead to a malformation in practice. For then freedom will be exiled insofar as, and wherever science is applied to what men shall and shall not do. The boundary that had been set for our knowledge is now shifted by such application.

In itself this procedure is certainly not impermissible. For example, technology has led in technique to the mechanization of much labor. Such progress makes sense. Generally speaking, no objections can be made even when man is involved. It is a wise farmer that gives to his hired man instruction derived from agricultural science. The flourishing of our culture owes special thanks to the application of science.

However, it is the attitude of those who have put their trust wholly or chiefly in science that must be guarded against. Those who only look to science for a solution of the problems with which the world wrestles give man a false sense of security and on the other hand they forge the bonds with which he will soon be chained.

Such an attitude theacheryously penetrates theories so stealthily that often the writers themselves do not realize it. This is due to the fact that in the field of science freedom itself cannot be a subject of research. When on the march, applied science drives freedom out and the flight of freedom is scarcely noticed when science is the marauder.

The sociologist Mannheim, for example, wants to defend freedom — planning for freedom — but he states that integrated science can enable us to visualize clearly the causes of malformation, the sources and forms of the abuse of power in human society. And elsewhere without qualification he says that human behavior can be modified with the aid of scientific social research. In this mental climate the problem of sin is solved and science assumes man's responsibility for his own continual reformation.

The behaviorist Watson presents the following ideal. He first informs us that the medicine man, the soothsayer and the prophet of antiquity were lazybones but keen observers. They operated successfully with fear and thus knew how to train followers and to keep them under control. Then they organized and there arose religions and churches. A God to be feared and an individual soul, distinct from
the body, played an important rôle. This soul has lingered in science for a long time. But psychology has never yet had the soul in a test tube. Behaviorism therefore abolishes the soul; it wants to work only with what can be observed: the ways of human behavior. After the manner of natural science behaviorism wishes to describe behavior in terms of stimulants and reactions. A stimulant is anything from the environment or in the conditions of man or an animal by which behavior is modified. Eventually a behavioristic ethics of an experimental type will arise. With an eye to the adaptation of individuals it will teach us whether it is advisable to have just one wife, or more easy divorce laws, etc.\textsuperscript{13}

This behaviorism is quite friendly; it still speaks of “advisable.” However, it is hard to see why a dictator should not issue a series of commands enforcing the ethics of behaviorism, since it is supposedly accurate.

\textit{Huxley} has made fun of such statutes concerning eugenics. Eugenics is still a part of the scheme of scientific advice. Likewise birth control is advised on the basis of social conditions; castration, on grounds of insanity; choice of a vocation, on the basis of psychotechnic research in adaptability; the solution of strained relations in the factory, on the basis of a survey of industrial conditions, and what not. And do not forget that UNESCO, an international body which was for a long time under the leadership of the other \textit{Huxley}, the chairman of the humanistic society, is campaigning for birth control as a scientific solution to our problems. If a scientist thinks his \textit{advice} is adequate for the general and central solution of such problems, and his science does not know of any limits, he paves the way for someone else who turns such advice into a \textit{law} that is binding to man. Today a science that exceeds its limits is the necessary preparatory condition for a modern dictator who exceeds the limits of his power. Without such a science a dictator would grope in the dark, but with science at his side he can dictate to society and liquidate man’s freedom to decide for himself.

There is a kind of modesty in modern science which deserves our attention for a moment. I have already referred to it. In every area of research scientists are aware of the fact that they are working with laws of probability. For instance, by random samples it is possible to determine the average length of a man’s arm and the curve of the spread, or the preference of people for a specified type of film. By means of special inquiry an average can be established for a variety of facets of the ways of men. There is nothing against that.

But perhaps we would feel a bit disagreeable if the handling ap-
paratus of machines were constructed on the basis of such data as the average arm length. What must the poor man do who diverges from the "ideal" average? And yet such a construction is an improvement in comparison with one in which no account is taken of such data.

It is more objectionable, however, if the build of the average ideal man is taken as one of the factors for fixing wages.

And it is even more reprehensible when films are produced solely to satisfy the taste of the average movie-goer.

It would be most serious, however, if our knowledge should be applied in cases like our last named example. Then average lines of conduct would be treated as precepts that must be observed by everyone*. Such control would actualize the ideal of science in our practical life, viz., the control of human society on the basis of acquired knowledge, which control will always have an equalizing tendency inherent in science such.

Science may begin by respecting the diversity and the freedom of men in the statistical form of its laws, based on probability. But it ends by an application which eradicates such diversity and banishes man's freedom of determining his own way of life.

Bear in mind that such a domination of people's lives is established with the best of intentions. For science desires to serve man by delivering society of its faults by means of applied knowledge. Only in the sequel to this process does the power acquired become an end in itself and do other aims than adaptation to the average play a rôle.

For the present our concern is in the first place with science that threatens man's freedom by exceeding its limits in its sphere of application. Man's freedom can be placed in jeopardy by psychology, wrongly considered to be the all-embracing science of man, and in sociology, the science of the societal structures of man.

Our concern is with sociology, for we shall inquire how science and technique can be used and abused for the organization of man into societal relationships. Then the misuse of science and technique will appear from a disturbance of the balance between authority and free-

*Translator's note: An illustration of control by the mediocre is nowhere more in evidence than in the public school education in the United States. By law parents are compelled either to pay for private schools, where available, or to send their children to schools where education aims at the "average". Education has become a technique. The training of teachers, for example, is no longer a matter of free academic instruction based upon the mastery of a subject. State legislatures have succumbed to educational lobbyists who dictate what teachers should know, what they should teach, and how.

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dom. And insofar as more than one qualified relationship may be incorporated in such an organization, the abuse of science signifies the abrogation of sphere-sovereignty.

Organization with the aid of science and technique

From Comte to the present day, not a few illustrious personages have been firmly convinced that the organization and ordering of society could be actualized with the assistance of science and technique. By means of science and technique humanity was supposed to overcome its difficulties, so that an undisturbed, harmonious human fellowship would arise. This was the ideal that utopians of all ages have always striven for.

As a matter of fact such a goal is in an advanced stage of achievement in large-scale industry. And in many countries symptoms of it may be observed in the combined field of politics and economics. Here and there, as in Russia, the goal has been attained in an all-embracing sphere. We propose to find out what are the characteristics and results of such an organization. In this chapter our inquiry will be further confined to the industrial field and its spheres of influence, because such an organization has been realized, and by reason of its simplicity it is less complicated than society in toto.

It has been shown that technique has provided mankind with a new and richer environment. The history of technique is the progressive replacement of the natural environment by an artificial technical milieu. Recently the latter has obtained such a large area that modern man in his work and even outside of it lives almost completely in that practically faultless world. In the final stadium, however, in order to reach a stage of perfection, technique had to form an alliance with science. The history of science has been a process of approaching reality in order to investigate it. In the process of investigation science was more accurately and more richly differentiated. Since Galileo we may speak of the experimental phase of science in which the mathematical method also acquired great significance. Since 1800, however, reality has been approached in order to apply science to it.

The first field of application was technique. In that application three phases are to be distinguished. The first concerned the development of nature: the technical product and production, irrespective of man. The second had to do with man in production. The third phase is that of the complete automation of technique, insofar as this was possible.

The second phase is of special interest to us, but first by comparison
let us make a few observations about the first phase. The effect of the alliance between science and technique was the division of technique into areas of preparation and execution. The plan and production were no longer in one hand. The craftsman of former times was differentiated into the engineer and the factory worker.

Science enabled the engineer to generalize his problems by analysis. He composed his project by finding partial solutions which were as simple as possible, and were capable of very general application. Through the individualization of these elementary components (e.g., from iron to U-iron) and by their oft repeated integration with other elementary units (from U-iron via some panel work, i.e., frame work to a bridge; or from glass via an electronic tube, via a high frequency set, to a transmitter), he arrived at a planned solution.

Thus, before actual construction, the engineer controlled the technical object in a scientific way on paper. Such control did not lie, as with the craftsman of old, in the plane of practical experience, intuition, or skill, and a feeling for the qualities of the material. The new knowledge and control of the object was of the nature of scientific precision. It was made up of the clear scientific and comprehensive knowledge of the elementary components and their integration.

Insofar as the drafted plan served as prescription for the product, the production worker was thereby bound, and his freedom in labor was transferred to the domain of technical planning. Such could be predicted, for a division of responsibility had taken place.

Of course, the precise scientific control of technical objects did not come about immediately. Stephenson, who built the first locomotive in 1814, was an unlettered inventor. When asked about his invention in Parliament, he replied: "I can't say it, but I'll make it."

Another characteristic of this development is of interest. Science works in a general and equalizing way. Therefore modern technique strives for mass-production of utensils and usable products (e.g., autos, razor blades). If such is not possible, it tries at least to furnish the generally usable components for mass production. Therefore, the product of technique is no longer something individual dependent on its maker and on the special purpose for which he has made it but has become an artificially equalized product.

It stands to reason that once the product had been brought under scientific control, a similar effort was expended on production. Not only did this procedure reveal the excessive desire of science to expand, but especially the conviction that it made little sense to control the product so minutely on paper, if its production might slip away
from this control. At any rate there remained an element of uncertainty.

The progress in modern tools, e.g., steam engines, lathes, looms, presses and the like, were already a great help in this matter. These instruments removed much uncertainty; their operation also fell within the domain of scientific control.

But in production man still remained an uncertain and uncontrolled factor. The control of labor and the common effort was not complete; i.e., an organization, scientifically drafted and planned, was wanting. From the viewpoint of science, when was such an organization possible and desirable? Such an organization could arise if production could be scientifically analyzed and integrated in such a way that at least its parts, if not the whole, had a general possibility of application. The permanent universally valid results of science have meaning only in relation to that which has a certain degree of stability and universality in practice. *Mass-production* fits these conditions. It made it possible to investigate the activities of labor and their cooperation and, in an increasing way, to record them scientifically.

For the rest, of course all the facets of labor and of cooperative work relations that had a general and abiding character could be embodied in prescribed regulations. The latter differed from the usual expressions of authority, characteristic of societal relationships in general, only by virtue of their written form and partly scientific character.

Thus an important area of industrial enterprise was accessible to scientific management and organization. And in course of time this sphere was further expanded and more intensively controlled. The first definite result was the *Taylor* system of scientific management with its productivity analysis and study of elementary motions and of the time required for them, of physical conditions of the job, and of waste and incentives. The most modern methods of time measurement are based upon a system (M.T.M.) of elementary movements, from which every movement can be constructed as words are built up from letters of the alphabet.

The greater the degree of control, the greater the certainty of future production. And, because from the scientific point of view the most economical method of operation could thus be prescribed, it was supposed that also in this way the maximum of production could be reached. At this point, however, an error arose rather typical of the scientifically deluded; but more of this in the sequel. For the present, however, the reader ought simply to remember that in this case science had man for its "object." As has been said, the application of science
in cases where man used to be free in his activity or inactivity destroys his freedom. To the degree that scientific control was increased, the freedom of the worker decreased both in his work and in society.

The issue was not the search for a balance between the imposed order and freedom, but the conscious attempt to get production as completely as possible under the control of management. So from the start the tendency to disturb the balance between authority and freedom was inherent in this attempt. Intentions were good, if you like to put it thus, but the consequences were most serious. This is a practical example showing how security was purchased by loss of freedom.

The clearest insight into this scientific method of organization is obtained by comparing it with the preponderatingly practical method of organization. Then, of course, the best basis of comparison is found by selecting another labor relationship such as a common trade or a farm.

In such a trade as a smithy, for example, the boss naturally indicates general directions and rules for the work. Here, too a specified balance is set up between authority and freedom. But in contrast to scientific control, this balance is quite mobile. It changes from moment to moment and from one type of work to another. The extent and nature of the functions performed and the manner of cooperation are constantly modified. In individual production, the boss would not be in a position to prescribe a permanent pattern of functions and their coordination, even if he were so inclined. Moreover, he has no such inclination. His personal direction is not only able to adapt itself constantly to special cases, but he also wishes to allow his subordinates the greatest possible degree of freedom. For their labor is based upon their independence. Personal direction is merely supplementary. Ultimately the workman ought to perform his task under his own responsibility. The greater his independence, the more flourishing the shop or enterprise. Such is a healthy balance between authority and freedom, a balance enabling man, consciously or unconsciously, to fulfill his original calling to serve God responsibly in freedom.

But there arose serious reasons to modify this system. Applied science made it possible to analyze production for the best methods and to save the results of analysis and experience. Whether this necessarily led to the abolition of the freedom of the workman as in Taylorism, has to be dealt with later in this book. It will then be made clear that this is not the case.

Secondly, the number of employees in the industrial enterprise
increased considerably in the last century. Now, personal leadership cannot be exercised over an unlimited number. It is extremely difficult to maintain it over a group larger than twenty, unless new groups are formed, headed by a sub-foreman. But the introduction of subordinate bosses weakens personal leadership, and if carried on extensively, the smooth operation of the enterprise is increasingly weakened and it becomes unstable.

The limits of personal leadership can then be exceeded when replaced by written regulations and instructions specifying the main policies to be followed. Of course there are many transitional stages between personal and scientific direction, but in this manner we have thus entered the stage of a scientific method of management. The latter is present to the extent that written rules replace personal contact, and, in keeping with the nature of science, these prescriptive rules form a permanent scientific pattern for the common effort.

When the cooperative activity becomes still more comprehensive, it will not be possible to preserve a close cohesion in the operations, at least with this rather limited application of scientific method. Then a far reaching independence of subdivisions will be imperative, unless the application of this method of control can be extended so much further that the management is able wholly or partially to plan the delimitation and the coordination of the component functions scientifically, and to control them with the aid of regulations and training.

The minimum requirement for such a scientific method is the planning and control of the framework of the cooperation of all the workers concerned. Such cooperation is then in the main withdrawn from the workers. This type of organization is encountered in large factories, offices, and laboratories. Then, too, within such a set up, personal links are inserted as parts of the chain of command. Such supervise the division decided upon and the coordination of the operations, and in this respect they exercise a controlling and corrective function.

Consequently, any large organization which is scientifically operated displays a permanent pyramidal structure, in which officials operate at different levels according to rules or recognized practices to which they have to bind their subordinates. Their own initiative and originality are employed to prevent friction and to control whatever escapes scientific control as an incidental occurrence, but without violating the prescribed scheme of operations. The degree of free play decreases in proportion to the level of descent from the apex of the pyramid. Wray correctly observes that in such an establishment
the foremen are not a part of the administration and do not represent the latter, but merely transmit the control of the administration. 14

However this may be, this pyramidal structure is not adequately described in terms of “employers” and “employees.” Also it will be clear that the old division of labor here obtains a special form, viz., that of scientifically planned specialization. And finally, even in this limited application of science to organization, it is evident that the balance between authority and freedom has been shifted in the direction of authority. The center of decision has moved to the top.

If, in addition to the control of the coordination of labor, the work is itself brought under scientific control, then the limited amount of freedom at the base is virtually abrogated. More often than not such control is possible in mass production. In the control of the coordination of labor the scientific method not only brought the fixation of partial functions but also the extremest possible degree of their atomization. The process can be extended in mass production until labor is reduced to one simple operation.

Each partial function is now such an elementary unit of production that it can be analyzed, drafted and prescribed in detail. The freedom of the worker is practically nil; it has been shifted to the management. Work is entirely controlled by the management. The latter plans and directs all operations scientifically, the jobs as well as their integration. And it makes certain that its prescriptions are complied with.

Generally speaking, there is an inverse relation between the degree of certainty in a scientific sense with which the management operates, and the freedom allowed to the worker. The greater the security, the less the freedom. Every degree of freedom at the base weakens the over-all control of the administration.

Meanwhile production could never be controlled to such a vast extent if modern technique were not at its disposal. To make this clear I shall have to approach the matter from another point of view. Complete scientific control corresponds with complete automation of production. Then the planning of production, the directives for the partial functions as well as for their integration, are projected into the independent “technical operators,” they are technically translated into the positions of their adjusting-apparatus. The “technical operator” is man’s instrument for technical formation which in its operation is wholly or chiefly independent (motor, turning lathe, radio-transmitter, computing-machine, blast-furnace, etc.).

If for some reason or other there is in the case of scientific management still some room left to man in production proper, its planning must in any case be rendered as secure as possible by a prescri-
bed procedure for the technical operators and by technically translated directives which bind the workmen, e.g., alarm systems, automatic guards, and controls.

Certain consequences of the scientific method now require our attention: the integration of the societal relationship, the specialization of the functions and the devaluation of labor.

**Techno-scientific integration**

The connecting element in a human organization has so far appeared to be a system of regulations enacted by the authorities as a means of holding the organization together. Such may be a necessary provision, but in general it is not sufficient to maintain unity. The voluntary acceptance of the imposed obligation is also needed. The organizational frame must have a spiritual counterpart; there must be a readiness to be together and to cooperate.

The first thing that strikes the attention is the necessity of a sense of participation in the meaning of the societal relationship; there must at least be a sense of unity of purpose. This holds for the fellowship of love within a family, for harmony in the political aims of the state, as well as in the production goals of a factory. This sense of unity grows stronger to the degree that it is more deeply rooted in the bond of a common lot of the members. The ties of tradition furnish a powerful adhesive.

Integration is strongest, however, when members are united by a spiritual bond that reaches farther than the specific meaning of a qualified relationship and touches a broader foundation than a common destiny within an association. The greatest unity is achieved when the members of a social unit are one in belief concerning the ultimate religious meaning and the basis of their existence. They can then give themselves up to cooperation without having to leave a part of their full personality inactive and unused in social relations, for the sake of work.

This situation is significantly modified by the modern techno-scientific method. The latter introduces in science and in technique a new factor of integration, a factor that does not simply unite with the relations mentioned but which supplants them. Tönnies has in a general way pointed to the shift from a real communion to a mere association (Gesellschaft), in which organization and economic interests dominate.

For both science and technique are able to establish a relationship
between people. If the nature of the social ties in a community is looked upon as unimportant, because their stability is exclusively valued, the obvious course is to sacrifice the bond of participation in the meaning and destiny of the relationship which is much harder to attain. Then this bond is replaced by a mutual coupling by technical and scientific means.

Add to this the fact that science and technique are able to bundle a far greater number of people together. I have already pointed out that under personal supervision the number of workers cooperating in a labor-community is limited to the hundreds. By the application of science to an organization and by the creation of a technical environment, it is possible for tens of thousands to work together in a strong organization. This rule has a much more extensive sphere of validity than technical industry alone. The familiar development of society, whose center lies successively in the village, the city, the county, the provinces, the state, and now in the continent, is possible only on the basis of technical integration and with the aid of science. The generalizing and comprehensive character of science, the conquest of distances by technique, the technical production of energy and of goods in mass, and the concentration of production are all parts of this development.

But this extensive integration has a serious drawback. For the personal relation has to yield to the scientific relation and to the relation established through the technical milieu. In a large sphere it cannot be otherwise. In a small fellowship (a church of 300 members, a town of 5000 inhabitants, a factory of 500 employees) personal acquaintance is feasible. The formation of a community can be run by personal connections. In a larger context (a church of 2000 members, a city of 500,000 inhabitants, and a factory of 10,000 employees) such is practically impossible. In this case relations are depersonalized; we might also say they are technicalized and theoreticized.

Notice further the intensive aspect of integration through technique and science. We have seen that in a large factory personal contacts are replaced by scientific dicta and declarations; and that with the aid of technique new ties are usually much firmer than those in a small enterprise. They are frequently so intensive that no free movement remains.

Such a state of affairs is not restricted to factories and offices. In exchange for convenience and a higher standard of living, the technical milieu binds us to itself, to time schedules, communication, radio, television, gas, light, heat, and so on. Whereas in large industry this tie acts almost as a coercive agent, in society this feature is lacking,
except in a totalitarian society. There is freedom to bind oneself or not, and insofar as one is practically compelled to accept these constraints the individual is still free to rise above it. Our life need not lose itself in a technical environment. That such generally happens points to the average person’s loss of spiritual power to resist and to be active.

Finally with the aid of science and technique there is a tendency for organizations to display a centralized character. As soon as the scientific method dominates the method based on personal contact, the bond of the common destiny and the share in the meaning of the societal relationship, a loss of freedom arises at the bottom of the organization; and there is a concentration of power at the top.

Such was already evident in the case of the factory. The scientific means of adhesion shifts free responsibility to the planning and directing top. Such need not be the case, it is true, but the technical environment may easily be centralized and is in fact centralized. As a result the vertical lines of connection in an organization running from the top to the bottom, gain influence when compared with a small business, and the horizontal relations become continually of lesser significance. That this is repeated on a grand scale in a totalitarian society will occupy our attention later on. Orwell has given us a striking sketch in his novel “1984.”

But even in a free society we should not underestimate the extent to which life is centralized by applied science and centrally controlled technical utilities: traffic, electricity, gas, water supply, railroads, telephone, sewage, etc.

Stuart Chase has shown how much life in a great city like New York depends on this centralized technique; how many untold risks a man is exposed to there; and how great the catastrophe would be if through a calamity or an act of violence this technical milieu should fail to function. 16

Specialization

The modern method of organization of a large industry, when viewed from the standpoint of the man who has been integrated into it, discloses two characteristics: the specialization and the devaluation of labor. The first characteristic turns our attention to the whole, to which the partial function belongs. The second characteristic confronts us with the partial labor function itself.

In a certain sense modern specialization is accompanied by a loss in the value of labor; however, we shall reserve the term “devaluation” to denote an essential deterioration or degeneration of the job
itself. In itself specialization does not imply such deterioration. For specialization is, for example, also applied in scientific work.

As a matter of fact the application of the scientific method to the direction of a labor community is accompanied by the attempt to bring labor under scientific control insofar as such is possible. Such an effort leads at least to specialization of a scientific character. And if it is possible to carry the procedure to its extreme, the continual division of labor will at last lead to the devaluation of labor itself.

What is modern specialization? What distinguishes it from the division of labor which has always existed? Modern specialization is the result of the scientific analysis and planning of labor. This determines its atomistic, isolating and fixing character.

For this atomizing process, this continual division, is the method which science generally follows in order to solve its problems. The greater the consistency with which this splitting up of labor is carried through, the greater the efficiency of the control of labor in the artificial synthesis of its component parts.

Whereas in the project of the construction of a technical product the process of division is and should be extended to the component basic elements, the actual division of activities of labor is in many cases bound within limits. Such limits may be due to economical considerations, but of especial significance is the fact that it is man who has to perform the partial function. If human initiative is required then it is necessary that the limits of man's function are not too narrow, otherwise he cannot gain experience and insight. Man needs a certain freedom of action. However much we may desire an extreme methodical division of labor, such a desire is counter-balanced by the requirement that in qualified labor the division shall not cancel the conditions which make labor possible. It is food for serious thought that with respect to such a division of labor e.g., Hatfield makes the remark that a real inventor cannot thrive in a modern large-scale industry. And Wiener considers a large laboratory very unsuitable as a source of new ideas. Of course, the cultivation of work in a group can compensate for much that is lost, but such a team can never replace the great accomplishments of human personality in the technical and scientific sphere.

It will be clear, however, that as the quality of labor decreases, its division can be carried through further and further. Also, when in mass production a worker is engaged in the operation of a machine which is of course concerned with an elementary function, even with a number of variations, the circumscription of his task will be narrow.

In addition, the fact that science furnishes lasting results implies
that the limits of partial functions are fixed; they are not fluctuating, as is the case with the division of labor under personal direction. There is even a constant change of function in the latter. Fixation is further accentuated if a series of work is accomplished by technical operators. For then the task of a worker is fixed within their sphere of operation for a specific production process.

The *isolating* character of modern specialization arises from the fact that the coordination of partial functions is withdrawn as much as possible from the responsibility of the individual worker. Thus the worker is relieved of responsibility in order to leave his concentration on his work undisturbed. The first fruits of the planning of a labor process are to be found in the sphere of delimitation of partial functions and in the coherence of such functions. This coherence is brought about by means of specialized training of the worker and by production regulations, and if possible without any human interference, simply by means of the connecting function of technical apparatus (the conveyor). Science cannot always accomplish this aim, for example, in the coordination of a complicated laboratory work. But even here the attempt is made to leave the coordination of the work of a group entirely to a leader.

So in all work of a simpler nature within a large scale industry the worker is in any case spared as much as possible the concern of cooperation. It is not necessary for him to be concerned with work which is being done right next to him, nor must he be concerned with the adaptation to it of his own work. This is the reason why his interest, in so far as he has any, remains entirely enclosed within the boundaries of his own function in the area where his attention is demanded. That is why the modern method of organization tends to incline the organized individuals to self-isolation. Through this self isolation especially, man became detached from the meaning of his work. He then loses an important stimulus. Just think of the results of the fact that the worker today, unlike the craftsman of former times, is no longer inspired by the knowledge that his work is being conducted for a fellow citizen whom he knows, nor for a final purpose that he knows.

Concerning the causes which lead to this specialization, I can in the main point to what I have already said, when introducing the technical scientific method. The striving for a central control of production, viewed as an ideal of science, and leading, e.g., to modern specialization, is not enough in itself. It is, indeed, suggested by science, but cannot be fully explained as an ideal of science. This ideal finds response only in the increasing size of industries.
larger industrial relationships this method is the accepted way. The
degree of specialization is dependent on the complicatedness of labor
and on the possibility of comprehending it in a permanent scheme
of division, and finally on the economic criteria of the enterprise.
Extreme specialization is possible, for example, in the case of repeated
processes in mass production.

On the other hand industry is forced along the path of specialization
because various forms of work, for example, technical and scientific
work, cannot be controlled by one person.

What now are the results of modern specialization? It will be under-
stood that we have reached a subject that cannot be dealt with in a
few lines. I will content myself by giving a few important points.
Concerning the technical aspect, notice that in modern technique
the craftsman is not simply divided into the engineer and the factory
worker. Both of them are in their turn rather classes of persons whose
work can be subdivided into many specialized types.

I have pointed to two causes of specialization which must be
differentiated sharply at this point. The attempt to attain the cen-
tral control of production leads to a division of labor into ever simpler
parts. And in such a case the worker can master his function in a
training period of some hours, days, or weeks.

On the other hand, the development of science and technique has
so increased the scope and the degree of refinement of our knowl-
edge and skill that it has become necessary to introduce an increasing
amount of specialization. As a result a worker has to become a really
productive and practical expert in such a limited sector that his
training does not exceed a certain maximal period.

Consequently, on the one hand there is a tendency toward the
introduction of specialized unskilled labor, and on the other hand
there is a trend to a great degree of highly skilled specialism. These
diverging ways bring about a new contrast or opposition between
people. While the old opposition based on economic differences is
disappearing, on account of a continuous gradation of economic
positions, and on the other hand the economic proletariat of the last
century is nearly gone, there arises a new antithesis.

This new antithesis is much less conspicuous but cuts much deeper,
because it touches the very meaning of existence: it is the antithesis
between skilled experts and the new proletariat of unskilled workers.

This line of demarcation does not separate manual labor from
technicians, nor is a white collar a criterion. Both types are to be
found in office and factory. This contrast has its counterpart in the
societal relations. The part of humanity that has become proletarians
through labor reveals a mode of life and a manner of thinking which is incomprehensible and unapproachable to others (the devaluation of labor which we shall subsequently discuss is of considerable importance in this matter). This remarkable and serious fact has become evident from American research in the problems of large industrial centers. It will be one of the greatest problems of the society of the future. And if this problem — which is one of massification — is to be tackled, the approach to it should not be made on the economic level, but in the sphere of labor itself.

The cleft is deepened by the fact that the majority of the privileged class likewise experience the results of specialization. The atomization, fixation, and isolation of their field of labor give them an attitude little adapted to approach the problem. Such people are in danger of becoming like those of whom it is said they know everything about nothing, and nothing about everything. Their interest in social problems is practically nil.

Actually we have touched the social aspect of specialization. There is truth in the remark that the worker in a large factory has the feeling of being a number. The large size of industry is certainly responsible for this situation. It has resulted in the loss of the personal contact with the company and of the awareness of working together on a common task.

But this feeling of being a number is not so simply explained. It acquires its typical character from the new impersonal method of organization and its resulting specialization. The atomization of labor, and especially the isolation of a partial function and its resulting fixation, gives the worker a feeling of being alone in his work, of not really belonging. He feels rightly that he is considered only to the extent that he is himself a fixed determined partial function within the total operation. He feels as though he counts within the factory merely to the extent that he is recorded within a filing system, and that he is interchangeable.19

These facts have been brought to light by the Mayo group who studied the 29,000 workers of the Western Electric Company between 1929 and 1937. There was something wrong with the social structure of the factories. Man no longer counted in the so-called formal organization, and within the informal organization, e.g., the personal relations with foremen, there arose all sorts of social tensions for which measures had to be taken.

The devaluation of labor.

When in scientific organization the division into partial labor
functions is consistently carried through, then in the case of mass production it will usually be possible to assign a very elementary function to the individual worker; a simple operation that must be repeated with the regularity of clock work, every minute of the hour, every hour of the day, every day of the week, every week of the year.

Then it is generally possible to employ technical means in order to integrate these elementary functions into one total process of production. The objects to be processed are put up on a moving belt or suspended on moving chains. Sometimes also the workman is himself made a mobile fixture on a moving platform. The products to which this system can be applied are legion: cigarettes, candy, radios, televisions, automobiles, refrigerators, and so on. The method was first applied to the production of meat products from pigs and cows in Chicago.

Friedmann gives us some statistics from which we can get an impression of the extent of this sort of work. Three fourths of the workers at the Ford plant perform such repetitious partial functions. In a factory of Western Electric 5,000 workers out of a total of 5,400 were engaged in such work. Similar proportions occur in all the large factories engaged in mass production.

While modern specialization in general is accompanied by the loss of the intrinsic value of labor, (vision is narrowed, function is rigid, the contact with the final result is lost, as well as that with the person for whom the product is destined), this loss increases with the consistent application of the last phase of scientific organization described above, so that this phase may be regarded as an impermissible devaluation of labor. Work has lost its essential character. The gravity of this situation is increased by the fact that work is itself the meaningful task assigned to man by God at creation.

The devaluation of labor in endlessly repeated, simple manipulations is further increased when the individual function is itself subjected to analysis and subsequently the training for such a task is closely associated to what we have been describing. Taylor originated the methodical analysis of time, motion and function in mass production. Taylor, called the father of scientific management, has declared before a committee of inquiry that his idea of scientific management in the workshop is not in the first place concerned with analysis by means of the chronometer, with specialization, with an increase in efficiency, the lowering of costs, greater profits, higher wages, and the like, but that his method had in view a mental revolution of the workers and managers. He would change their sense and understanding of their
mutual obligations in their work and their sense of unity in industry. So he wished to resolve all conflict and insure the devotion to labor. No doubt his intentions must be taken to mean that he did not denounce chronometers, etc.; for they constituted his method. But his ideal reached further and was to be realized by coordination in industry. Scientific management by means of analysis and planning was the basis for the control of partial operations and their integration; and this would have to prepare for and create a new mentality.

Again we have reached the error which plays such a decisive rôle in our age, and which is constantly the subject of our discussion; namely, the idea that man can make his fellowmen happy by thinking for him and looking after him in such a way that he is integrated scientifically into the community, so that he is no longer able to bring about any misfortune upon himself or his surroundings. In other words, Taylor wanted to obtain his ideal through organized security at the price of free labor.

Indeed, the price paid for scientific organization, whenever consistently applied, is the freedom of man in labor, his personal responsibility, the appeal to initiative, to decision, to effort, to skill, and everything over which man disposes in the scope of his freedom. Wherever freedom of work is wanting or means nothing because the features of labor have become so elementary and repetitious that labor as such is devaluated, it no longer deserves to be called by the name of labor.

I have repeatedly discussed the degradation in the core of man's existence, driving him forward along a path where his freedoms are traded for securities. \(^{21}\) It is not our purpose to dwell on the subject again at length. It will be sufficient to make the reader alive to this problem again by means of a few observations.

Many do not consider the devaluation of labor to be serious; others acquiesce in it because it is unavoidable. I am afraid that many people, convinced of its unavoidability, construct the first optimistic picture of the situation. Both points of view are, however, incorrect. Let us look at the real situation.

That the kind of labor meant has lost its intrinsic value in an alarming manner is evident from the short period required for training, and from the ease with which people who up until recently still lived very nearly in the stone ages, for example, in Brazil, British India, and Siberia, are taken up into the modern labor process. Especially convincing is the fact that tests with debilitated people have shown
that many of them are fit, sometimes eminently fit, for all kinds of such operations.

Often it is pointed out that similar labor is to be found in agriculture, for example, in the sowing and digging up of a piece of land. For here, too, we encounter monotonous repetition. Apart from the difference in surroundings and appreciation of the meaning of the work, both important considerations, but irrelevant to the issue at hand, there is, however, a subtle but essential difference. The difference between factory and agricultural labor is that in the latter one is free to follow one's own rhythm, but when scientific organization has consistently been applied to mass production, the rhythm of labor is either prescribed or imposed by the technical operators; in most cases such compulsion is mixed in origin.

This question of rhythm introduces to us a remarkable contradiction between two statements, which must be clarified. According to one statement the characteristic of devaluated labor is that it is very easy and light work; the worker is relieved as much as possible of heavy tasks. But according to the second statement this work is very often experienced to be so hard that nervous tensions and psychological disturbances are frequently the result. Such is pertinent to work performed along the assembly line. Friedmann has given much attention to the question of rhythm. According to his investigation the employees at Western Electric frankly admitted that the tempo of the conveyor belt was indeed frightful.22

But this furnishes a solution to the apparent contradiction. The burden of labor is to be found in this compulsory rapid tempo, and not in an overburdening of the human capacity for work, skill, insight, inventive gifts and constructive powers. The worker has even been freed as much as possible by mechanical appliances from bodily exertion. His predicament is comparable to that of a machine whose speed has been brought to a maximum. The overburdening of a worker concerns his mechanical function, i.e., the function to which his labor has been reduced.

Friedmann furnishes a good outline of this mechanical function of the worker in work at the conveyor. Of course, the devaluation may also occur when work is performed in isolation. "The work performed on an assembly line is a repeated and a divided labor accompanied by a forced and collective rhythm. Repeated and divided work: the worker is bound only to a limited, restricted part of the total manufacture of a product; but his work is performed in accordance with a compulsory collective rhythm, i.e., he is a part of a gang."23 I would like to supplement this description in two ways. Division of labor
is carried through to an elementary function; and then not only is the rhythm of labor compulsory but also the nature of the operation itself, either because its simplicity does not allow of any variation, or because it has been planned in detail, or it is compulsory in more respects than rhythm on account of the technical apparatus.

In brief, we are confronted by a predetermined labor. The performance of the workmen is even no longer to be considered as an instinctive one, but merely as a forced and automatic operation. Feeling, skill, and thinking are eliminated, because they would only interfere with work. Thoughtful attention to the task performed is as a rule superfluous. It can thus be understood that a workman is not interested in his work. If he has been at the same job for a long time, he not only acquires a completely passive attitude even outside of his work, but he is apt to become afraid of any form of free responsibility and initiative. Even a new position on the assembly line is apt to trouble him. 

In this fashion man is alienated from his freedom and made spiritually sterile in a predetermined task which deprives him of the essential characteristic of labor.

Is the individual workman aware of what is going on? Significantly at the beginning of one of his chapters, Friedmann writes: "In sorrow and tediousness shalt thou earn thy bread." In truth, sweating has been replaced by the machine and by planning. Yet the reaction of the worker according to oral questioning is not such that one can say that the bulk are suffering. Relief from the sorrow in labor is sought in diversion outside of the shop and working hours. And it is remarkable how quickly people become accustomed to boredom when it cannot be avoided. Such is true of Miami Beach as well as the assembly line.

In his interesting dissertation Kuylaars examines this problem of "drained labor". He notices that the workman does not find the monotony of such work annoying. It is found agreeable. It is easily mastered and can be performed without the use of intelligence and responsibility. The main problem for the workmen is their relationship with their immediate supervisor.

So this investigation has furnished us with a striking example of the relative value of such research. The positive data, the questions answered, will in this case be entirely insufficient to establish the sad plight of modern labor, since the persons concerned are unaware or do not experience the fact that their labor has been devalued.

This is one of the reasons why the results of the Hawthorne investigations were onesided. Provisions were made for the social
structure of labor which appeared to have disturbing influence
upon the work. But the disturbing factors inherent in the work as
such, the monotony of elementary repetition, and similar defects,
were not even considered. And yet this problem should not have
entirely escaped the investigators, for their own investigation
furnished some indication in this direction. It would indeed be
interesting to discover why the investigators stubbornly overlooked
such indications. Ydo obtained even stronger indications from his
own investigation, but this serious problem escaped him at the mo-
moment he took over Mayo's one-sided method of classification for
the interpretation of his data.\textsuperscript{27}

In the light of the future social order there is no reason to think
lightly of or to ignore, the question of predetermined labor, the
slavery of labor. On the contrary, it deserves full consideration
in connection with such topics as massification, the use of leisure,
cultural elan, secularization, and so on.

Perhaps the experience of the enormous strength of the forces of
resistance to be overcome before a correct conception of this problem
is possible induces me to quote the American Wiener, a pioneer in
the recent development of technique. Wiener declares, "It is a de-
gradation to a human being to chain him to an oar and use him as
a source of power; but it is an almost equal degradation to assign
to him a purely repetitive task in a factory, which demands less than
a millionth of his brain capacity."\textsuperscript{28} (And of the dexterity of his hand,
I would add.)

In summary I would point out that a correct analysis of the problem
is possible only when, in addition to an understanding of a worker's
subjective appreciation, insight is gained into the religious norm for
that which is really labor and into the structure of labor in modern
production, as it has been analyzed.

\textbf{Automation}

It is, of course, a question of great significance whether or not the
future will bring an increase rather than a decrease in the devaluation
of labor. For if in the past Western civilization was brought to
great prosperity, owing to the insight on the part of the Calvinistic
adherents of the Reformation\textsuperscript{29} that labour is a divine calling, then
it is to be feared that the devaluation of labor will have an
opposite effect. It will threaten the future progress of our civilization.
The latter stands or falls, not only with the need for, but also with the
opportunity of free labor.
The present need for free labor does not incline one to be optimistic, but we will consider this later on. I am of the opinion that mass production will increase rather than decrease, and yet I believe that in the future there is a greater possibility of a decrease in the devaluating process in labor. To make this clear we must approach our problem from another angle.

The technical scientific method of analysis and planning aims at the complete control of the products as well as of the processes of mass production by means of a knowledge of the planned elementary units of construction and their integration. Such control by planning and regulation implies, from the point of view of the process of production itself, that its activities are predetermined.

If it now becomes possible to devise technical operators which can perform partial functions and coordinate them, it would be possible to execute the plans of production without the aid of a single laborer. The fact that production is predetermined makes man superfluous in principle. In other words, the technical scientific method of the control of production has as its counterpart the automation of the production process.

If, however, scientific control is successful, but technical operators have either not yet been devised or do not yet work in a perfectly automatic way because of technical difficulties or cost of operation, then here and there a man must be used to fill the gaps in the process. He then takes upon himself a part of the predetermined labor and fills the shortcomings of the technical operators. Production is then quasi-automatic. This means that man fits himself into the mechanized process of production, performing an automatic function. From this perspective it is not difficult to observe the devaluation of such labor.

The appearance of devaluated labor is a transitional phase. It will pass with the automation of production. Our own time furnishes many examples of this tendency toward complete automation. Electric light bulbs, for example, were first produced by a series of operations performed by a group of girls. Their manufacture is now performed by six automatic machines.

In connection with the application of science the following three stages can be distinguished in modern technique: the scientific control of technical objects, the scientific organization of production employing human labor, and automatic (mass) production. These three stages must not be conceived of as if they were actually distinct in history. From their very beginning, some 150 years ago, traces of all three are in evidence. In the then existing textile industry, for
example, many functions previously performed by human hands were transferred to the machine. But we are warranted in saying that the period of consistent scientific management dawned around the year 1900, whereas in our own time consistent automation has started.

There are, it is true, factors that elude scientific control such as changes in temperature, variations in natural material, etc. But the technical apparatus itself can be provided with the power to take care of such instances by means of *automatic switching* and *regulating* apparatus. The undesirable deviation is then used as an indicator to modify the process in such a way that such deviation is practically eliminated.

Not everybody is enthusiastic about the development described. Modern technique is accompanied by a peculiar social readjustment of the hours of labor. Formerly the lower classes worked longest, and leisure time was the privilege of those who had climbed to the highest rung of the social ladder. Since the middle ages a better idea of the meaning of labor in Western society has caused a great increase in the activity of the higher circles of society. Since the rise of modern technique the burden of the upper classes has constantly increased while the workers gradually shortened their period of labor, and for many workers the responsibility for their labor was diminished. In the matter of free time and labor the rôles between the classes have been reversed. The causes of this change have already been discussed. On the one hand scientific organization led to a shift of responsibility from the bottom to the top. And this shift was accompanied by a transfer of manual labor to machines.

As technique becomes more and more automatic, shall we have on our hands an army of superfluous workers, as *Jules Romain* thinks? *Polak* formulated the question: “Will there arise a tremendous increase in structural unemployment, including skilled and unskilled alike? Will there arise a fifth class of robot slaves who will ultimately surpass the powerless human masters in the most gruesome 'free' competition that has ever appeared, and which will actually make the 'revolt of the masses' inevitable?”

Before we become entangled in this new problem, let us first be grateful for the solution to an old one. Only then can we view the new question in its proper perspective. Our concern should not be that workmen need no longer perform tasks that have been devaluated and reduced to the most elementary form of specialization, because automation has made such labor superfluous. What we should be concerned about, and what should have filled us with anxiety a long
time ago, is that many workmen must still perform tasks unworthy of man, because necessary and worthwhile to the machine.

Automation is a human victory, a victory for man in the sphere of technique, both because it is a cultural unfolding of the creation and because it delivers man from labor that does not deserve the name; viz., labor without freedom. This change concerns not only the individual person, but it affects our entire culture, for extreme specialization and the consistent devaluation of labour have the nihilistic tendency to form masses, thus partly realizing the mystery of practical lawlessness (II Thess. 2.) Consequently automation delivers us from a serious problem. Whether or not the damage that has already been done is not already too great, is another question.

But what if this liberation is accompanied by the abolition of labor itself, or at least with an important reduction of the quantity of work to be done? An official of the C.I.O. told me that in the future this would be the greatest threat to labor that has ever confronted the trade unions. The machine itself was already considered by many as a danger. Just Havelaar concludes: "We boast of our century as the century of democracy. But the truth is that we live in a century which has crushed the soul of the people under the machine. The machine has spiritually murdered the European laboring class." 32 And are we now to say of the society of the future, moreover, that the machine makes man superfluous?

Let us first of all establish the fact that it is not the machine which is on trial, but it is man himself. Man is the defendant, technique is the witness. Technique is not our fate. Its development is not predetermined, it is man, who by his exaggeration of the technical scientific method has deflected the proper course of modern technique, and thus permitted the worker to become spiritually afflicted.

And if in the future automation replaces enslaved labor and many people are thrown out of work, man will again be responsible, and not technique.

The recognition of human guilt does not make it any easier for us to solve the problem. At best it keeps us from making excuses. It teaches us that the unsolved problem of the past will greatly hamper us in finding a solution of our new problem. The perverted view of labor which arose with modern technique and which made humanity content with the humiliation of a devaluated task will continue to pursue us in the future. For resistance to a proper solution is to be expected from those who have been weaned from real work and reared in the attitude that man works merely to have free time and that the meaning of life is simply to gain a good living through wages.
For, just as in the case of the previous problem, the decisive question is again whether or not man understands what labor is. It is foolish to imagine that automation will necessarily render labor superfluous. Such would be the case if this process of automation were the end of the unfolding of creation. It ought to be a new beginning.

Automation will raise the level of labor, it will spiritualize it. The future challenges us to develop life in all its diversity. Can we respond to this challenge? Our society has become so deranged and so economically distressed that we can no longer even imagine the rôle which every one must play in order to meet the challenge. If we are to have a chance in the future, it must be based upon on awareness that the essence of our life is our calling to work, that we earn in order to work and not conversely. Leisure is for relaxation from work, and ought not to take more of our time than is needed. A higher standard of living, and a good life do not in themselves constitute the final purpose and meaning of our existence, but ought to be viewed as one of the fruits of our labor — result in which we may be delighted, but which is neither the condition nor the meaning of our life on earth.

It is, moreover, in no sense certain that in the future society free time and structural unemployment, measured by the old standards, will increase. Technique is far too complex to be certain about that. But if such be the case, the first demand to find new work is that we learn to understand anew what labor is. Labor is not a necessary evil, it is not an economic value, not a prelude to leisure time, or a bread winning, but in the deepest sense it is the fulfilment of the cultural mandate of the Creator.

*Cybernetics*

It has not yet become clear how the automation of production is possible. We have merely assumed that the scientific control of production was needed as well as the technical apparatus which can translate and execute the plan of production. What really occurs in practice is extremely complicated. It cannot be treated extensively in this context, and yet I would give a general picture because these scientific and technical potentialities will probably be employed in a future society in which it is attempted to realize the ideal of security, the controlled stable human community.

* The term 'Cybernetics,' the art of steering man, was coined by Wiener. It covers the entire field of the control and communication theory.
The replacement of man by a technical operator is not of recent date. It is already encountered in a discovery of Watt. If by a decrease in the load of the steam engine, its velocity is increased, an engineer can regulate the flow of steam so that the velocity is reduced to the required amount. Watt's discovery of a regulator displaced an engineer. This automatic regulator ties an increase in velocity to a decrease in the flow of steam, by which the velocity will be decreased. The machine governs itself. Another example of such automatic control is found in the control of the thickness of paper in a paper factory. If for one reason or another paper passing between the rollers of a machine becomes too thin, the movement of the machine is automatically retarded so that the paper again acquires its proper size. This is done by directing a ray of light through the paper. The light grows stronger when the sheet of paper is thinner, thereby putting a regulating mechanism into action.

We are acquainted with the automatic switch, the automatic opening of a door when a light ray is broken by the approach of a person. And, further, we know the so-called servo-mechanisms. Such do not serve simply to keep one factor constant, for example the velocity, when another factor changes (the pressure), but such mechanisms cause one factor to follow another. The latter may be a directive for production which, for example, is projected into a metal mould. When this mould is brought into contact with a pin, it is transferred to a cutting chisel which turns off the required model on a shaft. It may also be that instead of following a directive it is desirable to follow an arbitrary fact by an automatic operation. For example, an automatic speed box may operate on a motor in proportion to the increased velocity of an auto.

But the cases that we have mentioned are quite simple. They act upon one technical indication which has to bring about one act of regulation or switching. The only thing is to establish an unambiguous connection between the indication and the act in one single technical structure. It is another matter, however, if we wish to automatize an entire manufacturing process, such as the manufacture of radio sets. The directives for this manufacture constitute an elaborate story of numerous actions, starting with punching pieces of tin to their correct size for the chassis, and finishing with the artistic packaging of the apparatus. And all these details must be taken care of in their proper sequence. In one course of production condensors are made, in another brass wires, and so on. These parts must join each other somewhere and be mounted, and this is no simple affair. The mounting equipment can begin to operate only when everything
is arranged in its proper place. There must, therefore, be a technical "eye" that "warns" the machine when it must begin. For one stage of production many technical 'eyes' and 'ears' are required, not only for the objects and the machinery, but also for the milieu of the production, the temperature, the humidity, etc. And when a disturbance occurs, for example, if a condensor does not fit, a lamp has a crack in it, production cannot be stopped simply to let a workman repair the defect, because this would mean that an automatic factory would never operate. Most defects must be corrected automatically, and if possible, be prevented. There must, e.g., be a means of testing the lamp before it is assembled; possibly such testing must occur several times during its manufacture.

So automatic production must include (a) a long series of directives to be worked out in accurate sequence; (b) several indications of the course of production that have to play their part in the execution of the directives; (c) a long series of orders to lead the production.

Formerly the course of production, the formulation, the timing, and execution of orders were carried out by factory personnel. How is it possible to do that without man in an automatic factory? During and after the last war tremendous advances have been made in the solution of this problem. In two fields there have been important gains. In that of technique the automatic computor has made its appearance. It can transform the directions and indications into commands. And within the scientific field a new theory has been formulated, the information theory. It has subjected the question of receiving, transforming, and transmitting messages to fundamental research. The technical and scientific aspects complement each other. Together they constitute the core of automation, which must be considered as the final goal of scientifically managed and organized production.

The information theory and the automatic computor cover a much broader field than production. Moreover, the area covered by the information theory is more extensive than that of the computors. The theory of information enters the domain of philosophy and would comprehend all language and symbolism.

For both of these theories the American Wiener has coined the striking term cybernetics — the steersman's art. Also connected with this movement are such people as Vannevar Bush and Shannon. Many others are of course connected with this development because individual achievement is no longer possible in these spheres of science and technique. Among the British the names of McKay and Gabor ought to be mentioned. Institutions which have played a great rôle
are among others: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, the Bell Telephone Laboratories.

The automatic computor is the most important technical device of our time. For its development special mention must be made of institutions such as the International Business Machines Corporation (I. B. M.), and of the University of Los Angeles, as well as of the Americans Aiken, Huskey, and Von Neumann, the Englishmen Williams and Turing, and the Canadians Leavies and Brown. Together with Wiener and Bush, they have made important contributions to the realization of the automatic computor. In my opinion it deserves more attention than the atom bomb, certainly in connection with the future structure of society. And the theory of information is rapidly developing into a theory the influence of which may presently be compared to the doctrine of evolution in the last century. Just as the doctrine of evolution became the doctrine of progress, so the information theory will become the doctrine of community formation, the theory of the certain control of the collectivistic society.

For the present, however, we shall confine ourselves to the problem of automation, the elimination of man in mass production.

Let us choose an example which is somewhat simpler than that of a factory, namely, the case that started this development: the automatic anti-aircraft gun, a project of Wiener and others. We shall not occupy ourselves with the details but simply with the main features. Wiener and his co-workers were faced with the problem that the velocity of modern planes had become so great that it is no longer negligible in comparison to the speed of a shell. This means that it is not possible to aim directly at a flying plane but that one must aim at the spot where the plane will be when the shell arrives. But where is this point? That is dependent at least upon the position, the speed, and the acceleration of the airplane at the moment it is observed as well as its direction and the velocity and path of the shell. To find correctly the position of the target from these data requires a tremendous amount of calculation, so much so that it would be impossible for an artillery crew to compute the calculation quickly enough.

It therefore became necessary to introduce an automatic computor which could work very rapidly. What now happens is as follows. When a plane comes within range, radar apparatus spots it and automatically gathers data which are then passed on to an automatic computor. The latter estimates the direction and angle of the artillery piece and a servo-mechanism sees to it that the gun barrel assumes the calculated angle.
Such an automatic weapon at present still requires a gunner who operates a switch that adds some data to the computor, data not yet derived automatically from the plane. The adjustment of the switch is determined by the type of plane and flying conditions.

An interesting feature in this construction is that the point at which the shell explodes in the air is also controlled. From the distance between the explosion and the plane or the target, an extra impulse is derived which causes a further adjustment of the artillery piece. This retro-coupling is called the "feed back." It might be considered as an adaptation. According to Wiener it is a phenomenon of common occurrence. To light a cigar, for example, it is not sufficient for the brain simply to give an impulse to the muscular system. The muscular system is continuously controlled by the person who relates the distance and the speed of the hand to the cigar by means of the sense organs. Of course, such action is done automatically and unconsciously.

One question in this procedure, however, can never be fully solved, but some approximation must be sought. The automaton endeavors to forecast the future. For the issue is how to determine where a plane will be presently. In this procedure the pilot is the unknown factor, "the X," the insurmountable hurdle. The pilot is free to accelerate, slow down, dip, or turn. And yet he is not altogether free. The range of his possibilities is limited. Nevertheless, the exact position of his plane can never be forecast with certainty.

This point is of such special interest to us because it suggest something of a much wider scope about the control of community life. The computor can operate only on the hypothesis of a determined or established flight. But Wiener now proposes to use the probability calculus in order to attain a closer approximation to the future position of the plane. To this end the plane would have to be followed for some time in order to establish a statistical probability concerning its flight, and thereby to determine the chances of its continuing in a specific direction. All this would also have to be figured out by the computor so that it could establish the course of greatest probability. Such a procedure furnishes us with an example of the manner in which the freedom of man can be brought under control to the greatest possible degree with the assistance of the probability calculus.

Returning to the factory — where the freedom of man is not in question — the above example is an illustration of what is necessary for the automation of a factory. The center of the regulating apparatus is formed by the automatic computor. A production plan must be drawn up suited to the available machinery. This proposed graph
must then be translated into a code to which the computer reacts: e.g., a punched strip. To this automation there must then be linked a series of "guards" or regulators, to inform the automaton concerning the actual state of affairs in all kinds of phases within the production process. And finally the automaton must adjust mechanisms which govern the processes of production. It should be borne in mind, however, that the description of all this is a much simpler affair than the required calculations, and that the theoretical project is easier to compose than to realize in actual constructions.

It is quite desirable to furnish some data concerning the automatic computer. Already certain legends are in circulation. Polak speaks, for example, of thought machines. Somewhere else he says: "They will take over the work of the senses, the nervous system, and the human brain. And it is just the latter which man imagined to be the distinguishing mark that separated him from the remainder of his fellow earthly creatures." 36 What is there to such a statement?

The idea of constructing a calculating machine was alive in the previous century, e.g., with Babbage. His experiment with the aid of mechanical means, wheels and levers, and the like, miscarried for technical reasons. In our age calculators with keyboards for addition and subtraction have come into extensive use. How do such differ from the automatic calculator? The ordinary adding machine is continually serviced, whereas the automatic calculator is primed with an order in advance and is then left to work it out for itself. An automatic calculator cannot be serviced continually because it operates so rapidly that a person cannot interfere in the process. It is, moreover, this speed which makes it superior to man. It is, for instance, capable of multiplying two numbers each of ten digits in a thousandth of a second. It is readily understood what enormous potentialities are open for the solving of complicated problems, problems which an individual cannot even begin to undertake because they require far too much time.

But there is nothing mysterious about its operation. It is no more mysterious than the fact that the cutting chisel of a lathe can manufacture a steel shaft which a man cannot handle with his hand alone. Technique furnishes us instruments that enable us to see and to hear at greater distances and to go quicker, to apply more energy, and likewise to compute quicker than we could do when left to our own resources.

The speed of the automatic computor is obtained by means of electric circuits. In this way also the difficulties in the mechanical construction known to Babbage were overcome. The electronic
computer is of course a very complicated and intricate totality. So, for instance, in an automaton called *Eniac*, 17,000 electronic tubes are placed in the different circuits.

A very important feature of the automatic computer is its ability to dispose of a kind of *memory*. And it is a quite fantastic memory. All the subdivisions of the order received — an elaborate instruction, demanding much time and trouble — are executed, not simultaneously but successively. So the automaton has to register the command so as to enable the instructions to be started successively. But not only that, the results of the calculations must be preserved in an apartment of memory for the purpose of their combination with other results. When we think of an automatic factory, for example, this memory will have to retain all manner of data, derived from production by means of thermometers, photo cells and the like. It must then derive instructions from such data at the proper time in the production process.

We can perhaps distinguish four potential uses of the electronic calculator. It can do sums or *arithmetical* operations. It can serve as a *measuring* automaton for the transformation of various data of some occurrence or other into a convenient form for human insight and further elaboration. It can also be used as an automatic *checking* apparatus, by means of which various data are worked over by the automatic computer into a directive impulse (it is thus a complicated automatic regulator or switch). And finally it can be used as an *ordering-automaton* for the control of some fact or other.

That possible results can be obtained in various forms, even translated into the form of the spoken word, is an incidental matter that deserves mention.

The automatic anti-aircraft gun is of the third type, and the automatic production works according to a combination of type three and four. This combination, but without an automatic computer, is of very frequent occurrence in technique, i.e., as an automatic regulator and switch (3) and for the adjustment (in advance) of metal working machines (4).

The future of this new technique can in many respects only be surmised. To my mind we are sure to be confronted with the two aspects of every development of creation: the enrichment and ennobling of life, as well as the risk of misuse leading in this case to a terrible degeneration and destruction of life.

In connection with this danger, I would refer to two subjects of which the first is concerned with the *view* to be taken of this
automaton in its relation to man as well as in comparison to man; and also, what view of man is taken in the information-theory. In the second place it is important to examine what will be done to society (i.e., to man) with this theory and this technique.

These two subjects are closely related. For the view of man is an introduction to the question about what will be done to him. This is an instance of the concretizing of a subject that I have already discussed. Permit me to recapitulate my theses on this point. Science is compelled only to recognize the freedom of man, because this freedom can never be conceived in terms of science. Freedom is the fundamental boundary set to science. But it is also true that this boundary can considerably be changed in the application of science to human society. In so far as applied science is concerned with man, his freedom will fall a prey to the application of science to society. Well then, the freedom of man, or more generally, the characteristically human in man, may be made by scientists into something that can still be conceived in terms of science because of an exaggeration of the possibilities of science and of their ignoring our first thesis, but only at the expense of man and his freedom. Not only are scientists who make this attempt powerless to resist the unlawful application of science to man and society, but they even pave the way to such application by means of their theory. And then their protests are of no avail. This is indeed the tragedy of such men as Wiener and Polak.

When Polak describes the automatic computer as a thought machine which will deprive man of that which differentiates him from other creatures, Polak discloses that he does not understand the meaning of man's free thought. The automaton works in a predetermined fashion. It can never think, judge, and make decisions as a free agent like man. From the very instant that man withdraws after giving his orders, the final result is irrevocably fixed. The condition for our employment of the automaton is that we know in advance that its results are unequivocally determined. The very meaning of our use of it is that we do not know in advance what the result will be, and that we ourselves cannot reach it as efficiently.

Wiener is more cautious. He says that the new technique will devaluate the human brain, at least in the simpler routine decisions. He also says that we must not, with the materialists, imagine that mechanical brains can produce original thoughts. His plea is for the freedom and fertility of thought in technique. And he recognizes the responsibility of man.

Nevertheless, Wiener claims: "It is my thesis that the operation of the living individual and the operation of some of the newer
communication machines are exactly parallel.” Elsewhere, however he adds that perhaps his interpretation is in principle incorrect. Wiener’s trouble lies in a typical over-estimation of science. According to him speech is essential to man, and speech is based on knowledge, on learning. It is this which is supposed to distinguish man from animals. And Wiener thinks that the learning processes are not entirely outside the field of the engineer’s possible inventions. There is a method to construct machines which can learn. Such occurs in connection with the “feed back” and the “memory” of automatons. For learning is in its essence a form of “feed back.”

By means of the information theory science can attain access to this terrain. Actually knowledge is a quantity of information and this information can be analyzed. Man does not occupy a position impregnable to science; his example is not inimitable to technique. The following is a striking example of the seriousness with which Wiener treats this matter. Information can be signalled. His idea of information is much broader than that of language. Everything that is organized, has any structure, represents a quantity of information. (It is here that we find a connection with physics in which entropy is a standard by which disorganization is measured, the disorder which increases continuously according to the second main law of thermo-dynamic.) Thus the entire man is equated to a totality of information. In principle then, according to Wiener, all this information can be transmitted. It is thereby possible to transmit man himself, for he is a quantity of information. Wiener admits that the gathering of this information and the reconstruction of a living being is very difficult, but he gives evidence that on the road leading from man through language, knowledge, information and communication he has fallen into the pitfall of the ideal of science. He, too, has lost sight of man as a free agent in the formative process.

Shannon, who wrote an interesting treatise on the information theory, demonstrates the same fault in another manner. The issue is reality, considered from the point of view of information. For example, a poem simply represents a quantity of information. It consists of a finite number of letters in a specified order, each selected from a limited number of letters. Many combinations can be made, but the number of such combinations is finite. Someone making totally arbitrary combinations, chosen at random, might eventually produce a poem. A rapidly working machine that performs random selections from letters, and registers the results, will create such a poem much quicker. It will also make many other combinations of letters that have meaning, since it searches out all possibilities. Such a machine
will produce as if by magic other poems of a given number of letters, even the most beautiful and hitherto unknown works. The reader may be repelled at the idea of a poem machine. Of course it will still need a man who on the basis of its meaning will be able to discern when a beautiful poem has been produced by the machine, but one can find no fault with the method of operation proposed. This will be clear to anyone who examines the way in which this method is used to find such a simple word as “on” or “fear.” The probability in the case of the word “on” when chosen from 26 letters would be 1 to 676, whereas the word “fear” would give the ratio 1 to 12,000,000. Consequently, to produce a poem is practically beyond the reach of the automaton, although in principle it is possible.

Shannon correctly observes that it is not necessary to apply the method of the probability calculus in this way. We ought to take into account the structure of language, and introduce the probability of combinations of two, three, four, and more letters.

Shannon ignored the meaning of the message, because the information theory cannot furnish the criterion for that. Now he starts an experiment. By means of his statistical knowledge of language and after an arbitrary selection, he tries to approach meaningful language, as if from its foundation upwards: first he selects a number of separate letters (in an arbitrary way). Naturally the result is nonsense. Then he chooses a whole series of letters in the same way, while taking account of the probability of their occurrence. He next composes such a series while considering the possible occurrence of the combinations of the letters. Then the same thing is done with words, etc. He thinks he can in the long run construct meaningful sentences in this way. Such sentences are supposed to occur in an entirely arbitrary fashion as if by magic. In his initial experiments there were no doubt traces of this.

I would like to point out, however, that although ignoring meaning ostensibly, Shannon smuggles meaning into his statistics of words and letters already when he starts his “arbitrary” selections and combinations. Moreover, even if he is successful in producing a series of letters that have sense according to the mere usage of language, we must object that such a series in itself is meaningless, because it is not related to anything else. A sentence signifies a specific matter. Without such a relation it is in no way a sign, as it has no referent.

At the present stage of its development there is not yet much to be said about the application of the information theory and the computer to society. Such application will probably consist in assembling an
enormous amount of data concerning the behavior of human beings, and in forecasting the probable future with the aid of the statistical results obtained, and in the use of such information, together with elaborate plans, for the direction of society. These possibilities, supplemented by a system for the control of individual human beings which has been adapted to the use of the computer, would bring the “ideal” of a stable and centrally controlled community within reach of its realization.

_Shannon_ thinks of such a plan in connection with military actions. He and others are trying to devise automata for playing chess. In principle such an automaton is able to try out all the moves and counter-moves possible in a given position together with their continuation to the end of the game, and finally to select the best possible solution. Although in principle the fact that the number of possibilities is finite may suggest that such a proceeding is feasible, that number is far too large in practice for the attempt ever to succeed. But such an automaton would really always vanquish the best chess players of the world. By extending this idea _Shannon_ conceives of an automaton that can trace all the possibilities implied in a military situation and enable the military leaders to select the best possible strategic plan.

The same type of machine might be employed in agriculture, production, economy, etc., _Wiener_ thinks that within ten or twenty years we shall possess machines capable of such fantastic, extensive research.41

It must be observed that the areas mentioned, in comparison to chess, present an endless number of variations. Certain artificial tricks would, therefore, need to be applied to reduce them to a finite number that can be analyzed by the automaton. Properly speaking, the most important stroke of art is the artificial reduction of possibilities, aided by scientific planning and the technical arrangement of such a sphere. And to the extent that the real course of activities deviates from the planned scheme, the control is adjusted to the facts by a “feedback.”

The experts in these fields do not regard such matters as mere fantasy. _Wiener_ is extremely concerned over the liability of abusing this new technique in the future. His ideas, however, and those of others lead us to surmise that they are so much occupied with the potentialities of obtaining a central control over every area of life that, in warning against dangers and pointing to the fact that man is free, they themselves have undermined his freedom in their own minds. They have nearly lost sight of the concept of and respect for
the freedom of man. They have lost the idea of the freedom of man as well as the respect for it. Wiener repeatedly fails to see the essential distinction between a responsible human personality and an automaton manipulated by the aid of the information theory and the probability calculus.

In connection with our subject I have had to put the drawbacks of the development in the foreground. This is both the strength and the weakness of one-sidedness. So long as this one-sidedness does not induce us to leave relevant facts out of the picture, but merely eliminates irrelevant facts, it is not only unavoidable but permissible.

An example of the perspective offered by the electronic automata is their use for the translation of one language into another, which would be of inestimable value to international conferences.

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The social “machine”

We must still consider another characteristic of the scientific organization. For the impression might have been given that we have adequately described the scientific control of society in terms of technical integration, disturbance of the balance between freedom and authority, and the concentration of the competences of decision at the top. But this impression is wrong.

What is ironical is the fact that the masters of the organization, the elite of the collectivistic factory and society, have themselves become more or less prisoners of the organization. For their power rests on means of exercising power that have become comparatively independent and self-supporting. For by drafting plans supplemented by technical instruments of instruction, a stable pattern has been formed, a pattern which controls leaders as well as subordinates. It is such a pattern which is the only guarantee against the dissolution of the gigantic cooperative enterprise. Think also of the five year plans or other such schemes. The organization on paper, frequently provided with a technical basis, becomes an impersonal power against which man, whatever his position may be, struggles in vain. Any one who has ever made the attempt within a large enterprise to solve a problem by common sense in a simple manner, whereas the prescribed solution would be highly complicated, has encountered the force of a paper bureaucracy. Behind the resigned shrug of the shoulders of men who are in a position and willing to cooperate, the “organizational machine” looms high above the individual. In The Twenty-fifth Hour, Moritz experiences this in a camp of displaced persons. Everybody agreed that Moritz could be set at liberty; but the “machine”
had not yet reached Moritz's card in the files, and no power on earth could force that.

In his excellent novels, "The Trial" and "The Castle," Kafka presents a soul-stirring and a depressing portrayal of the futile attempt of a man to penetrate to the top of bureaucracy. But we must not lose sight of the fact that Kafka's sketch penetrates behind the immediate problem into the vital experience of our times, into the agony of loneliness, into the torturing question as to what this life is for, who is behind it, and how he is to be found?

Gangsters as well as eccentrics around Sartre are not only excrescences of our civilization; they are living protests against the harness of the "social machine," the iron-bound organization of society.

Countless others acquiesce and adapt themselves to this pattern of organization. Not a few welcome it. Tielicke relates how the powerful and prominent Lawrence took a position as a mechanic with R.A.F. and gave the explanation "I do it to serve a mechanical purpose, not as a leader, but as the shadow of a machine. It is a good thing to be merely a part of a machine. For thus I learn that it does not depend upon me." 43
Chapter six

THE SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE

Not in the cutting of the paddie is joy, but joy
is found in the cutting of the paddie that you
have planted. (Multatuli)

The gist of the matter

It has become evident that the longing of utopians for an ideal society has ever and again inspired them to the idea of a transformation of society. They thought they could remove the defects in the existing social order by the creation of a community, embracing humanity in all its activities. The reliability and stability of such a community is sometimes based upon a trust in man, but in any case it always rests upon the concentration of power and the organization of society.

To test such ideals and to test the practicality of societal relationships on the basis of man’s vocation on earth, the diversity of his obligations, and his calling to an orderly social life, I have developed the principles of the structure of society: the balance of authority and freedom, and sphere-sovereignty.

Our attention was then directed to the recent history of society from which it became evident that the economic formation of power in the last century disturbed society’s equilibrium in an ever-increasing degree. The state whose independence was equally brought in jeopardy by the course of events reacted in the twentieth century by a gradual seizure of economic power. The state’s gradual assumption of this power occurs and continues to occur in a manner analogous to the development within industry.

This state of affairs induced us to consider the method of such development and it appeared to be characterized by scientific organization as well as by integration by means of a technical milieu. The result of this method in large industries was the concentration both of power and responsibility no less than the specialization and devaluation of labor. There is also a tendency toward automatic production and the rise of an impersonal pattern of organization, an independent power, of which the technical environment and the totality of scientific plans, drafts, and directives are the component parts. For the rest it appeared that both science and technique continue to furnish their fullest support to such modern organization.

These instrumental characteristics absolutely new to our culture
enable the state to assume the central control and global direction of economic life. The rapidly increasing expansion of the rôle of government in this field is unmistakable.

Do not imagine that it will stop with the economic problems. Germany and Russia have taught us a lesson. And also within democratic countries the government has extended its interest over many other spheres of culture. That the independence not only of the economic societal relationships is threatened, but also that of those of an other nature, will prove to be an inner result of the development which is predicted as well as desired by the socialists. And it is undeniable that since the first world war the socialists have taken the lead in European society.

All these things are evidence that we are passing through a structural revolution of society of fundamental and far reaching significance. The history of Western civilization up until the last century was characterized by a gradual liberation and emancipation of life, albeit at a slow pace sometimes. In our century the reaction has set in. The characteristics of our own society confirm the hypothesis that this revolution is not of a superficial character and to all appearances is not of short duration.

To my mind the main characteristic of this revolution is the emphasis on organization. In a way similar to that of the utopias such a system means the rule by organization, i.e., it is an organocracy. The origin of this exaggeration of the organizational aspect of society is to be found within the ideal of science implying that by means of science we can attain a comprehensive knowledge and adequate control of reality. Such an ideal ultimately culminates in the central control of human society, something which was already propagated by Comte.

The scientific organization which we have discussed presupposes planning, the preparatory scientific draft of the organization. Such a draft is not only concerned with the permanent organizational forms, but also with the structure within which the course of the development is conceived. Our age is sometimes called the age of planning. Any one who is willing to take the facts for what they are will have to grant to Polak¹ (the director of the Central Bureau of Planning in the Netherlands), whom we will discuss more than once in the sequel, that at any rate it is no longer a question as to whether or not there is to be planning, but that it is only a question as to where and when, by whom, and how far planning is to operate.

The disturbance of the equilibrium between authority and freedom, and the relativizing or abrogation of sphere sovereignty by the
state has been discussed already. To place one's hope in the planned organization of society is at least to disturb the balance between authority and freedom, and if this ideal of science is posited to be without limits, the independence of social relationships in general is not safe.

On the other hand it is perfectly true that every hierarchical collectivistic situation and every totalitarian endeavor in the past has been in conflict with our two basic principles. Nevertheless we ought not to lose sight of the unique character of our own society. Many imagine that the most striking feature of our century is the totalitarian state. However, this characterization does not hit the mark, for then we make a twofold error. The fact that the state is totalitarian is not the essential point. In Russia it is a question, for example, as to whether the political province dominates the economic sphere, or vice versa. The boundaries between these two domains have been eradicated, and, besides, the totalitarian character of a power formation is a consequence. If we trace the matter to its roots we can discover that before the totalitarian structure arises, there is to be encountered an endeavor and a method which seek to ascribe primacy to organization, and to the application of the scientific method of planning, together with a technical integration and the goal of bringing society under a central control. And within this collective enterprise there is the aim to push on by means of the spiritual integration of such a “Gesellschaft” to a total society.

The totalitarian state must be opposed at its first manifestations, at the first abuse of science and technique, at the first appearance of a community ideology which would pervert the relationship between authority and freedom, and relativize the independence of the different spheres of society. The totalitarian state is preceded by the planned economy and a concentration of industrial power. It is preceded, moreover, by an hierarchical frame of mind, and inclination toward an all-embracing spiritual fellowship, and an elite which is to form and lead this community. There is a keen sense required to protect society against the naive arrogance of many scientists and the dangerous and significant silence of a new order of managers, against the duplicity of a number of politicians, and even of those numbers of the clergy who have been intoxicated by the ideal of a community under their control. One will have to install a signal to sound the alarm when attempts are made to “protect him from himself” or when the slogan of fellowship has gone out. One will have to undertake a less exciting but more important rôle than throwing stones at an evil elite. One will have to look with distrust upon a benevolent elite, itself
often unaware that it is an elite, unavoidably and unwittingly on the road to the abuse of power, to deceit and malicious intent. Our present discussion of the society of the future cannot be limited to the social tendencies of the moment or to the rôle of technique, scientific planning, and organization. This social aspect has in fact already been considered extensively. It is now imperative that for a moment we consider modern man, his aims and attitudes in so far as they concern the structure of the future society.

Even a meager treatment of modern man is necessary if we are to consider whether or not and to what extent the continued social process described above is unavoidable for the future development. And we shall not be allowed to lose sight of man, because in the revolution of which I have spoken modern man expresses a preference for organized security rather than personal freedom.

It is obvious by now that I do not belong to those who would welcome a century of planning and organization, of security and a collectivistic "community." In the light of present practice and of the ideals of some enthusiastic propagandists, I shall have to show what is unavoidable and what is undesirable in the future development.

And for the present, assuming that a radical change in the trend of society is not to be expected (even though I have written this book in order to bring about such a change), I would discuss what tendencies of our society point toward the society of the end of days, of the period of the anti-Christ, and to what extent the foundations of the final society are being laid. The reader will have to bear in mind that the relationship between the society of the future and our own must be examined from the perspective of the structure of society and from the perspective of man. Before we carry out this program it is, however, desirable to give a brief sketch of a number of peculiar traits characteristic of our time in order to give an impression of all kinds of things involved in the revolution of our society. Such a sketch will be necessarily incomplete. This brief summary will, moreover, be a recapitulation of what has already been treated. I will try to show a connection between such characteristics, because too often such a description is no more than a mere enumeration and leaves us in the lurch at the very point where it becomes interesting and important, viz., when relations are to be described. Of course our sketch will slightly exceed the compass of our book.

A sketch of our time

By viewing our own era from a distance one becomes aware of the radical character of the events occurring within it, and how radically
our century differs from past centuries. It may be best compared with the end of the Middle Ages. Burnham has correctly observed that as in our own day the end of the middle ages was marked by a social revolution of significance, namely, the liquidation of the feudal society. A further similarity however is to be found in the ominous atmosphere and in anticipation of catastrophe. Though some writers, such as Sorokin, think that the present crisis will not lead to destruction but is the necessary preamble to a new integration and prosperity, most twentieth century philosophers of culture are caught in an attitude of decline. The number of novels is legion that have as their subject the somber and morbid aspect of life, usually pictured in a cynical manner, and in which it is imagined that “the twenty-fifth and Last Hour” has arrived. And among Christians there is an increasing number of those who await the immediate approach and return of their Lord.

A comparison of our era with the end of the Middle Ages, however, also breaks down in many respects. Life was then passionate; ever falling into extremes, burdened with the weight of disasters, and glittering with color and splendor; interwoven with black sin and childlike joys, cruel and innocent, full of power, stirring; rich in variations. Huizinga’s book on this subject impresses the reader with the feeling of decline, but it also makes him sense the anticipation of new things and new periods. Our era, on the other hand, is much more even-tempered, orderly, and critical; and more tolerant and decent, too; and where sin breaks through it is more perverse; because the happy acceptance of life, spontaneous joy, the sense of guilt, repentance, and sacrifice is lacking. Behind its materialism most often lurks dumb resignation. Such masks are no longer the attributes of sport; but they have become a bitter necessity to hide our feeling and insecurity, agony, and the lack of character, our adaptation to the artificial uniformity of the style of life of the masses. And there is nowhere any fact or writing which convincingly predicts a hopeful future.

However, the light of the Bible shines through the darkness of our age. It makes every event a sign of a radiant future, the future of Christ. But turning toward myth and religious substitutes, our century has not risen above the “Diesseitigkeit” of the nineteenth century. It has lost the sense of the “mysterium tremendum,” as Otto calls it. It remains blind to the word of redemption and salvation. And this is its essential difference from the Middle Ages.

Perhaps what is most striking if we compare our own century with
the past century is, as André Siegfried remarks, the loss of freedom. Travel, industry, commerce, labor, housing, and traffic are all hedged in by regulations and prohibitions, passports, visas, quotas, forms, notices, laws, stop signs, building plans, and especially official authorities, mighty powerless authorities.

This situation is closely bound up with what I have called the primacy of organization. And this leads us to a series of important features. For modern organization is based upon scientific planning which furnishes a symbolical system of relations within the organization, and whenever feasible such a system employs technical apparatus, such as telephones and the like, or plans are projected into a technical device.

Even apart from such planning modern technique exercises a unifying influence. It collectivizes society by its systems of communication, utilities, gas, water, light, sewage, communication, public enlightenment, and means of conveyance. Inter-human relations are at present comprehended to a large extent within a technical setting arranged according to a scientific pattern. And in both cases collectivization is nevertheless marked by a concentric integration, a linking of society toward a center.

Such concentration is an essential feature of modern organization. Concentration not only characterizes modern organization. Röpke views this concentration as the greatest problem of our time. In addition to the concentration of economic and political power stands the concentration of production, of people and of property. It appears to me that Röpke uses the term in varying senses, but in any case his illustrations are closely related to our own observations. At bottom all these phenomena are concerned with a concentration of competences and responsibilities, which are proportionally lost to collectivized man.

A further characteristic to be noted in this connection is the independent existence of the organizational framework. The latter detaches itself from those who planned and direct it; it lives on as an impersonal power, in papers and machines and incorporated companies. One of its expressions is a bureaucracy. (Röpke cites as an example the consumption of paper in Württemberg-Baden, where 32 tons of paper were used each month for newspapers, 70 tons for books, 500 tons for periodicals, and 1000 tons for official publications. Polak's view that planning does not necessarily lead to a bureaucracy is to my mind extremely weak. His argument that planning can decrease bureaucracy only demonstrates that there are degrees of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is inherent to the execution
and control of the central plan, if such planning seriously aims at control.)

It is due to this independence of the organizational framework that collectivization can assume such massive dimensions. The individual is bound to collectivity by many unbreakable ties. The technical scientific interweaving of the life of the community is also connected with mass instruction and the concentration of the masses in cities, factories, offices, skyscrapers, stadiums and theaters, as well as modern means of conveyance. This is the cause of the assemblies that Ortega Y Gasset would like to disperse.

The expansion of the masses is, however, but a minor feature of massification. More to the point is the levelling process in society, the eradication of all differences. Whatever science touches experiences this levelling influence. Its influence is encountered in scientific organization and in the results of modern technique. As Friedmann tells us, this monotonous levelling strikes all who compare various American cities. One is struck by the wearisome similarities within the city layout, a likeness of businesses, dwellings, and factories, etc. This reduction to a common denominator is most strongly felt in the environment produced by mass products.

Henry Ford's observation when he placed his Model T on the market is in this connection strikingly ironical: "Everybody can get a car in the color he desires, provided it is black". The following anecdote, if true, is an apt reply. Ford is supposed to have met an Indian wood worker who made beautiful chairs for five dollars apiece. Ford ordered a dozen that had to be all alike. The Indian explained to the astonished Ford that such chairs would cost eight dollars apiece, for to make twelve chairs all alike is a dull and tedious job, for which one would have to pay extra.

It needs no comment that the reduction of man's milieu to a common level influences man spiritually and brings about a collectivistic attitude. The devaluation of labor and the isolation and fixation of modern specialization described earlier have a great influence on the process of mass-formation. Specialization at least in its exaggerated form, compels man to think exclusively in terms of mass units of work. His loss of vision of the purpose of his work strengthens his dependence upon the collectivity in which his work is performed, and the devaluation of labor leads to passivity, to a hankering after security and an estrangement from freedom.

In all these characteristics there is a tendency to demolish personality and individuality, an urge to collectivity, in which humanity seeks to recover its lost security within the masses, there-
by apparently and passively compensating for a loss of liberty.

There is yet another important effect of concentric collectivization with its typical technical and scientific structure, and its devaluation and specialization of labor. Whenever collectivization gets the upper hand, the societal relationships that do not fit into the collective pattern begin to show signs of disintegration. It seems as if modern organized collectivity would assimilate and amalgamate all such relationships into its structure. The family is a special victim of collectivity. Modern social integration introduces disillusion at another point: the disintegration of man's temporal existence. Man functions in all sorts of societal relationships and relations. The coherence between these functions constitutes his temporal existence. Under the proper conditions, this coherence ought to be integrated in a harmonious manner; it ought to be directed to the total meaning of life. In general this harmonious coherence of temporal existence is still found in rural life, in which all its facets are directed to their internal meaningful coherence. A person whose existence is caught up in a modernized collectivity has to a large extent lost such unity in his life. Such is especially the case with regard to his work, the essential part of his temporal existence, when modern specialization causes him to lose sight of the meaning of his labor, and his work has been devaluated to the extent that its subjective meaningful character has been lost. Then he fails to harmonize his life within the collectivistic relationships with the rest of his experience. The unity of his life is split up. Family life and church life are detached from the totality of life, thereby losing their meaning. As a consequence the dissolution of such private and personal bonds is started by such collective integration.

There are some more characteristics of modern organization to be mentioned.

The technical environment in which we live is especially responsible for a forced rhythm and tempo both in our work and elsewhere, e.g., in social intercourse and traffic. Both constitute a threat to what is personal by suppressing individual rhythm and the enforcement of too rapid a pace on life and action. Hurry, nervousness, and a lack of moments in which man can come to himself and to rest are the result. Many become inured to a pace which in my opinion can be maintained without injury only in an emergency. Our whole life is infected by this forced rush. In the days of the canal barge it took half a day to travel from Amsterdam to Haarlem, a journey now made by train in thirteen minutes. It was possible then to pay a few calls on one's way to the barge, and not miss the boat. At present one has hardly the time to greet an acquaintance.
It is possible to adjust to such a situation only by living a peripheral life and becoming a part of a social "machinery." Thus there arises a disharmony between the outer and inner life of man. For many the latter is suppressed and the former is merely a façade of modern practicality and rationalistic simplification.

Collectivization and the attachment to an artificial environment, to the extent that man is lost within it, is accompanied by an uprooting in an historical sense. The consciousness of being included within an historical process, of building upon a tradition, is lost. Berdjaszew, in particular, raises this objection to the modern period.10

Man is of course responsible for the situation as it is. But before considering man's part in this process we must deal with two other traits of modern society which may be understood as the result of technical scientific development. The first is the large amount of leisure time. It is estimated that we have about a thousand hours more leisure time per year than our grandfathers had. The second is the rapidity of the process of historical development since 1800. Both traits are unique in history.

The speed of this development puts a severe strain upon the human ability to adapt. The changes which modern society has undergone penetrate far deeper into human life than political revolutions ever did. Baschwitz points out that revolutions always concerned a small group rather than the masses, who for the most part were undisturbed and continued to live as they used to, after the tension of a few crucial days.11 "Technique will leave its imprint when all other traits have disappeared. This Faustian passion has altered the face of the earth," as Spengler puts it.12

Objection may be taken to the picture of our situation that I have hitherto presented on account of its one-sidedness in its exclusive concern with the development of science and technique and the modern organization of society. This one-sidedness, however, I thought necessary for a more lucid exposition of the essential traits in the social development. But it repeatedly appeared that man is involved in the social organization and development; and man is not only a dependent variable of the situation in which he lives. He himself influences the course of development, and this influence is dependent upon the condition of his heart from which proceed the issues of life, also in society. It is therefore necessary to consider the human aspect of our society. Special emphasis must be laid on the human factor which is of the greatest importance. Man's value, especially his beliefs, are ultimately decisive for the future of our civilization.
And in this context it is not merely the question as to whether or not one views man as an independent factor of great significance, although this is very important in the face of such views as those of Marx or Burnham, who contradict it. The main issue is how man is viewed. It is here that there is the parting of the ways. Modern socialists by their personalism have gained much over Marx, and yet they are still so chained by historical materialism and the ideal of science that there is very little left of man's independent existence. And where the depths of man are probed somewhat deeper, for example by Karl Jaspers, we get no further than riddles instead of an answer to the question as to what is the cause of modern man's undoing. These riddles are said to be inherent to existentialism.

However, many people are fully aware of the fact of decadence, and are no longer misled by a show of practicality and externalized activity. Of our culture Huizinga says: “It is richer and mightier than ever before but it lacks a genuine and noble style of its own. It lacks a solidarity spirit and enthusiasm; it lacks a firm confidence in its own soundness and it lacks harmony, dignity, and lofty repose. Our culture is burdened with the leaden weight of humbug and false conceit as never before.” But Huizinga and all humanists, although they do not wish to ignore this unique trait of Western culture, do not tell us the cause of this incongruity. We are left in the dark concerning the reason for the loss of style and harmony. Where does this conceit and humbug have its origin? For these facts are intrinsically in conflict with the humanistic view of man. Our inability to get at the root of our troubles on this point is due to humanism's inability to view the facts. And not only this, humanism is responsible in addition for the cause of our trouble and the decadence of modern humanity. Humanism has wrongly considered man to be sovereign, independent, and spiritually indestructible. Man is not such a sovereign. His life must have a basis, a living root, a basis in Christ the Redeemer of humanity and the restorer of life. If humanity severs itself from this root and forsakes faith and the redemptive work of Christ, its entire existence is threatened by a constant death. Then life fades away from generation to generation, from age to age.

What we now experience in our time is an advanced stage of human disintegration. This is the crisis of humanism, announced by Nietzsche, though misunderstood, and lived through in the twentieth century. I have already discussed this point elsewhere more than once, and though it requires further elaboration, I shall not enter into it now because it would lead us too far away from our subject. All the dangerous aspects of our social structure: collectivization,
the levelling process, the transfer of responsibility, the distintegration of man's temporal existence, the practicality of man, the loss of his inner life and of all connection with the past, produce in us an anxiety for the future of civilization. Such factors produce tremendous tensions in our social life. But they are fully comprehended only when viewed from the perspective of the spiritual disintegration of humanity. For then we not only realize the constraint put upon man by modern society, but we also discover in man himself the urge to transfer his responsibility, to merge his own self in the collectivity, to level all differences, to externalize his life, and to succumb to the historical uprooting of human temporal existence. This latter aspect is that which renders the cultural situation so serious and casts a shadow over the future.

It is said that our age has become acquainted with the masses, the human hordes. This is true, provided one does not think of a separate sort of human being, but of the characteristics of a type which is manifested in our century with increasing clearness; and which occurs for the first time in history on so grand a scale.

Who then is this mass man? Does he grow out of poverty? To think so is the mistake of socialism. The mass man does not originate in care and sorrow. The mass man does not even arise when the tension of freedom is made unbearable by the heavy load of care. His milieu is where cares have been taken away and removed; where security provided from without has released the tension of the bow of freedom. Security is the main need of the mass man.

But does man in such an environment inevitably become a mass man? To think so is the second error that can be made on this point. The milieu which makes man passive and offers him security at the price of liberty can level his temporal existence, but not his personality, it cannot degrade the human heart. The mass man can appear only if in such an environment the process of spiritual disintegration has also reached its final stage. This process, as history teaches us, takes its course along the route where God is denied and, materialistically, man's perspectives are rigorously limited to the earth. In the end man's horizon grows narrower, doubt and disillusionment appear when in actual practice reality turns out to be the very opposite of his ideals. The earthly perspectives are incapable of rousing his enthusiasm, because they are not genuine perspectives. Then everything is meaningless, for man can only await death. Man is abandoned to himself. He experiences the loneliness of being forsaken by God and is now also lonely among men. He has no standards and can follow no meaningful course of action. In other words he is confronted with
nihilism, and his agony and anxiety drive him to the masses. “Es friert sie wenn sie nicht zu Tausenden sind.” (They are terrified when they are not among thousands). Within the crowd of the masses man seeks his lost security. He desires collectivity and equality, for freedom is an intolerable burden and the transfer of responsibility is a relief. When man flees from himself, he becomes a nihilistic mass man, who is the mask of his suppressed inner life.

A pre-determined society?

Let us return to the discussion of our subject in the narrower sense and ask whether or not the structure of society which in the present day revolution is in the process of becoming, is unavoidable in the future. Is it necessary to acquiesce to the concentration of power now in process, to this process of collectivization in a society in which scientific organization is decisive, and in which the planners and the managers will have the last word?

Is the process of a continuous economic usurpation of power by the state inevitable, so that politics and economics will be forever amalgamated into one whole?

To be somewhat more concrete: will the government of the future, or some organ which is dependent on it, decide wages and prices, the type and quantity of products to be produced? Will it direct investments and assume the right of final decision in the matter of hiring and firing? Will it prohibit strikes? Will the milkman have his customer assigned to him or housing be controlled and allotted to us by the government? Will the concentration of money by the state increase? Will the state be a Santa Claus that subsidizes youthwork, art, education, charity, and the building of churches, hospitals and foundations; will it pay the salaries of clergymen, scientific research and physicians? Will the government control and direct what it deems necessary, and thus guarantee the requirements of man for a life of security from the cradle to the grave? (Beyond this it certainly cannot go.)

I know that a number of these matters have already been realized, although methodical planning and control has just started. In general all these tendencies are directed toward their realization, even though they may be slowed down or reversed temporarily. There is general agreement on the existence of this state of affairs.

But the question is whether or not this process is unavoidable. Is there any way that we can escape collectivization, concentration of power, and such organocracy? Is this our destiny? If so, there is little
left to choose from. If such a future is inevitable we ought to adapt ourselves to this process and acquiesce. Then it is folly to rebel. Our only sensible attitude will then be to stake our all on planning.

Communism is permeated with this determinism. According to Marx we can indeed only acquiesce in a deterministic social process. Burnham also believes that this social process is unavoidable and in the future it must terminate in a managers' society in which the tendencies described above have fully developed.\(^{15}\)

Modern socialists are in general somewhat more cautious. At least on the point of determinism they do not fall in with Marx. The late sociologist Mannheim, a prominent theorist on the idea of planning, who will often claim our attention in the sequel, hopefully suggests that the social process and thinking will alternately direct each other.\(^{16}\)

A closer examination of socialistic works, however, discloses that the mitigation of their determinism is merely a surface affair. Schumpeter, e.g., says: "......the economic process tends to socialize itself — and also the human soul. By this we mean that the technological, organizational, commercial, administrative and psychological prerequisites of socialism tend to be fulfilled more and more." And further: "The capitalist process shapes things and souls for socialism."\(^{17}\) The old Adam has been relativized somewhat but is still far from conquered. This need not surprise us, for it is not simply a question of a traditional attachment to Marx, but the fate of the ideal of science is at stake in its conception of man and history.

For in their opinion there is within a particular society only one particular form of thinking possible. To them the other side of the medal exists only in an academic sense. The structure of each society is accompanied by its own form of culture. Spiritual values are dependent upon specific social circumstances. The social process is a spontaneous process. Marx possessed prophetic gifts concerning the rise of collectivism. In brief, these socialists also regard planning as inevitable.\(^{18}\) In their opinion it will be necessary above all to accept the typical compulsion and constraint of industrial development with its accompanying concentration of power and extensive integration.\(^{19}\)

And it is therefore obvious that on the part of the socialists we can only expect acquiescence to the factual situation. Man must adapt himself to the social development, and has no alternative but to throw his full strength in the planning of the integrating and collectivizing society.\(^{20}\)

Modern socialism is committed to this limitation or restriction of existing possibilities. Hayek correctly observes that the proponents
of planning are not content to state that planning is desirable. They imagine that circumstances compel us to accept it.21

We must not think lightly of the constraint placed by society upon man's free choice. And in this case the situation is such that as we proceed on the road of organocracy and collectivism, the chance to strike out new paths within the near future is constantly growing smaller. Undeniably the structure of modern big business especially holds us in its grip. (We hope of course that the compulsion to plan because of the threat of war is of a passing nature, but this may not be the case.)

I am, however, in agreement with Röpke in his conviction that this determinism based on the development of technique and science must be rejected as dangerous and without any sound foundation.22

Both the older rigid determinism and the modern relative determinism, however, err especially in their view of man. This error has its source in the arrogance of science, the modern form of the humanistic ideal of the control of reality. It is forgotten that man has a relation and a responsibility transcending this temporal reality, and that it is not his social circumstances which in the first place set the standards of this thought and action.23 The true standards are in principle independent of man's environment, even of man himself. These standards or norm principles are only moulded by man (good or bad) in the course of history into norms, valid for the situation at hand. This moulding is of course not an adaptation to the situation as the latter has to be tested by it.

An understanding of the social development until the present moment requires that we take into account both the scientific ideal of control independent of its practical application, and the spiritual process described in the previous section. And for the future in so far as his own life is concerned as well as in so far as he is called upon to lead others, man will have to allow his thoughts and actions to be directed by what society ought to be and to become, and not merely by what it happens to be. The possibility to do so demands that, although we recognize what binds us to our own time and to the continuity of history, we have to reject every form of social determinism as well as modern collectivism.

Planning

According to Mannheim within Western civilization there is to be distinguished a collectivistic phase, ending with the Middle Ages, and followed by a liberal and individualistic phase of transition, only to
revert again in the present day to a collectivistic phase.\textsuperscript{24} Burnham has a similar doctrine of three phases. He distinguishes the feudal society, followed by the transitional phase of capitalism, which in its turn was superseded by the manager society. This kind of three phase theory commits in any case the error of overlooking the period of the Reformation, which was not individualistic, nor liberalistic or capitalist. It may be desirable to add that the collectivism of the Middle Ages was not only general but organic, because of spiritual harmony. Modern collectivism in contrast is quite artificial. It is forced upon man from without. Spiritual harmony is absent. This fact is also recognized by Mannheim.

But what interests us now is that socialists do not simply affirm modern collectivism as a fact but hail it as a hopeful development for the future. However, to my mind it is a phenomenon of reaction. Socialists do not adapt to it reluctantly but they wish to promote it by means of planning. And they do not do so merely in the direction which the process is taking. Their planning is to them more than a prediction for the future on the basis of the present data and those of the past. Therefore it is desirable to state emphatically that the idea of planning is essentially different from that of simple adaptation to an unavoidable social situation. Adherence to planning signifies a conscious choice to promote the social process in a specific direction. Planning consciously seeks to give direction to the social process, and in this respect there is nothing inevitable about it. On the contrary, it is a free choice, and its proponents are beckoned by the future, their faith in an ideal — the building of an all embracing community. It is the matter of the realization of a "groping and seeking, centuries old, a search for an ideal social organization for human welfare."\textsuperscript{25}

It is necessary to keep in mind industrial planning when discussing the planning of society. In passing we would remark that because of successful planning in the sphere of technique, many engineers enthusiastically advocate a planned community, and that together with socialism and utopianism, technocracy was also present at the birth of planning.

I shall select a few simple factors to define the concept of planning. Man constantly makes plans for future undertakings. The planning here discussed, however, concerns the life and efforts of other people. It is realized in the relation of authority and freedom. Even this is too general a statement. It is not simply analogous to the program proposed by a chairman at a meeting. Such a program concerns only the framework within which the meeting is to be conducted freely.
Planning, however, does not concern merely the external framework, but it deals with the essence of cooperative activity. It is not concerned simply with the environment of production, such as space, location, light, air, and so on, but it concerns production by men itself; not the conditions of commerce, but commerce itself. According to Polak, welfare planning aims at the active control of future economic development.26 According to Mannheim, planning has the following characteristics: besides invention in individual situations it is the purposeful regulation and judicious control of the totality. For this purpose the key positions must be discovered and occupied. In addition to passing from the individual case to the totality, he asserts that in this way the step from the immediate purposes to the final stage of thought is taken with respect to the operation in the long run.27 To him the modern period is characterized by its progress from invention to planning.

Add to this that planning is of a scientific nature. The planner is no longer prepared to leave anything to “chance.” Eventually individuality must be more or less predetermined, if the planning is not to be arbitrarily disturbed by it, as Mannheim suggests.28 The individual event can no longer be left to itself. But remember that chance and arbitrariness — here we hear the calculus of probability approach on its stocking feet — are nothing but what the central planner discovers of the activity of free men. Chance and arbitrary choice lie outside of the plans of the central planner. Modern writings look as innocent as Plato’s Republic. For Plato tried to make us forget the essential distinction between the justice striven after by individual men and that prescribed by the state.

So planning is not merely scientific research, but its aim is its application. It does not simply give advice, but offers a plan by means of which to control and organize the activity of men in an essential sense.

As early as the last century, St. Simon and Comte were convinced that science had made it possible to control society centrally through its organization. Taylor, as we have seen, applied this theory to production. Not long after, Rathenau developed the idea of planning for economic life. And in 1928, Russia began its first five-year-plan. Then followed the plans of the Nazis, various labor plans, the New Deal, and after the second world war planning has become the fashion everywhere. Such names as Keynes, Beveridge, and Tinbergen are familiar to us. The war gave an important impetus to planning. The governmental planning of production was indispensable to the war effort. At the end of the war, the public had become used to it, and
the personnel and means were at hand to extend planning into a period of peace.

It is inaccurate to suppose that the planning and the organization of the economic life are the direct outcome of a desire to solve the social question. Though the social question served as a stimulus to planning, it was not its basic cause. For planning is a special solution and not the only answer to the challenge of the social question. For instance a choice can be made between increased production and the “short cut” of the planned redistribution of goods. Besides, the scope of planning is much broader. It would be possible to leave the correction of a social evil to appropriate legislation, as was partly done in the last century. We might call this method government control and correction on the border line between justice and intolerable injustice. However, it has been observed correctly that for this purpose economic life has been penetrated to a much deeper level, so that social policy has contributed to the creation of a new economic structure.

In general it may be said that in our century limited legislative control is gradually being transformed into the methodical planning of economic life in its entirety. And then it is at once clear that much more is intended than finding a solution to the social question. The aim is welfare planning. The purpose is not to cure certain social and economic maladies; it is rather to create an entirely new social system. The intention is to control centrally the future course and the spread of the general welfare. The stability of the system is of the greatest importance; for on it depends the reliability of all planning for the future.

All sorts of special aims may step to the fore within such welfare planning, for social welfare and its spread contain many aspects. The economic structure may be controlled in order to provide full employment, to prevent crises and depressions, or to provide social security. All such goals are but subdivisions of the “welfare plan.”

An exhaustive study of the manner in which such planning is worked out lies beyond the scope of our study. The general procedure, however, is to occupy so many strategic economic positions that the entirety is brought under control. The nationalization, e.g., of key industries creates conditions conducive to the adoption of a general plan. For then at least the key industries are brought under central control.

The modern view is control by regulating the financial resources of economic life, but without nationalization or socialization of the means of production. This procedure requires the planned control
of the volumes of money, taxes, investments, interests, foreign exchanges, wages, prices, and so on. Such regimentation makes ordinary nationalization superfluous, for then the power to direct one's own affairs has become equally illusory. The only difference is that one is caught in a web of planning with less noise and ado.

It should above all be borne in mind that every area of economic life that cannot be directed by planning, or at least included in it, shows a tendency to frustrate future planning or even to constitute a threat to the very stability of the development planned for the future. The sudden demand for a product, a rush of workmen to a specific occupation, inventions, freaks of climate, obstinate people that save in their own way without paying attention to the "rules" of economy, give the planners many sleepless nights. Such a sector of stubbornness must be controlled to insure stability. It must be included within a calculus of probability or subjected to directives.

**Planning is an error**

In this section I shall state why I believe that the concept of the planning of economic life is a dangerous error, an error which seriously threatens the social structure of the future. And in the next section I shall criticize planning in areas other than the economic.

To prevent any misunderstanding, let me say again that I am not opposed to planning in general. The “planning” which I would reject is a scientific concept of what is to take place in a specified area of human endeavor, embracing the activity of many people so that it would centrally control future events and future acts at the expense of freedom. Polak's definition lacks the essential element of control. He simply speaks of management but corrects himself later on by naming as a fundamental characteristic of planning, “the active control of the future economic development.” And this is of necessity central control, as Hayek correctly observes, “without some such central control of the means of production planning in the sense in which we have used the term ceases to be a problem. It becomes unthinkable.”

We shall now discuss the origin of the ideal of planning; its practice insofar as it deprives men of initiative and leads to rigidity; its disturbance of the balance between authority and freedom; its abrogation of the independence of the various societal relationships, and its menace to democracy.

Of course it is also possible to inquire into the economic value of planning, i.e., whether or not it offers a solution to the problem
of the most efficient distribution of scarce goods, and if so, in what way.

This is the question asked by Hayek. He considers it to be the only scientific question about planning: “on the validity of the ends science has nothing to say...... all that we can rationally argue about is whether and to what extent given measures will lead to the desired results.” 31 But the problem is not so simple as that. In the first place this question cannot be answered rationally because the effect of planning depends on the mentality of the people included in it. As a matter of fact, Hayek later on introduces this correction himself. More important is the circumstance that his way of separating means and ends is untenable. He admits this defect for the case that this method has only one particular end in view. But on the other hand he holds that planning can be connected with altogether different ethical ideals. This is an error. Planning allows of only one limited group of aims in so far as the method affects the aim. But it is equally necessary to consider the other side of the medal. For in order to know what to think of economic planning it is essential to take into account the economic aims that are striven after. Hayek observes that the central authority should draw up an accurate scale of economic values. For this purpose it is first necessary to consider more fundamental values, since this scale depends on the ultimate aims, e.g., prosperity, or security, or equality. It is clear that one’s choice is decisive for the measures to be taken. Hayek thought he could consider these measures apart from everything else. He wanted to derive a criterion from a comparison of competitive capitalism with centrally controlled governmental planning. But such a comparison will not enable us to form an opinion on planning because their aims are different. All the same we can frame Hayek’s question in an amended form. This amended question is whether or not we can compose a coherent system of values, collect the relevant data, and work them out. The second question is a difficult one. The contention that it would be absurd to expect that there is any one who can remember all these data even if he is an expert, has been invalidated by the invention of automatic computers whose uncanny “memory” we have at our disposal. The greatest difficulty, however, is to be sought in the question as to whether the future economic behavior of people can be included in the calculations as sufficiently reliable data when that behavior has not been directed.

From such questions it will be clear that we shall be occupied with more fundamental aspects of planning, whose problems will have
to be solved before any discussion of the economic question can be undertaken.

As to the origin of planning let us consider the view taken by Polak, who defends the thesis that planning is a neutral technique.\textsuperscript{32} This observation, designed to put his readers at ease, is as meaningless as the assertion that ruling and assembling are neutral affairs. The fact of the matter is that the planning that Polak describes and discusses is in no sense neutral, because it is the expression of a specific conception of life. It is therefore confusing the issue when he cites as examples of neutrality the planning of the military, of doctors and architects etc. The plans of the latter two groups do not deal with the actions of one's fellowmen. Military planning seeks to control military activities. Its purpose is so unique that it can hardly serve as a justification of the planning of the general welfare of society. Military planning is culturally negative. It has the unequivocal and undisputed purpose of annihilating the enemy.

The notion that "planning" is in itself neutral would tempt us to think that judgment ought to be deferred until the ideology behind a specific plan has been determined, e.g., communistic, socialistic, and so on. But the very concept of planning is a Trojan horse. An ideology is already inherent in the idea of planning. The outstanding feature of planning is the central control of a sector of society — eventually of all society, as we shall see further on. The building of a community, the collectivization for the sake of a 'diesseitig' (i.e., earthly and temporal) ideal of security to be realized by man (an elite group) for society, in a scientific way: this is the idea of planning. Polak does not put our mind at ease by pointing, e.g., to the “quite completely a-socialistic planning” in the Netherlands; planning without socialization of property. As we have seen in the previous section such is irrelevant as far as central control is concerned. It is not unjust to regard socialists and communists as the main proponents of planning.

What is most disquieting and amazing when we think of its humanistic origin, is the low esteem in which man is held by the advocates of planning. Man is approached within the collectivity of the masses; he is viewed as someone that seeks security, chases welfare and strives after happiness and satisfaction. And planning will provide for all that and even for a higher level of civilization.\textsuperscript{53} All man needs to do is to be herded with the masses.

Of course socialists have learned to recognize the masses as a social phenomenon (a phenomenon, however, which they cannot explain). Their fateful mistake is that they are undisturbed by it and
even stimulate and employ the masses to advance their ideal of control and practical planning.\textsuperscript{34}

A Christian views man as created in God's image and called unto His service. If man is viewed in this light and within the framework of the social principles of authority and freedom, and sphere-sovereignty, then we can understand the level of decadence to which the adherents of planning have gone in their view of man, and how hopeless his future will be.

No one would doubt that those who advocate planning have many good intentions.\textsuperscript{35} But in all honesty it is necessary to acknowledge that the leaders of communism originally meant well and even a Hitler once had good intentions. The test of a principle does not consist in the ideals and good intentions of its adherents. At the beginning of a chapter, Hayek cites a passage from Hoelderlin, “What has always made the state a hell on earth has been precisely that man has tried to make it his heaven.”

The defenders of planning operate with the shadow of what man ought to be. They would establish a stable society that would make man forget that his life is a continuous death, a fact understood even by the existentialist Heidegger. By providing man with security, he can take a nap and abandon the security of the faith in Jesus Christ. What is desired is a planned world that is no longer in need of God's providential guidance.

On the basis of the Christian faith, breaking through their science and serving as the basis of our own social principles, we reply that such an image of man is defective; that the way of planning does not end in stability but in the liability of wars and rumors of wars, in a reign of terror and the threat of terror; that instead of security, they will reap unrest, confusion, and agony (John 14:27). Such a planned society will not become a fellowship but a monstrosity without any resemblance to what God purposed in his majestic scheme of creation. And we base our prediction on the Christian faith that God is a jealous God who avenges himself on idolatry and permits man to destroy himself by his own sins.

The reader may object that science cannot operate with such dictums. I immediately grant that such religious statements transcend science and exclude and evade analysis, but such beliefs ought to be experienced and respected when the ultimate issues both of science and life are involved. Scientific activities ought to reverberate upon the knowledge of faith. If they do not react upon the Christian faith, they will be a resonance to other dogmas of a super-scientific nature. There is no third possibility.
It is well to speak plainly. Planning may be criticized in terms of its own presuppositions. I shall do so in great detail in the sequel. But it should not be supposed that this immanent criticism is the basis of my convictions. My convictions arise basically out of the confrontation of my own religious faith with what is at the back of planning, perhaps concealed by it.

It is a well known fact that during the period between the middle ages and the French Revolution, the monopolistic structure of the guilds did not permit men to adapt to changing social conditions and to keep pace with the progress of technique and economic life. Regulations are apt to become permanent, and the prominence of their regulations forced the guild system to assume a static character during a period that demanded dynamic expansion and transformation. The same holds for our second question. (See p. 179.)

Within our own social order this drawback of planning will be even more serious, because of the much quicker tempo of its development. And on the other hand science has afforded to planning a much wider field of operation and a much higher degree of organization than the guilds.

I know that Mannheim aims at a dynamic planning that adjusts itself to circumstances and is flexible with respect to the future. Undoubtedly the rigid influence of planning can be tempered but it cannot be abrogated. Any one who thinks it can be abrogated is mistaken about the nature of science, in the same way as Bergson's desire for fluid concepts was a mistaken idea.

Planning is static in character because of the nature of science and the general nature of central control. Planning determines the character of the social structure, and casts future development into rigid moulds, at least until a new plan is drafted or the old one is corrected. But in view of the internal coherence this correction or the introduction of a new plan is not so simple as it seems, because of internal complications and practical difficulties. For society has adapted to the static frame put upon it by means of an all-inclusive plan, and in consequence it has lost its flexibility to a degree that ought not to be underestimated.

A two-fold distinction is necessary at this point. Consider first of all the rigidity, as a result of permanent regulations such as wage and price controls. By now we should know how difficult it is to change them. The fixing of wages and prices as such is of a static character, because it binds people for a long time, or, to put it in a different way, such regulations force economic life to run in a definitely ap-
pointed groove. Besides, the fixation tends to level all differentiation. The continuous spectrum of wages and prices, which results from letting society form its own opinion in the main, is imitated in an artificial way and with a levelling effect by means of a certain number of fixed points in this spectrum. To enable the reader to form an idea of this procedure we would say that the situation is similar to certain standard types of mass production which are produced to suit the desires of the consumer, according to a certain average level. Notwithstanding the similarity, however, we should not ignore their difference; for mass production has no alternative and need not have one, but planning has.

In the second place a plan includes elements of historical fixation, i.e., prescriptions relating to development, e.g., the plan of industrialization. It is rigid in so far as it determines the future. Anything new and unforeseen is a source of conflict either disturbing planning or depriving any novelty of its chance. And further we must not forget that the result of planning becomes part of that impersonal social organizational machine, which operates as an independent power and is of an unwieldy and rigid character.

Once again let me emphasize that planning aims at the control of the future; and that no one will take it into his head to carry out such a plan if he has to leave out of account various vital and essential elements within his field of operation. Planning is of a scientific nature. A scientist, for example, does not attempt to predict the quantity of a crop of lemons from their special quality without knowing the climate and soil conditions in which they are to be grown.

In spite of all efforts to the contrary, planning is by its very nature inclined to put a straitjacket upon the free and spontaneous development of culture and society and render them rigid. Instead of stimulating them, it leads to the restraining and choking of progress.

The situation is aggravated all the more because the most essential ideological purpose of planning, social security in a stable society, demands the fixation of social forms and relations. Every spontaneous development menaces planning and its purposes. Not only are important new impulses a menace, but also the minor stirrings of originality may by their cumulative operation cause serious disturbances in a planned social structure. Planning lacks flexibility.

Of all the unpredictable spontaneity factors which affect planning, technique furnishes the most illuminating illustration. Its inventions are like so many unforeseen explosions. They are unpredictable and may introduce a course of development in society which is in disharmony with the drafted plan.
This brings us to a difficulty which also occurs in technique on a minor scale. It is the conflict between science and technique. Science serves technique on the one hand, but according to its nature it also stands in the way of technical invention and threatens to make it sterile. For example, engineers may grow so accustomed to the practical routine of science that they lack all creativity. If the supply of electricity has been arranged for a large area as a unit, then for a long time there is no incentive to introduce significant innovations affecting the operation of the whole unit. Planning thus obstructs technical progress.

It is legitimate to ask what will be the effect of various spontaneous developments or disintegrations (e.g., crop failure, epidemics etc.). This question also arises in a free society, which, however, will assimilate such movements in a manner which is much more difficult to trace. In such a free society, in any case, the attempt can be made to correct such evils.

The social structure of controlled society is also subject to the influence of such spontaneous phenomena. It has the choice of abandoning planned control or of introducing some form of further coercion; if need be, of suppression. And remember, such coercion seeks to place strong restraint on the activities of human beings.

The scope and intensity of unforeseen initiative and impulses determine the scope and intensity of the compulsion that must be put into practice. Nobody is able to say in advance exactly what steps will be taken, but the lessons of history and the possible steps that must be taken cause us to fear, however, that planning is the first step toward a totalitarian society, in which planning is supported by terror .... and deceit. Whether planning or the disturbing factor will be victorious in such a coerced society will depend on the nature of the disturbance.

It is a matter of speculation whether or not it is humanly possible, even with violence and force, to establish successfully a planned social order with really adequate control. And if I rightly understand the book of Revelation, it is impossible.

It is a favorite theory that with the transition from liberalism and capitalism to socialism, working for personal wages will make way for service to the community. Note in passing that socialism grew out of oppression and struggle for power and cannot feel comfortable in the garb of servitude. Socialism taught its devotee to notice his neighbor not next to him but only through the community, or, to unmask that myth, through the state. At least as important and alluring, however, was the promise that the community, or again the state,
would be of service to man and provide him with security. The difference between the egoism of the individualistic liberals and that of the collectivistic socialists is really only that the latter is more subtle. In this field we have been made richer with a series of slogans and myths that at least the clergymen in the socialistic group should see through with the aid of the Bible. Among others is the slogan that love for one's neighbor can be realized when filling in a tax form.

Even if we did not have to consider all these things, the contrast given above leads to an erroneous representation of the state of affairs. It is not man who serves society, but planning; and man obeys planning. This remark needs qualification in view of some leeway still left to man. But in the main it is correct, and as soon as planning is introduced, its validity steadily increases. Man's loss of freedom increases in direct proportion to the increase in planned control. The opportunity to serve the community decreases and the desire to endorse the needs of one's neighbor to the state grows steadily. Any one who keeps his eyes and ears open notices this state of affairs again and again. The most important thing, however, is that planning fosters the egocentricity that is dear to the human heart. Christ's second commandment, viz., "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" cannot prosper in an atmosphere where there is a supply of free service and hardly any demand for voluntary and spontaneous performance. In such a milieu emphasis is placed on the needs of the ego.

Here we are really discussing another aspect of the tendency of planning to lead to rigidity. In addition to egocentricity we are also confronted with the loss of initiative. Initiative is killed by rules and organization. Planning is not based upon human initiative. The adherents of planning do not in the first place build on private initiative but on planned control as such. Personal initiative must give way to the demands of planning. This is to say that initiative can have a turn only when the central control of society is secured.

This is a fact of greatest significance for the future of Western culture. The latter began to flourish by virtue of man's personal and social liberation. Such emancipation was the very condition for the rise of the rich variety of initiative that found utterance in a colorful pattern of cultural activity. From a central viewpoint, even a modern scientific one, this complexity undoubtedly appears as a hopelessly confused chaos. The opposite is the case, however. This activity was a pattern woven from many aims, each of which was the conscious and meaningful contribution of personal responsibility.
We have discussed how the sinful desire for power in the last century led to an ever greater concentration of economic power, and how subsequently the idea of a more central and comprehensive economic planning was given its first practical realization.

When the seeming whirl of initiatives is compared with a planned and directed society, it is readily seen that the introduction of planning has come at the expense of a tremendous loss in human initiative. We have already noticed a similar phenomenon as the result of the devaluation of labor. Of course the loss depends on the degree of planning. But even the most moderate type, in which the element of control is maintained, leads to a considerable sterilization of cultural progress.

And in exchange, society acquires the coordinated and planned initiative of an elite minority. The spirit of adventure, genius, insight, the perseverance of man’s capacity to adapt, are in the main sacrificed upon the altar of applied science. This perspective of planning, which lacks flexibility, justifies the suspicion that in a planned society we may anticipate a great retardation of cultural growth. The activity revealed in Russia is no contradiction. Russia is only busy catching up with the West. Russia gives no evidence of new cultural perspectives.

It is now desirable to view planning in the light of the principle of authority and freedom. This theme is closely related to what we have said earlier in connection with the factory. For the present we shall confine ourselves to the economic field and not yet deal with the question of sphere-sovereignty.

Our subject is of importance, for the proponents of planning are convinced that planning is an aid to freedom. It is our chief contention that planning upsets the balance of authority and freedom and that this disruption increases with the passage of time.

Among the proponents and the opponents of planning are those who advocate a third intermediate course of action. The advocates of planning would follow a course between liberalism and communism; the opponents of planning would steer between liberalism and socialism. Such middle courses are respectively called by such names as “social-democrat” or “neo-liberal.” The two trends are not yet identical, but some would even effect a synthesis between social liberals and liberal socialists. In any case the best thing in this situation seems to be to try to find a tenable position between these two groups.

Such relativization of the differences is in fact only a camouflage.
of the issue. It is based on a theory which distinguishes only between liberalism and communism, and a continuous transition between both of these poles. Within this framework it is, e.g., impossible to recognize that liberalism can be viewed as the derailment of correct social forms, whereas the very social form advocated by socialism and communism is essentially wrong. This distinction, however, is perfectly clear to anyone who comprehends the origin of authority, the essence of freedom, and the principle of sphere-sovereignty. It is the lack of such insights that permits the entrance of relativism.

Neo-liberalism will be discussed in the next chapter; our present concern is with so-called democratic socialism.

The criterion for the proper relation between authority and freedom follows from a proper Scriptural conception of both. The juridical basis of authority does not depend on what society demands and establishes as “traffic lights in the regulation of human behavior and conduct.” If such were the case the form of society would then determine the relation of authority and freedom. However, authority is rooted in the authority granted by God, and its function is to provide and maintain the order necessary within a specific social relationship so that its members individually and collectively may enjoy the best possible opportunity of functioning in freedom.

Socialism has a quite different conception of authority. Schumpeter says: “By socialist society we shall designate an institutional pattern in which the control over means of production and over production itself is vested with a central authority — or, as we may say, in which, as a matter of principle, the economic affairs of society belong to the public and not to the private sphere.” He admits, it is true, that he has excluded a few types. “This is because what may be termed Centralist Socialism seems to me to hold the field so clearly that it would be a waste of space to consider other forms.”

The subservient and limited function of authority is thereby extended to a position of supreme control. The community has priority over everything else, and in this community the central plan is in the foreground. The future does not depend on Mr. Johnson, as an individual business man; it depends rather on the plan into which Mr. Johnson has been partially or entirely regimented. Such is nowhere stated expressly but it can be read between the lines in the writings of the advocates of planning. “Planning can be carried out only by a strong central authority.” “Centralization is necessary because coordination of the different measures is essential to planning.” These are some of the theses which Mannheim deems essential.
Not only does such a view shift the balance between authority and freedom in a very serious manner, but according to the criterion we have adopted to test the validity of planning, the proper relation between authority and freedom has been reversed. The position of the latter is now subordinate to the former. There is a limit which ought not to be exceeded and in planning it is inevitably exceeded.

We noted that such a situation is caused by a wrong view of man and a community ideology. But even without such erroneous conceptions it is possible to be caught in the web of an erroneous conception of science such as, e.g., is found regularly in economic science, and then to be induced to accept “planning.” Science can never reach the individual and the particular. And when this fact is overlooked, only what is general and comprehensive will be recognized when the results are to be applied, that is to say, only that which is familiar to science.

I shall illustrate this by the view of Zylstra, though for the rest what has been observed about Mannheim and Polak does certainly not apply to him. Yet Zylstra views free social exchange too much from the ivory tower of science. He thinks that a mechanism of price governs society; it has an impersonal automatic order. “The system operates automatically.” The number of buyers and sellers is so large that the influence of each individual is a negligible quantity.43

Such a view arises when the free activity of individuals is considered from the standpoint of science, and probability laws are introduced to deal with this free activity in a general scientific way. Then the activity itself is further ignored. When afterwards such terms as “automatic” and “mechanism” are introduced, the directed economy no longer looks so ugly. As a consequence the fact is overlooked that “Mrs. Buyer” and “Mr. Seller” are not interested in knowing that their influence is not noted in a survey of the whole field of economy. (Perhaps they know that science has but limited potentiality.) What is of importance to them is that they do not buy and sell automatically, but can decide in freedom not to buy cheese or decide to wait for six months until the price of a coat is somewhat lower. And “Mr. Seller” may decide to hold his stock because experience has taught him that he may later receive a better price. Science may serve this experience but it cannot take its place.

May we then take no notice of the economic situation as a whole, the macro-economy? Of course we may, but it must not make us forget that the actual economic event — the frugal and sparing action of value-exchange — takes place in the market, at the door, and in the store. At least it should take place there. The scientific general
insight into the economy cannot account for such free individual acts. Of course one free act does not influence macro-economy, but the combined free acts of all the individuals makes all the difference. They can be rated by economic theory but never essentially calculated. The question is solved to the degree that they will be abolished. But there is no excuse for us to permit ourselves to be misled into partially or wholly sacrificing the free economic event to a central planning and a directed economy.

We may consider, of course, that sin enters economic transactions; that man abuses his chances; that the preponderance of profit may lie on one side of a deal, etc. But this does not justify planning. In such a situation we must begin by warning against abuse and leave correction to the responsibility of the parties involved. (We warn a boy who steals sweets and leave it to his sense of responsibility to correct his fault.) If reproof and correction are of no avail and an intolerable situation arises, more drastic action must be taken then and there. That is to say, an economic evil must be corrected. Transgression may also be prevented by legal measures, e.g., by fixing a minimum wage (a genuine minimum, that is, in exceptional cases). (All such correction may be compared with the admonition of a shoplifter and the threat of measures against misdemeanor.) As a last resort planning may be chosen as a solution. This is to say that a number of essential responsibilities may be taken away from the citizens and transferred to the state, which then in the real sense of the word begins to direct economic life, and thus in an equal degree to liquidate it. (In the same way the boy would only seem to be cured of his fault of stealing sweets when the objects of temptation, sugarpots, etc., are removed.)

But one will have to choose between the free economic activity of citizens and planning. Any one who attempts to blind us to the obvious meaning of the alternatives by saying that it is only a question of degree, raises the suspicion that he will be blinded himself when the communists try the same thing on him. There will be even more truth in the assertion of the communists that the difference between them and him is only one of degree and will be decided by the situation. The issue is whether we should introduce corrective measures to relieve the lot of a few, whose opportunities and privileges remain below permissible standards, of whether we must lend “aid” to all through general control. The issue is whether the many, according to their opportunities, wishes, and standards, shall determine for themselves their own course of action and by their decisions contribute their bit as a free regulator of the economic life, or whether from
some central office decisions shall be made which determine such 
wishes, opportunities and standards. Even when monopolistic situ-
tations arise in a free economy we still have a choice of various possibili-
ties; whether we shall acquiesce or correct, or whether the state shall 
assimilate them into planning and form super monopolies.44

Every man has the duty and should have the chance to find his 
own proper balance between the securities he may establish and the 
risks that he will run. It is his own responsibility. Planning introduces 
the process of dependence, in which one after the other possibilities 
of choosing a balance are removed, to make room for securities 
guaranteed and enforced by the government. Polak calls man a 
"planning animal."45 Why should this privilege be reserved for the 
chosen few, while the majority must be content with the rôle of 
"planned animal?"

Planning reverses the order of affairs in the relation between authority 
and freedom. And with the aim of centrally controlling economic life 
it obtains primacy over a free individual economic activity.

But then the question arises whether or not the impermissible 
curtailment of activity can at least be stabilized with a minimum of 
necessary planning so that some degree of free movement still belongs 
to the planned animals. If such is not possible a dictator is un-
avoidable.

Most advocates of planning are quite sure that a dictatorship can 
be avoided. One exception, e.g., is Dobb, who is of the opinion that 
the introduction of socialism is worth the price of sacrificing personal 
freedom.46 Mannheim, however, believes that it is rather obvious 
that planning does not necessarily mean a goose-step coordination.47 
Polak also holds that dictatorship does not follow logically from 
planning; and that it is possible to select a proper relation somewhere 
between restraint and freedom.48 We have already seen that planning 
exceeds the limits of the permissible. The question is, whether 
a halt can be called at least to such illegitimate activity. I can find 
no argument advanced by the advocates of planning which convinc-
ingly shows that it is possible to control and limit rigorous planning. 
Their own conception and description, where they speak freely, serves 
only to justify the fear of a totalitarian tendency.

Every one is persuaded that planning is accompanied by an 
esential structural alteration of society, a change of the same 
character, differing only in degree, with the change introduced into 
communist Russia. That is but another interpretation of the fact that 
planning as such has passed the threshold of the permissible,
and that there is a continuous transition on the wrong side of the
threshold. Consequently, the burden of proof rests with the advocate
of planning. He ought to be able to show that the revolution can be
checked half way; that the concentration of power can be limited by
planning.

I have shown that when science is employed to control economic
life, the very nature of science discloses an inordinate appetite to
bring the still unconquered provinces under its dominion, when such
are a menace to planned economy. To every one conversant with the
workings of science, it is at once clear that step by step so much will
be brought under control that only mere remnants of free movement
will survive.

As a matter of fact Mannheim simply admits the ultimate course
of this process. For a stabilized economy the control of wages and
prices is but the first step. Next comes the control of investment. And
even that may be insufficient according to him, so that the nationali-
ization of large industries must follow. Economic organization will thus
move from decentralization to centralization, "and might go beyond
the point where economic stability is still compatible with democratic
planning." Such a step would be required for stability only when
capital and labor fail to understand that their common interest is in
a compromise solution.49

It is evident how decisions will be made; how the freedom of
concept formation will be handled, and what the citizen may expect
if he does not endorse the views of the planning elite who act in his
behalf. Planning then proceeds on a totalitarian course. Not much
value can therefore be ascribed to Mannheim's rejection of the
revolutionary course followed in Russia in favor of a course of action
based upon reform.50

But an essential error is inherent in this line of reasoning. Mann-
heim has confidence in the people in charge of the exercise of control.
He is certain they will employ their knowledge and skill to supply
leadership and to bear responsibility, and not as the leaders of fascism
who only revelled in unlimited power.51

Believe this who can. The fact remains that the leaders of fascism
and communism usually began with the best intentions. Historically
speaking the concentration of power, in whatever shape, has always
been a temptation to abuse power. There is no ground whatever to
assume that the power which Mannheim would place in the hands
of his planning elite will not be misused. The more so as in such
situations those who desire the power the most (and are the least able
to bear it) rise to power the quickest.
But in any case Mannheim's exceptional confidence in those directing a planned society lacks insight into the sinful inclinations of the human heart. When the proper boundary is transgressed and citizens can no longer react against the first stages of planning, what will happen is that because of the inner scientific urge of the planning and the desire for an increase of power a path will be taken which leads to dictatorial planning. Drucker is right when he states: "There is no halfway point between free society and slave society." 52

But it is thought that democratic control of planning can prevent a dictatorship. Nothing prevents Parliament from exercising control.53 Polak thinks planning through personal determination and activity can hardly be called fascism. Such planning ought to be a government policy based upon the free will of the people.54

In the Netherlands the present governmental pressure in the economic sphere has already made it impossible for the Dutch citizen to exercise a discriminating choice. Even most elected representatives leave the decisions to experts. When planning, with its scientific arguments, far distant perspectives, and complex setup, becomes effective, can the average citizen still vote intelligently? Of course he will vote, but without insight, without interest, and without exercising real control.

It is in connection with this actual situation that Schumpeter suggests the reverse of the classical theory of democracy.55 The proposition of this theory is that the people hold a definite opinion about political questions and that they choose representatives who will see to it that their opinion is carried out. Now Schumpeter suggests as a more realistic democracy that the electorate shall choose representatives without reference to opinions. "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them." This is indeed a viewpoint which is nowadays much nearer actual practice, but it has no longer anything to do with democracy because the essence of democracy is lacking in it, viz., the citizen's political enfranchisement and competence. This 'democracy' is merely a matter of likes and dislikes with reference to persons. Even Schumpeter does not have much faith in it and weakens the remnant of this would-be democracy still further by requiring as a first condition "that the human material of politics should be of sufficiently high quality." But this 'decent' politics without genuine democracy is a
typical humanistic dream of wish-fulfilment with regard to an elite in possession of politically uncontrolled power. Aided by the arsenal of mass-psychology this elite will also control the election. Planning with its concentration of power, far reaching aims and scientific expertness makes democracy, (the controlling function of the people) a mere fiction. Moreover, concentration has already entered, as Burnham rightly observes, and has brought with it an evident shift of power from parliament to department.68

Not only an exact knowledge of affairs is lacking, but also the power of exercising real influence. Laski asked whether the Labor Government in Britain ought to take the risk that its measures will be undone by a new election.87 This question suggests that only such opposition ought to be allowed which would on assuming the responsibility of government continue to employ the method of planning and the introduced plan. Democracy in a planned society demands that all parties accept the “plan intelligently conceived.”68

However questionable this mentality may be, it is but the sober response to the reality of planning. And there is something more. Planning prospers only in a society of a new, collectivistic, centralized structure. It demands a social organization that accepts adequate control. I have already pointed out the inflexible and impersonal character of such an organization. Where the planning has obtained a start and the new organization of society has taken form, freedom can again be introduced only by enormous exertion and by a serious disruption of the social structure. By barring the way back, socialism thus renders itself almost indispensable. Röpke even thinks socialism makes itself indispensable for the solution of the very difficulties it has called into being.69 Such may be the case in practice, for the sensitive entanglements of planning disarranged by exterior causes can be disentangled, as experiences shows, only by further entanglement.

Planning requires a sympathetic public; but sympathetic only to the idea of planning, not to the contents. The following paragraph will show that this public is the final element in socialistic theory.

But as far as democracy is concerned, the advocates of planning would do well not to try to make themselves and us believe that the average citizen can have an intelligent understanding of, and an influence on, a far reaching comprehensive scientific plan, which is decisive for the entire collective community. It is no use speaking of the opportunity the chosen few will give the citizen to vote upon complicated and intricate measures, without discussing the question as to whether the citizen or his representative can offer an alternative. Planning simply abrogates democracy. I would gladly consider all
arguments to the contrary, but not empty phrases, however. Up until now I have been unable to find any convincing note of opposition.

We must now discuss a consequence of economic planning which did not enter into the industrial planning of production. Burnham has called it the amalgamation of politics and economics, the uniting of economic power with the power of the state.

The proponents of planning do not even notice that the economic sphere is thus deprived of its sphere-sovereignty. This fact is evident in Polak's charge that his opponents know only the difference between all and nothing. He would at most think of a subsidiary function of the government. But then the question of an essential distinction between the task of the government and of economic relationships is simply ignored. In this connection it is significant that in the Socialist Report of the Dutch Labour Party, entitled: "The way to freedom, a socialistic perspective," there is nothing to be found on the character of the state and the government, whereas the primacy of community and the necessity of planning is defended exactly along the lines we have been attacking. This is again the disastrous effect of Marxism which considers production to be all-important and has no idea of authority. There is evident effort, as J. Schouten* observes, to leave fundamental problems out of the discussion. J. Zijlstra, meanwhile shows correctly that the neo-liberalist Hayek and Röpke also don't give the question of the task of government an adequate answer.

Undoubtedly we are confronted with the difficulty of finding a vantage point which enables us to see that our own period has eradicated the structural boundaries between different spheres. Only then can an effort be made to establish a social order in which the independence of social relationships can be restored.

The first necessary step to be taken is the separation of political and economic aims. If the political and economic objectives differ in character there is no single reason to let the state function as the leading institution just because it alone can furnish a comprehensive view of economic life, as Zijlstra states. Who speaks thus can later on have no argument against the assertion that the state should control the growth of the population, child training, and education.

When such a separation is defended on the ground of an irreducible difference in nature, problems will arise when we then inquire where

* Dr. Schouten is the president of the Anti-Revolutionary political party in the Netherlands, and Zijlstra is the Netherlands minister of economic affairs.

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and with what right the various spheres of society may exercise influence upon each other. The influence of government may not be economic in nature. Trade and exchange of scarce commodities in terms of saving is the task of economic life. For this purpose economic life can assume a more or less permanent order to promote its freedom of action and to protect the latter from derailment (agreements between industrialists, the organization of industry). The influence of the state upon economic life can be only according to the nature of the state's own function. This function in society is qualified and determined by justice or right. That is the trend of Scriptural data. This point of view has been taken by Calvin, Kuyper, and recently by Dooyeweerd. Such a statement is little more than a preliminary limitation; but it is important in that it rejects the modern notion that the task of government is without limits. All the above writers stress the proper direction and limitation of the functions of the state.

It is not my purpose to present an elaborate treatise upon the duties of the state. As a continuation of Chapter III, I shall only make a few observations. Not all justice or right is a matter of concern to the state, e.g., church law. The jurisdiction of government deals with public right, e.g., the right of national existence. The private right to independence of the different societal units, and the private rights of citizens can also be dealt with by the government as public right. In the last two cases the state may interfere only in borderline situations. Laws are established with that idea; it is not the task of government to harmonize society in all its manifestations. The state is not an orchestral director. It is not its duty to regulate all social traffic. Its task is to correct the abnormal, clear up bad situations, and to protect the weak.

A moral question of good and evil concerns the state only in its aspect of justice and when it is of public interest; and then only in a borderline situation. Whoever would have the state decide upon all matters of good and evil, even when it might be of some public concern, is on the way to a totalitarian regime. When someone is treated unfairly or even cheated in business, when injustice is done in a factory, when a member of an organization is barred unjustly; such instances are not automatically the concern of the government. They become such only in borderline situations regulated by law.

It might thus be thought that the government may never venture to regulate anything. That is not correct. It must maintain order in its own national and public sphere. The significance of this and of the development of the national sphere for people in other spheres of
society is that the state provides conditions for their existence. The state has its own province (street, lighting, sidewalks, draining of certain public areas). And these matters cannot be readily comprehended as the direct concern of justice. But there are instances where the creation of conditions and the rendering of justice to a group may run parallel (e.g., measures against unemployment).

It is not easy to determine concretely the boundaries for establishing public right concerning economic life and those for the public conditions for its existence. It is clear, however, that the state should not even temporarily, let alone permanently, conduct the economic life of society.

If we lose sight of the specific character of the function of government, it is impossible to draw any restrictions in the same way as when the order of the relation between authority and freedom is distorted.

We have seen that the violation of the fundamental boundary by the state is marked by two facts: the reversal of the relation between authority and freedom (which introduces so-called state-managership), and the effacement of sphere-sovereignty by which the economic task is included in the proper function of government. Both factors would serve to realize planning and socialism. Both signify a fundamental step on the road toward a totalitarian social order. Once these steps have been taken there is in principle no defense against going the whole way. The conflict can then center only around a question of degree. And there is little chance of success in the struggle, because the totalitarian principle inexorably leads from one consequence to another.

Is a state-run industry a contribution to collectivism? In general that is indeed not a simple affair. At any rate, to my mind it is not accurate to consider state industries as a small public sector. The power concentrated here is tremendous, and the influence thus brought to bear upon economic life is important. The large-scale introduction of state-run industries as is done in many European countries indeed seems to have a collectivistic tendency. Was such introduction really unavoidable? The mistake made here is that in a certain intolerable situation the conclusion was drawn that nationalization was the only remedy (e.g., the state-monopoly of the railroads). There are other and better ways to meet such cases, e.g., the A.T.

Make receded from his original position and no longer unconditionally regards nationalization as the best solution to the problems of monopoly.
Integral planning

Let us summarize the preceding: economic planning brings inflexibility, chokes private initiative; reverses the relation between authority and freedom; breaks through the sphere-sovereignty between state and economic life; liquidates the real influence of the people upon government, and tends toward an ever greater concentration of power and an ever lesser freedom of movement for the citizens.

The reader may feel that is enough, but the worst is still to come. The scientific transformation of society does not stop with economic life. When once the ball is set rolling, all areas of life must be planned and coordinated. Unto that end the independence of all existing societal relationships must be abrogated.

Economic planning itself demands decisions in other fields. Shall material for churches, hotels, Bibles, and magazines be made available? And should the government not provide for buildings to be put at the disposal of the young, of art and the community, and also prescribe their architectural requirements? And will it not be obliged then to give them grants? Will the building of churches not have to be included in its planning, so that also in this sphere the government is obliged to make requirements and to give support in the form of state grants and thus to bind the church? And with social welfare in view, must not the “production” of children also be included in planning, especially in circumstances which force the most gifted to have a smaller number of children?

However, such questions are mere trifles; planning envisions much wider perspectives, for it cannot hope for success if confined simply to economic life. Therefore it must break through the notion of neutrality. Democracy must become militant. A unifying scheme, a spiritual integration, is required in a planned social structure.

If our civilization is to escape the grasp of a dictatorial planning, spiritual adaptation must be sought through planning. This adaptation of the whole man is the real meaning of “planning for freedom”: the triumph over chaos within our society.

Mannheim has made this theme his life’s task. With keen penetration he has perceived that an isolated economic planning cannot ward off a dictatorship. Economic planning in isolation can evoke only the latter; it is a trunk without a head. Mannheim has understood the dangers of integral planning. He ought to be given credit for having dared to draw the inevitable consequences of planning, and has earnestly tried with great foresight to avoid chaos and totalitarianism.
It is useless to speak of planning unless all of society is included. And such planning needs an ideology, the longing for a better world. It has to supply the religious and moral recommendations in order "not only to lay down some principles, but also a set of concrete patterns of behavior, the image of satisfactory social institutions and a whole world view as a connecting link between them." For this purpose a number of values are needed. Spiritual values must first be drawn from the sphere of indifference and neutrality and then transferred to the realm of the community, which cannot exist without such a spiritual harmony. The discovery of such values is a matter of a rational adaption to the social structure.71

According to Mannheim planning must therefore arrive at a new phase, for spiritual and material welfare go together. A plan must therefore be viewed from all sides. The plan includes society as a whole; all reciprocal influences must be considered. Such planning requires thinking in terms of a complexity of problems, interdependent thinking. Even the planning of religion must be included.72

Those who seek enforced socialism in the economic sphere only, and would still permit spiritual freedom, ought to show how such is possible. The problems raised by Mannheim must be taken seriously.

To our mind, in Mannheim's diagnosis is revealed the Marxist error of making the factual situation normative. It is necessary, however, to penetrate to the causes of the existing state of affairs without regarding it as unavoidable. The existing crisis is not understood if viewed as a lack of adjustment to modern society. The spiritual decay of man and the concomitant reactionary decay of society are the cause of the present crisis; the existing disharmony between man and society is only a result.

Whoever starts from man and society as accomplished facts will seek therapeutic measures in their planned adjustment by the planned control of man and society. Such therapy errs in its diagnosis, and the cure leaves the actual problems untouched. What it proposes to make of man and society is its greatest error, inspired by a social ideology and an idea of an arrogant science. Integral planning is in practice a silent advance toward totalitarian planning. Our previous objections apply equally to integral planning. The latter simply does not permit any area to escape its control.

Interdependent thinking is especially directed to man. Now that he has escaped from tradition, social science is turned loose on him. A new behavior and a new type of humanity is needed. Man must be remodeled. Mannheim would leave a few of the more complicated values to faith and individual choice, but democratic agreement is
necessary in so far as basic values are concerned. What is essential is
that man’s volition and thought be reconstructed in keeping with the
“social will.” The latter must therefore have the power to interfere
when necessary. It is to be hoped that, by planning, the conduct
desired can be determined in advance. The key positions of the social
mechanism must be manned with that in mind. By the rebuilding of
man in his entirety it is expected that society can be transformed in
its very depths. Of course Mannheim would avoid force. He antici-
pates ready acceptance of the new behavior. He expects by plan-
ning the remodeled man will become “planning minded,” and will
wish to be disciplined. “It is very likely,” he says, “that a democratic-
ally controlled planned society will be mainly based upon a new
kind of self control,......”

How does this position really differ from a dictatorship? In a
dictatorship key positions are also manned; society is centrally con-
trolled; an ideology selected; a plan dominates; man is remodeled;
and complicated matters which disturb the social order are set aside.
All this is readily swallowed by the communists. For Mannheim the
difference seems to be that in communism key posts are occupied by
evil men; he expects to find noble folks to occupy key positions in the
democratically planned society. And furthermore he will not compel
a man to become a new man, fit for that social order; but he trusts
that by gentle measures he can so plan him that he readily accepts
the change.

Unfortunately, however, history offers little confidence in this dis-
tinction between “evil” and “good” men. For the rest we shall revert
to this subject in the next section, and concerning his notion of
“voluntary acceptance,” I see very little difference between it and
compulsion. In practice it makes no difference; only the massman
will yield whether voluntarily or coerced. And it must still be made
clear what is going to happen if a citizen in spite of all effort should
still refuse to be “planning minded.”

It is not surprising that Mannheim wishes to use instruction and
socially controlled education for the remodeling of man. What is
surprising is the complacency of those who imagine that the struggle
for freedom is behind us, and that attacks on the free press and radio
are harmless. It is of course understood that planning extends its
maternal care to politics and even to science.

Let us pause a moment to examine the religious focal point of
planning. Man cannot fully experience the new situation in terms
of science but only in religion. Mannheim thinks that religion
must stabilize society and therefore become an integral part of it.

He expects something from Christianity and therefore makes an earnest appeal to Christians. The foundation of society, consisting of traditions and customs, has disintegrated. And the disappearance of prototypes and symbols such as the Virgin, the Saint, the Cross, the Lord’s Supper, etc., leads to the disintegration of religious experience. Society, on the other hand, has reached the stadium of greater consciousness; modern problems must be discussed. It is a question of being able to discriminate between taboos, which are only spiritual burdens, and moral principles, without which society cannot exist. Christianity must enter in and adapt itself to this movement. Religion may not be a separate department. It is necessary to restore the deeper powers of religious experience before the whole of society is destroyed. The conditions under which such experience can unfold must be created systematically according to plan. Again, it is not a question of imposing faith from above. Christian values have two aspects. They are the expression of a fundamental experience, which not everybody needs to undergo, and they regulate human conduct. The planning and adaptation of religion is concerned with this latter aspect. Planning is therefore not regimentation; it is a prudent and conscientious selection of the means by which planning can promote spiritual life. And that should not alarm us too much, Mannheim says; many Christians forget that Christian rules of conduct have been adapted to society for centuries. Thus Christianity continues to exist. But enough of Mannheim.

I always thought that Christ maintains his Church. But I must admit that Mannheim does not understand this. What he actually undertakes is a peaceable, prudent, penetration of Christianity. He is vaguely aware that there is perhaps something left in it of value. Christianity can do what it pleases if it accepts a new form and adjusts to the point of being “planning minded.”

To preclude all misunderstanding let us state that society is indeed in need of a new garment if it would not perish. But such will not be woven from planning and simply be fitted to society. It can only be spun in the converted, liberated heart. Only in this way can the idea of planning, the arrogance of science, the concentration of power, the social ideology, and the collectivistic ideal of security be swept away, and the modern reaction be overcome by a liberation of society. What is needed is a liberation of man which restores him to his free calling, a liberation which restores the independence of societal relationships, and a liberation of authority to its true nature, its dependence and limitation.
The closing chain

We have reached the point where we are simultaneously confronted by our own society, the ideas of planning of Mannheim, the social structure of communism, the fantasy of Orwell, and the society of the Antichrist, portrayed in the Book of Revelation. Many thoughts arise within us; many signs appear, and our survey is in danger of getting off the subject, namely, the structure of the society of the future. Occasionally such is warranted, if we would not let the menacing trend of our present society escape our serious attention.

In preceding paragraphs we looked at the future through the glasses of the proponents of planning although believing that, not being so short-sighted as they, we saw somewhat more. We shall now select several more points of view and focus them into a perspective.

For the sake of clarity it is desirable to sketch the framework within which we shall operate. The gradual deformation of our society demands an answer which many imagine can be given in terms of the planning and organization of communal life. The idea of the planned control of society, however, is also born out of unbelief. And of the same parentage is its counterpart: the nihilistic massman. As in a planned organized society any perspective beyond the present world is lacking, such a society is directed by an ideology, suggesting confidence and security to the masses, but in the long run degenerating in the mind of the elite. For a stable order does not arise, and the essential question of meaning remains unanswered. Society is in this way pushed on to its communistic form. And with the increase of tensions in such a society, the main point in the ideology finally becomes the maintenance of at least the power to plan. At this point nihilism breaks through also on that side, viz., on the side of the man of power (Machtmensch). Meanwhile intolerable tensions arise between the organized integration and the disintegration of man and society, which in the society of the Antichrist tend toward self-destruction.

This sketch does not purport to be complete; it can naturally concern itself only with our human side of the mystery of the future. From this it follows at least that only some types are combined without presenting a chronological relation.

The elite and the mass

It may be a surprise that socialism is associated with the theme of the elite and the mass, i.e., with the classification of humanity into two types, a directing minority and a directed mass, in which the individual man no longer appears. That aristocratic thinkers like
Nietzsche and Ortega deem this division to be a matter of course, may be readily understood: (likewise that communism recognizes a party elite). Yet socialism also employs this distinction. This may not be always too evident, but writers such as Mannheim and Polak do not hesitate upon this point for a moment. In this case, too, I have the impression that the inevitability of the division into an elite and a mass takes precedence over its desirability.

The question arises as to how a form of socialism which purports to be democratic can adopt such an undemocratic bifurcation. The answer is simply that a division of people into two types is inherent in the departure from the two structural principles of society: the proper balance between authority and freedom, and the independence and distinct authority of societal relationships. The elite and the mass are always encountered in theory and practice on the human side when the above named principles for society are discarded. History furnishes many instances. And then the standards by which we measure the elite are of secondary importance. They may be religious standards (priests); political standards (Cesare); or scientific standards (the Enlightenment and positivism). Since the last century until recently, the standard has been financial; at present, an organizational elite is in the process of formation. In all such instances the main rule was: “A few lead, the mass is led.” (“Dasz einige wenige führen, die grosse Masse geführt wird.”)

When sphere-sovereignty is no longer recognized, and the position of authority is therefore no longer understood as a qualified office held under God, it is possible to think that such superiority holds everywhere. It is moreover then possible to believe there are two classes of people and that the elite leadership does not owe its position to divine ordination for a certain area but to special qualities that endow it with permanent superiority (e.g., birth, environment, power, intellect, courage, education, etc.). And by shifting the balance between authority and freedom toward the side of authority, society will then place a preponderating or total confidence in those that direct and not in those who ought to be free to realize their life’s task under the legitimate protection of authority.

Those who imagine they belong to an elite would find it ridiculous if an elder of a church who was employed as a carpenter should make inquiries concerning their spiritual life, and perhaps admonish them. But such action on the part of an elder is perfectly proper because of the authority vested in him by Christ, and not because of the qualities of his personality, although the Church will try to find the the best office-bearers.
To argue that since an elite is repeatedly found in history it ought also to be accepted now, is an argument based only on facts, and it is in this case a reactionary argument. (History’s acceptance or rejection of principles, e.g., sphere-sovereignty, is never normative.) The necessity and the possibility of the liberation of the life of the people ought not to be so overlooked. Then it is also ignored that in the period of the Reformation, however short, especially in England, Holland and America, this liberation was actually started.

The division of humanity and the postulation of an elite are in flagrant conflict with the Christian perspectives of the liberation of man and society.

Dostoyevski has portrayed most beautifully the mentality and the motives of the elite in the sketch of the Grand Inquisitor in the Brothers Karamazov. To show how strongly an elite is in conflict with what Christ taught and expected of man, I can do no better than cite Dostoyevski.

In his narrative Christ again comes on earth in Sevilla in the sixteenth century. Christ moves silently with compassion among the people. After He raises someone from the dead, His identity is known to everyone. The Grand-Inquisitor, a Cardinal, arrests Christ and condemns Him to death.

Then follows the famous conversation of the Grand Inquisitor with the silent Christ. The Grand Inquisitor speaks for the elite who would improve the deeds of Christ. The elite, supported by Satan, has yielded to the three temptations which Christ had resisted: turning stones to bread; performing a miracle before the eyes of the people by leaping from the roof of the temple; worshiping Satan to obtain power over the world (Matt. 4). The elite has utilized mystery, miracles, and authority to lead the multitude. “For never was anything so unbearable for man and society as liberty.” Change stones to loaves and humanity will follow like a flock. “Give man to eat and then require virtue of him.” “And even when thousands and tens of thousands shall follow Thee in the name of the heavenly bread, what will become of the tens of millions of creatures, that have not the power to choose the heavenly bread above the earthly?” Men will look up to the leaders with adoration, and will regard them as gods, since these are prepared to bear the freedom of which the flock is afraid. “For man there does not exist a more endless and agonizing anxiety, as soon as he is free, than to find as quickly as possible someone to whom he can bow down.”

But then something more is needed. Man not only lives, but wants something to live for. The way that Christ showed him, the Inquisitor
thinks, has, however, brought man confusion and misery instead of rest. With the miracle that Christ rejected, the elite will grant the multitude satisfaction. What is needed is to teach man that it is not the free choice of the heart and love which have significance, but rather the secret that he ought to obey blindly. The elite will reach its goal and become the sole rulers; thereafter, it shall be able to consider the happiness of all men. “O, we shall know how to convince them that they shall be really free when they sacrifice their freedom to us and subject themselves to us.” “Then we shall provide man with the quiet modest happiness of weaklings, for which he was created.” “Only the elite, who preserve the secret (the alliance with Satan), will be miserable; they are those who have taken upon them the curse of the knowledge of good and evil.”

Such is the thorough pattern that moves socialists to seek the happiness of the multitude by leaving the way of Christ for socialization under the leadership of the elite.

Three factors promote the appearance of the elite: the idea of planning, the desire for power, the appearance of the mass.

From the foregoing it will be evident that planning requires an elite as the means to a central control of society and its future. Mannheim and others will argue instead that society’s inclination to integration and collectivism calls for planning. It has become plain that we reject this conclusion. But it is also desirable again to point out that a planning elite is also something desired. “With the tendency toward the integration of modern economic, political, governmental, and cultural institutions the possibility is itself given that minorities can begin to kindle the collective will and accomplish the desired reconstruction.” 76 Man will actually be master of future developments. It is slightly euphemistic when Polak alludes to the cooperative rôle of the massman. 77

In addition there is no denying that wherever the masses reveal the desire for security and the willingness to follow, the inclination arises in those in positions of authority to transform themselves into a ruling elite.

The confidence of the socialists that the elite will not form a totalitarian society rests on the conviction that there are bad and good men. There are those in whom the old Adam still lives on and those who by a slow process of training and learning have so developed their rational and moral qualities that they can bear responsibility without abusing it. 78

But the facts of history make it extremely precarious to place the future into the hands of a planning elite. Green, the former president
of the A.F. of L. says: "It is inherent in man to abuse uncontrolled power." The lack of any opposition has up until now resulted in the abuse of power whenever it fell into the hands of an elite. Why should the man of the future behave more decently in a planned organized social structure? Because their power is controlled? But we have seen that this is a fiction. And on the other hand nothing in history can compare with the modern possibilities of building up a power-machine. Perhaps because of the rational and moral education of the elite? But in the course of centuries has the humanistic ideal furnished anything better than the decadent humanity of the twentieth century?

It is not our intent here or anywhere else in this book to offend individuals. Our opposition is to false principles and convictions. The Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, once said that power entices to selfishness. This is the point. And it is for this reason we stress the social principles that curb power. However, the problem is posed with even greater clarity by the proposition: Man's original sin, selfishness, entices to power. What is manifest to us in Mannheim is this longing to obtain control over reality and with the aid of science to acquire security over the future. Notwithstanding the sincerest wish to spare him, the individual person becomes the victim. This striving after power as such ought to be guarded against.

And now a single observation about the other component of the new humanity: the masses. First it is necessary to see how the elite with their new facilities for planning and directing communal life readily promote the formation of the masses. Goethe somewhere permits four old women to appear at the door of Faust: want, guilt, distress, and care. They desire entry but are refused: want, guilt, and distress, cannot get in. But care manages to slip in through the keyhole; care cannot be kept out.

Is this the case? One aspect of the ideal of progress and control is to eliminate care. And the twentieth century has produced a class of people that no longer have any worries; about wages, unemployment, sickness, old age, recreation, conveniences, children, marriages and religion. Such cares have in an ever increasing degree been taken over by the ever-concerned elite. With his cares man has also gotten rid of his responsibilities and the ideals for which he might have striven. He has gotten rid of his wrinkles and also of his vision. He walks the path of specialization to the tune of technique and to the beat of the melody of planning, written in the files of bureaucracy.

This man without cares — sans souci — (we shall see how care slips in again at the back door), the man without responsibilities is herded
with the masses. He lives passively; his daily task has lost its natural
dignity. (We shall have to realize that this man does not desire to rest
on the seventh day because he does not really work for six days.) His
only desire is to leave everything to the elite.

I have already shown that this new social environment is indeed
necessary and yet not sufficient to produce the mass man. The mass
man is also the product of an internal disintegration process caused
by the *spiritual* decay introduced by secularization. Well, the fact of a
spiritual decadence, with its extension into nihilism, is now generally
admitted. But a few understand it in the Christian sense as did Kuy-
per.79 There is a great diversity of opinion, but the facts are at least no
longer denied. And it is also this modern phenomenon of the mass
which evokes an elite.

This fact at least will be clear now, viz., that socialism will not pro-
duce the promised classless society. *Burnham* is acutely aware of
this.80 Without an elite, distinct from the masses, the community ideal
to be realized through planning and organization cannot be actu-
alized.

The objection will naturally be raised that the situation will be
totally different from what it was under so-called capitalism; because
the aim is not conflict but harmony between the classes. And it is
expected that people will be pliant and law-abiding.81 Let us not
forget, however, that the possessors of economic power also desired
such harmony, but not much came of it in practice. Presently, we shall
see what sort of harmony may be expected in the socialistic order of
society.

*The crisis of our culture*

After laying bare the perspectives of socialistic planning in various
directions we are ready to discuss the critical point in these per-
spectives, in which — as has been made clear from the preceding —
the line of demarcation between them and a totalitarian society has
been passed. Or, to put it differently: we have advanced to the point
where we pass on from *Mannheim* to *Burnham*.

To do justice to socialism it is first necessary to take a serious look
at our situation. Following *Ogburn*, some view the crisis in our society
as a “cultural lag,” i.e., one part of our culture has fallen behind the
other. Religion and family life have not kept pace with technical and
economic progress. Others conceive of it as a retardation of the
formation of society in the new situation arising from modern science
and technique.82 And we might point out with *Mannheim* that man
himself has not been attuned to the situation.

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Many socialists are fully aware that our situation is extremely perilous, and chaos or a dictatorship threatens to gain the upper hand. Hence their earnest effort to effect a genuine community in which by planning they hope to bridge the chasm between man and society. They therefore seek a reliable social structure and a controlled future. Do not forget that socialists do not only consider a planned society to be a future ideal, but also as the last chance of saving our distressed culture. With the exception of a few naive innocents, socialists also know that it is a question of "to be or not to be."

But then our ways part. For the present crisis is not a question of adjustment, of bringing up to date a retarded humanity and an old fashioned religion in a new situation; it is not a question of designing social forms suitable to modern technique. We have to deal with man on his way back, in his decadence, because he has left God. And in our society the sin of man is making an ever deeper imprint, so that society becomes constantly more ungovernable. This means, therefore, among other things, that we have also to examine critically the forms of modern technique.

In both man and society a process of decay is evident: man appears to become powerless and society appears to be following a fatal course. So the crisis is indeed much more serious. A chasm exists, it is true, but the trouble is not primarily in this chasm but in what is happening on each side of it. Our main problem is not that man is retarded in a society itself transformed by technique, economy, and science. The difficulty is rather that both man and society have degenerated. Man is, therefore, less able to bridge the gulf, and society is more difficult to reach. Our chief problem is that they are drifting apart to an ever increasing degree.

God's judgment on sin is what we encounter. The seals are broken; the red, the pale, and the black horse gallop over a powerless earth. Happily enough the conquering white horse is also about (Rev. 6).

Man may try to dominate social development by systematic planning. He may try everything as a means of self-redemption, including planning. But secularized man will only find himself up against problems that will press him onward against his will along the road to decadence.

A deep tragedy hides in this striving. Instead of regarding himself as unimportant before God, and thus to be esteemed of Him, the humanist has had a high opinion of himself and has ended with the despised mass man. He has posited the sovereign man and secularized freedom so that he no longer saw his calling and the meaning of his life for which he was created free. Instead of a calling and a meaning,
all that he has left now is the ideal of security; and instead of true freedom there remains only social discipline. Instead of “Search me, O God, and know my heart,” he chose “Know thyself”; and as a result understands so little of man that he expects salvation from planning.

From planning he expects freedom: Planning for freedom. Madam Roland understood that freedom can be viewed from two sides. In ecstasy she cried, “O Liberty” when Marie Antoinette ascended the scaffold; but when she came to it herself, she added, “O Liberty, how many crimes are committed in thy name!”

One wishes to plan security and welfare. And many really expect that human freedom will thus be restored, a tragic mistake, that cannot escape us if we consider the relation between man’s peace and contentment and his security and welfare in practice.

One wishes to plan for freedom from fear, from want, and distress. Now that mankind is able, it should do everything, wherever possible to lend a helping hand to the neighbor in need. But such correction is something quite different from the planned control of everything. The latter, if successful, would only replace the compulsion arising from want, need, and fear, by a new restraint. And this restraint will extend to all. Planning and freedom are incompatible.

Note in passing that political freedom to bear responsibility may not be compared with so-called economic freedom, the raising of the standard of living. Everything depends on the question as to whether the raising of the standard of living is accompanied by an increase or a decrease in the degree of human freedom.

But planning for freedom has even higher aspirations. It wishes to reach man as well as his circumstances. But what sort of freedom is to be expected from the control of man, and from experimenting with man and penetrating inside of him? 83

The planned control of the future is in irreconcilable conflict with planning for freedom. The latter is a contradiction in terms; it should read “planning for security.”

It speaks at any rate for Mannheim that he does not withhold from us his own misgivings on this point. “It is possible that the age of planning will be followed by that of pure direction.” “It is possible that the new social situation will not produce the new man.” “It is not for us to decide here, in what sense man pursues the impossible in his effort to reconstruct man.” 84

Socialism has been on the offensive for a few decades. But since the war, it placed all emphasis on freedom, the very element to which it is a menace. This fact illustrates that many socialists see the danger
and have the courage to introduce an insolvable conflict. This fact also proves that they are again on the defensive. Their defense is hopeless, however, for socialism offers no stable position, as notwithstanding the socialists, it is a transition to a totalitarian society.

The totalitarian society.

We have shown not only that social tendencies point in the direction of a totalitarian community, but also that the approach to society through planned control is simply to go from bad to worse. Through the abrogation of sphere-sovereignty, society receives a completely collectivistic structure. And by exceeding the critical point in the balance of authority and freedom in favor of a centralized control of the future, the curtailing of freedom is a necessary procedure limited only by the possibilities of planning.

The question may arise as to whether I am not thus proving the inevitability of a totalitarian social structure. Such is not the case. My argument is that totalitarianism is not the result of some social determinism. Its real origin is to be sought in a special choice on the part of men of a planned organization of society.

Others may be of the opinion that the process will not go as far as totalitarianism. It is thought that history repeatedly shows that society holds itself in check, and society itself arouses the counterforces to operate against derailment.

Of course experience gives constant evidence of restoration. But this restoration is not automatic. It is proof of God's grace by which the penetration of sin is checked. The first thing we see is that God places man before the consequences of his sinful thoughts and deeds. "Thou wast a God that forgavest them, though thou tookest vengeance on their inventions" — Ps. 99:8. In that wrath there is also mercy. For man is thus confronted with the facts; and he can learn that what he did was wrong and what was the cause of his failure. But the question is whether he wants to learn his lesson and learn it well.

If man no longer has a sense of norms and can no longer distinguish between good and bad, true and untrue, right and wrong, then he no longer learns but gropes blindly in the dark. The transvaluation of all values ("Umwertung aller Werte") is in fact the abolition of values; it is nihilism itself.

And if man still has a sense of norms but no longer recognizes God as the giver of standards, and views them as subjective and relative, so that their religious power in life becomes vague and formal, and their deeper unity breaks apart in fragments, then he can no longer
learn the lesson well. His reaction is then only a *retardation* or a change to another *extreme*, e.g., from individualism to collectivism. Then there is no genuine restoration.

So resistance is not brought about automatically but depends upon man's religious attitude, on the depth and extent of the religious decay. In this only a temporary check can be expected from such resistance on the way to a totalitarian structure of society.

But the seriousness of the situation is thus not yet sufficiently realized.

Society in its entirety is being collectivized and integrated by the planning for the future. Even science cannot escape. The *Lysenko* affair in Russia further illustrates how far the liquidation of the independence of science has advanced there.86

Education and even religion are comprehended in planning. Ultimately it becomes a matter of a planned remodeling of man, of his very soul; the souls of men are at stake, at least in the theories propounded.

It was further evident that the realization of such an intensive and extensive control could be thought of because of the tremendous progress of science and technique.

But again, the picture still lacks an essential feature usually associated with a totalitarian state, a feature found in the description of the kingdom of the Antichrist. For this kingdom is totalitarian in its social aspect, and in its spiritual aspect it is *nihilistic*.

Our present concern is therefore with the *spiritual attitude* of the *elite*. *Mannheim* hopes that the planning elite will be able to avoid the regimentation of society and the dictatorial method of violence.87

This is evidence, as I have explained repeatedly, of an unjustified confidence in man, and in the consequences of the power vested in the elite. A similar misplaced confidence is often put in the labor leader; confidence is withheld from the industrialist but readily placed in the union representative. There is no foundation to the distinction between bad people who yield to the temptation of uncontrolled power and good people who do not (allowing for many gradations). A person in the possession of unrestrained power is inclined to enlarge or at least to maintain it.

But I shall adduce two considerations bearing directly upon the concrete situation. *Mannheim*’s exposition goes no further than the establishment of a social order and a system of securities for humanity related to the general welfare. He has no answer, however, to the question, what is the real *meaning* of all such efforts. He lacks any
conviction concerning the actual significance of the existence of individual man and of humanity as well as a correlative criticism of life by religious standards. Such is the tragic conflict between a sympathetic social sentiment and a sceptical undermining of vital convictions. It leads to behavior keenly characterized by Polanyi as "The chisel of nihilism, driven by the hammer of the social conscience." 88 The situation is highly serious. For where must strength be found, in the absence of vital convictions, to protect relativism against nihilism? How will the planning elite be kept from merely amassing power?

Our second argument is that in the situation created by planning the elite will gradually come to the choice of either abandoning the planned control, or transforming Mannheim's planning into a compulsory totalitarian control, which is supported by an ideology devoid of any norm. In the sequel we shall comment on this extremely important conclusion, this reversal of method and spiritual attitude on the part of the elite. Lenin and Stalin might be said to have observed this consequence. They avoided the detour of the slower process of evolution by planning.

In this connection the analysis and the view of the sociologist Burnham are very instructive. I have elsewhere discussed them in great detail and referring to that treatise, I shall now be brief. 89

According to Burnham capitalistic society will not be replaced by a classless socialistic society but by a new society of classes. The former elite controlled capital; the new manager class controls the power of organization. It is not superfluous to point out that the new elite will not consist of scientists as is supposed by some proponents of planning. The scientists will only be the specialists of the elite, who will pull the ropes in the scientifically planned society, including science. Within such a society there will be no more human freedom. This organized community is maintained through threats and violence, and by an ideology, satisfying to the masses and to the interest of the elite. Discipline takes the place of freedom in the ideology of the new order; an assigned task is substituted for free opportunity; the community replaces the individual; duty supersedes natural rights; and individual initiative will give place to regimentation. 90

In the main I agree with Burnham's insight in the factual conditions and their development; but his deduction of life's laws from the data is erroneous. The starting point of his cynical, normless point of view is that the struggle for power is all-determinative in human life. And the chances of success in this struggle are at present offered by the organization built by science and technique. But Burnham incorrectly
generalizes on the basis of a complex of social facts he had found in Nazi Germany and communist Russia, neglecting the ideological aspect. He is convinced that Western countries are well under way to such a form of society. Because of his starting point, however, he did not perceive that generally speaking the West has not passed the critical point, that here a completely nihilistic ideology is still lacking.

But such is of little comfort. For Burnham is right in so far as passing the mark may happen gradually and quietly. Through the integration of power, waxing nihilism, and the disturbing consequences of planning, Western society is made spiritually ripe for an elite, which will bring about the coordination of all society, but merely in behalf of its own power. In other words, there is no need of a lost war against communism to transform Western society into a totalitarian structure.

In my opinion, the candidates for an authoritative elite belong to three groups: those that hold key positions in government, in the industrial world, and in the labor movement.

Whether or not the elite has passed the critical juncture may be best determined by its ideology, and in a broader sense by the tenor of the propaganda with which the elite spiritually approaches the mass. The crucial point is whether or not this propaganda is to be regarded as true or simply as useful in a pragmatic sense. Is it to be tested by standards of truth or by the interests of the community as envisaged by the elite?

It will be clear that the very existence of a division into an elite and a mass, and its acceptance as being proper, makes it feasible to regard the interest instead of principles as all important. Such a view then leads to the eradication of the distinction between truth and falsehood in propaganda because the victims of planning do not understand scientific control; they are not willing to adapt themselves to all kinds of measures imposed, and do not simply accept the failure of planning to provide securities. All such difficulties arise, as has been said already, because of the desire to cling to an elite and to the planned control of society. The lack of understanding on the part of the public is simply a fact. Whoever relies on scientific planning cannot expect the public to understand or serve as a check.

Burnham correctly speaks of a distinct transfer of influence from parliament to department. And of further significance is the rôle of specialists in present day government. Mannheim points out that the most important questions cannot be handled in full sessions but
only by committees of specialists, and that the same thing holds for our culture which demands such a refined knowledge of specialized fields that nothing can be attained by irresponsible debate concerning control and government. He believes we must proceed by means of well prepared official information and the direction of spontaneous impulses and experiences.\textsuperscript{91} It seems to me that Mannheim would humor the public with unessential matters presented in nice sounding phrases. Even if it is thought that such must be done for the general welfare, there is still question of deceit. I had a similar feeling in a public discussion with the socialist H. Vos, who, while expressing anxiety about the menace of organocracy, advocated socialistic control with the hope that the latter might be so scientifically directed that it would not be felt.\textsuperscript{82} Such a guise may be different from propaganda but it still seeks to deceive the public.

If in dealing with the public the criterion of truth and falsehood is ignored, one becomes entangled in his own deception. One thing leads to another. Eventually a system of instruction is built up around a number of leading slogans which do not have much to do with truth and serve rather to camouflage the intention of the elite for whose aims the public are to be employed.

And then a systematic method is adopted in which our own time, without dictatorship, is already so rich: the use of trickery, propaganda, reliance on the loss of memory, misquoting, oversimplification, complicating simple matters, the covering up of facts, tampering with data, and so on. Demagoguery is not new. Vollenhoven points out that it was systematically practised as early as 450 B.C., in the Orphic mysteries, in a compelling kind of oratory.\textsuperscript{83} Our time is not the first in which an elite has appeared. Of concern, however, is that the elite again appears after the citizens of Western culture had wrested their freedom from the priest, medicine man, Ceasar, feudal lords, and absolute monarchs. And the new development is alarming because of the more effective technical means available to control the masses. Recall Orwell's 1984, in which the masses are brought under a more rigid control by a continuous simplification of language. And do not forget the scientific handling of language in the information theory of Shannon, although he has quite another aim.

An ideology gives coherence to misleading propaganda. And in such an ideology a myth furnishes the religious element and center. Such a myth is always constructed on a pattern analogous to true religious themes: God and Satan, heaven and hell. The origin of such a myth is not forced but natural; it gradually takes form as extremes are portrayed in increasingly bright and somber colors, e.g., the
gruesomeness of individual capitalism vs. the beauty of the socialistic community; the wickedness of the dictator, vs.; the nobility of Mannheim's elite.

Myth serves as a mediator between the elite and the masses. It serves to make the masses forget how unintelligible are the actions of the elite. Man cannot live without faith and confidence. Myth becomes a substitute faith for the dependent and passive crowd. The myth would foster faith in the future and confidence in the elite. But a myth does not function only for the masses. I have already mentioned that the modern elite thinks in relative terms and lacks any vital convictions and religious inspiration. The myth of the leader and of the rosy future also provides the elite with a substitute faith.

In the same proportion there is more need of the spook of capitalism to keep the hope of socialism alive (Trotzky was needed to make Stalin glitter and Goldstein to glorify Big Broher in Orwell's 1984).

When considering all these things our thoughts are involuntarily led to the Biblical revelation about the future. But here great caution is needed, for the comparison of this revelation with our own times might induce us to identify the present with the final period or with the times immediately preceding the latter. This would be an unwarranted speculation. On the other hand it is not only permissible but even necessary to establish some connection. History is a coherent whole and in its totality it develops in one direction. The phenomena to which the Bible refers manifest themselves in the historical process now rather vaguely, now clearly, but in the course of the times with ever increasing clarity. In the final stage these phenomena will assume the completed form of a radical apostasy, a total rebellion against God; and at the same time they will be directed towards the total destruction of life. This is the time of the antichrist preceding the coming of Christ. We are not only able but we are called upon to recognize the signs of the times in the light of the Biblical revelation about the final period. Such knowledge should not induce us to passivity and quietism but enable us to improve our equipment for the realization of our Divine calling.

We shall understand our own times better in their true perspective when we observe the shadows cast over them by the end of days. In connection with our discussion attention should be paid also to the formation of the totalitarian power of the beast risen from the sea and worshipped by the masses; the delusion practised on these masses for the purpose of such worship by means of great
deceptive miracles, signs and marvels and wicked attempts to de-
lude; and the regime of deceit exercised by the antichrist, the one
who rejects the Father and the Son (cf. e.g. I John 2 : 22, II Thess.
2 : 9-12; Rev. 13 : 7-14).
The Bible also tells us that the masses who refuse to believe the
truth will be placed by God under the influence of a delusion, to
cause them to believe a lie. In this statement we are face to face
with one of the most important Biblical data in this connection,
namely with the fact that in the development of history the hand
of God is continually in evidence. We are so subjected to the
influence of scientific thinking that in matters of society and
its future we can hardly wrestle free from determinism. What stands
in our way is that we anticipate a wonderful external intervention
of God’s Providence; we do not understand that intervention as the
background of present social and spiritual events (Prov. 19 : 21; 21 : 1).
The Antichrist will not just fall out of the blue sky. He will start
with exactly such good intentions as Mannheim’s elite. And God will
punish him in the very practice of his planning. God will transform
his unbelief and relativism into a false myth, lying propaganda, and
a nihilistic view of life. And because of their unbelief the masses will
also be punished. It is this terrible thing, of which Isaiah had to tell
the people (Isa. 6 : 9, 10). “Hear ye indeed, but understand not. Make
the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their
eyes, lest they see with their eyes...... and convert and be healed.”

There are some more indications of a connection between our
social order and that of the final period.
It has already been pointed out by Kuypers that economic interests
occupy the center in both social orders. This takes us to the milieu
of the first temptation of our Lord in the wilderness. It is precisely
in that area that massification will be stimulated. For the ideal of
security is primarily concerned with material securities; the dis-
appearance of human worry in this area is a necessary condition for
the formation of the masses. Eventually a person will share in ma-
terial things only if he is “planning minded”, when one is stamped by
the mark of the beast and participates ideologically in the communi-
ity. The Antichrist will surely not call the mass man by his name
(Isa. 43 : 1).
We can visualize the mass man as the man who has fled and has
been driven from the responsibility of his work; the man who finds
a substitute for a meaningful life in the circular course of his leisure,
in the cycles of sport and amusement. He seeks no Redeemer, for he

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has no cares, and in his superficial refuge in the masses he does not know his own misery. What he asks is a trainer to lead him by the bridle and feed him regularly.

It is not difficult to see that this organized materialism will work hand in glove with an unrestrained egoism. Planning will eventually liquidate social sympathies and love will grow cold (Matt. 24:12).

But though there is no doubt that the society of the last days will live in luxury (Rev. 18), we are struck by the fact that but very little is to be expected from the ideal of security. On the contrary, insecurity, want, unrest, war, anxiety, are the outstanding features of the picture the Bible sketches of the last Babylon. Want will be suffered (Rev. 6:5, 6), men will seek death (Rev. 9:6); they will be tortured and killed (Rev. 9 and 16).

Perhaps the situation is such that the formation of the power of the elite through planning and organization will set off a chain reaction. At first, it is true, the masses are given security in exchange for their dependence. Then gradually their self-sufficiency will grow smaller, and their blind trust in the elite ever greater, whilst on the other hand various causes finally will bring about a torturing insecurity that binds the masses to the elite to an even greater degree. There are at present already such causes: disasters, wars, the threats of war, the unrest of the elite and the masses caused by the meaningless of their existence. There is, furthermore, the practical failure of planning and the inability of the elite to maneuver their own apparatus for the control of society.

The last factors have been repeatedly set forth so that a passing observation will here suffice. It is not only possible, but it is the general rule, that the particular aims of planning will be realized especially in the technical field. But when we speak of success or failure, planning must be viewed as a whole, as the control of the entire social order. The ideal expressed by planning is nothing less than the belief that the complicated and varied order of all reality can be satisfactorily comprehended in the scientific terms of planning, and maintained under organized domination. To abide by such an ideal — and we shall see that this is not done — is to pitch one’s hopes of forcing reality into a too high fixed mold. We need only consider that violence is then done to the human personality.

In addition, the organization of society becomes more and more independent and ungovernable, so that there is decreasingly less chance of variations in the planning and adaptation to unforeseen circumstances. And whether the elite will be able to provide the promised security and welfare of all depends on such adaptation.
A further source of discontent is war; it provides a parallel between our time and that of the anti-christ. Militarism is regarded by Huizinga as the greatest disease of our era. Militarism is in fact a very important facet of it. However, the cause of wars and rumors of wars, of the coming of the red horse that will take peace from the earth, is not to be sought in militarism. The latter is itself a result of an inner lack of peace. When the Bible says that there is no peace to the wicked (Isa. 57:21), we recall particularly the atheistic nineteenth century. And while this unrest was aggravated through the fiasco of humanistic ideals, escape was sought in the fancied perspectives of national concentration in the new area of production and economy, which soon led to militarism.

The Book of Revelation also speaks of natural disasters and epidemics. In this respect, however, our time shows, as far as I can see, no exceptional signs.

Unrest and dissension are contributing causes to the fact that instead of the anticipated security, insecurity and anxiety will prevail. We cannot yet form a complete picture of the full effect of such unrest and discord as there will be when the Antichrist has his hour (Rev. 17:12); and yet something of their cause and character is understood.

Loneliness is the ground of unrest; the solitude of man when he forsakes God; that seclusion from which Adam fled and because of which, driven by an inner unrest, the mass man seeks the superficial, outward and worldly satisfaction in the masses.

With the forsaking of God man severs his connection with the basis and the perspective of his existence, and thereby places himself in a relation to nihilism. Man will then go after idols, set up secularized standards and seek after false perspectives. But as he fails in all this, he will eventually land in atheism; and then, when he finally feels existence futile and senseless, his atheism will be transformed into nihilism.

The security and happiness which modern society would offer is such a false perspective. Even as an ideal they do not solve the basic question of meaning. Unrest remains. The would-be remedy, the myth, is too far removed from the uneasiness which is near at hand, and issues forth from the heart.

And this is a serious menace to the concentration of power of the elite. Therefore, instead of trying to alleviate unrest, the elite will force it into a framework of organized insecurity, characterized by an arbitrary caprice. Unrest is shunted and channeled to weaken the resistance of the masses and to render them dependent in their very
soul (Rev. 18: 13). The arbitrary and unaccountable use of terror, the arrests, the purgings and the war of nerves, as utilized by the communists, are but examples of it, “There is system in their madness”.

This is, however, not merely a matter of building up power. The arousing and fostering of a sphere of unrest and insecurity is also an outlet for the internal unrest of the nihilistic man of power himself.

True, at first there are good intentions, ideals of planning. But the masses must already be deluded to insure their cooperation. And when in practice things do not turn out as expected, and ideals do not satisfy the demand for meaning, then the elite begin to fool themselves. Then they will have reached the stage where they seek to retain the power to plan even though planning has miscarried. And such power is then maintained to satisfy the masses and themselves, by organizing and cultivating unrest and insecurity.

Dostoyevsky has given an example of two stages. Before Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment commits with a social motive the robbery and murder of an old miserly woman, he wrote an article in which he contended that there are two kinds of people. To accomplish their ends the members of the one class may do such acts of lying, injustice, theft, and murder, which must be forbidden in the masses. But in the book Demons, the character Werchowensky no longer pursues any ideals with his secret building of cells. Struggle and destruction are in themselves his purpose. Two generations of ruffians is what is needed.

Nietzsche has painted a brilliant picture of the nihilistic man of power. The Superman transforms the passivity of the nihilism of the masses into the activity of the blond beast who makes the flock his instrument and his enemy. The conflict with the herd is welcome as the means to live out the will to power. There are no values or ideals. A lie is as useful as the truth. The will to power reigns; real culture is war. War is an end in itself. Life is movement, action, unrest. “The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt” (Isa. 57: 20).

The last mire which this sea of unrest casts up is the result of a conscious annihilation, the destruction of culture. In the end there will be no other perspectives.

In forsaking God, man is beset with a loss of all standards and meaning. He runs through all phases of planned control and power formation of the elite, of deception and myths, of arbitrariness and terror, until finally he ends in destruction.
Maxima

In concluding this chapter I shall summarize a number of facts whose alarming character casts a shadow over the society of the future. Viewed historically they are unique facts, at least for Western civilization, and they indicate that we are approaching a limit, a maximum. And by extending the rate of progressive deterioration toward that maximum, the final limit, there are stirred up associations with the image that the Bible gives us of the society of the last days. Consequently, they are signs of our time. Many of them have already been considered; the rest will complete the total picture which can then serve as a point of departure for our thoughts of the future social order.

I can well imagine that the reader rebels inwardly against such a summary of somber aspects of our time. Are there no bright sides? And are we living through the beginning of the end?

There are, indeed, brighter aspects of our own times. We are referring to the protection and elevation of the lives of the weakest members of society; also to the great increase of the number of churchgoers in countries like the U.S.A., and to the results of missionary activities.

In the next chapter we shall see that there are here and there phenomena in industrial life that may be called hopeful. Yet we are of the opinion that the total picture with its chief characteristics of the secularization of life, its nihilism and collectivism gives ample reason for anxiety.

As far the second question is concerned we have already pointed out that nothing is farther removed from our thoughts than such speculation. We only wish to point to the signs of the times. Not until the contents and the intention of these signs are clearly discerned can we confront them and make the right use of the existing possibilities to shape a better future. The realization of the maxima that present themselves provisionally in our own days is not inevitably connected in a direct way with the present period, although many of them display such a tendency indeed. Future events, however, are still undetermined and largely depend on the beliefs of the men of to-morrow.

1. It is rather dubious whether the aspect with which we shall begin, can after all, reach a maximum stage of development. Some think that technique is nearly reaching its limit. We may interpret this in two ways. First, that technique has in principle solved its main problems, so that we are now simply filling in the details, e.g., think of the
progress in the field of riding, sailing, flying, creation of energy, the
technicalization of environment; the technique for seeing, hearing;
the automation of determined mental functions in computing
machines and the like. Wolf, sketching the historical phases in the
process as the snail pace walking, and the express train, believed that
we are again plodding along.\textsuperscript{95} But thirty years after he wrote, we
know that he guessed wrong; technique is still progressing like a
cyclone, in spite of \textit{Fourastie}'s opinion to the contrary, which is,
however, very optimistic about the future.\textsuperscript{99}

A second interpretation is more to the point. This concerns the
question whether technique and agriculture can continue to function
and maintain the high standards of living already attained. One can
point to the exhaustion of sources of energy and raw materials, to soil
depletion, and to the law of the limits of technical economic develop-
ment. In connection with the question of the sources of energy, \textit{Wiener}
observerds that the supply of human needs will in a few generations
depend entirely upon new findings.\textsuperscript{100} And \textit{Vogt} devotes a whole
treatise to the problem, especially to agriculture. He concludes that,
by robbing the soil, humanity is entrapped, and that unless we can
restore our resources and control births, our civilization will sink back
into barbarism.\textsuperscript{101} This aspect of the situation is menacing indeed, and
it is not unlikely that in years to come the struggle to maintain the
same level will play a larger rôlle in the technical field.

Yet my thoughts concerning this question run in rather another
direction; they rest upon such vague symptoms, however, that I shall
only mention a possibility of the trend towards a maximum. It might
well happen that through spiritual decadence as well as through a cer-
tain rigidity in the social system, the human development of technique
will be constantly more retarded; that loss of the sense of a high
calling and the self centering of human life will deprive man of the
insight into opportunities for development which creation still offers.

In any case I think it is possible that in this way the society of the
Antichrist will come to a deadlock.

2. The situation is similar in \textit{science}. Since the application of sci-
ence to technique, one area after another has been invaded by the
application of science. There is even a thought of applying planning
in the realm of religion (\textit{Mannheim}). But this is in itself not yet a
reason to think that science has reached a maximum level. If and
when that comes it will be brought about rather by a relativistic and
pragmatic conception of science. At any rate such characteristics are
now in evidence for the first time.

3. There is much clearer evidence in the fact that the \textit{totalizing}
process of the social relations, accompanied by the abrogation of their sphere-sovereignty is so universally under way that it is approaching the maximum degree characteristic of the final social order.

4. In connection with point number three, we must call attention to a unique feature of the history of the social development of Western civilization. The slow process of liberation; its derailment in individualism; and in our time the reactionary phenomenon of collectivization.

5. With the aid of science and technique collectivism gives the newly formed elite an unprecedented opportunity for power over man.

6. The means to this concentration of power is the organization of a social apparatus that tends toward an automatic operation, thereby rendering the individual ever more powerless to direct society.

7. The power and machinery of the elite clearly reveals the effect of a reduction in personal responsibility and a breaking down of liberty.

8. The disintegration of existence, i.e., the dissolution of coherence in the elements of existence, has reached an advanced stage for a great many people.

9. The decline of life's meaning to the materialistic level, which will be dominant in the society of the last days, may be noted as a tendency of the last hundred years.

10. After passing through city and state economy and politics, society is approaching the last stage of a world state and economy. As Hammarskjold, secretary-general of the U.N. stated: "Technology has made the world a neighborhood." A number of superstates begin to take shape.

11. Great wars succeed each other ever faster, and between them the cold war becomes permanently imposed upon life.

12. The time of total war involving and menacing the whole citizenry has dawned over the world.

13. With the H-bomb, a type of weapon appears on the scene that threatens to make war a method of complete self-annihilation for all participants. The moment draws nigh when a world-state will seem to offer the only way out.

14. The extent of secularization, the denial of Christ as the Redeemer of mankind and the world, grows steadily, especially since the last century, so that the dominating circles of civilization must be considered predominatingly secularized.

15. The intensity of secularization by way of humanistic deterioration has already reached the last stage of nihilism in many areas, such as philosophy, art and literature.

16. Humanity brings us now for the first time in contact with the
characteristic phenomena of the nihilistic *masses*. The man of lawlessness, the nihilist, which in former critical periods appeared in the upper strata, is now encountered in the man of power as well as in the man of the masses.

17 The exhibition of *sin* displayed itself also in former periods of crisis and decline, but in the present manifestation of decadence there is no sign of revival or hope. It is marked by cynicism and a gruesome taking it all for granted. Whoever wishes to satisfy himself upon the acceleration in this respect, may compare the war novel of *Barbusse, Le Feu*, with *Mailer's, The Naked and the Dead*. While the former — at that time avoided by many due to its realism — shows us the soldier in far worse conditions, the latter brings us in contact with a climax of normlessness that — and here is the notable difference — was not fostered in war time but in peace time. The same decline holds for a comparison of *Zola* with *Sartre*.

18 The steady *disintegration* of family ties is easily manifest; the authority of the parents has lost its power and the number of divorces is alarmingly on the increase. In the U.S.A. there is one case of divorce in every four newly contracted marriages per year.

19. The *church* of Jesus Christ stands ever more powerless over against her problems and division.

In all these marks our society reveals, as no other in history, the features that the society of the Antichrist will bear.
Chapter seven

THE LIBERATION OF SOCIETY

And He said, My presence shall go with thee, and I will give thee rest. And Moses said unto him, if thy presence go not with me, carry us not up hence. (Ex. 33: 14, 15)

Orientation

The future does not look too bright when we consider the main tendencies and forces in the development of society. There is reason to believe that we live in a time of trouble for our Western society (Toynbee). The disturbing unrest in the background of modern life is caused by the feeling that humanity cannot find a solution for its troubles and that society is being driven on a path leading to a dead end.

The assimilation of this state of affairs is not equally easy for everyone. Those who are in the thick of practical affairs, and especially those in positions of leadership, do not find it easy to get matters straight in a spiritual sense. For, willingly or unwillingly, they are contributing to an ominous development. The situation is even more difficult for those who have long since acquiesced in the course of events. Such are easily inclined to turn their backs with bitter resentment on gloomy forebodings. For we have to go on, do we not?

From this quarter the reproach is made that the foregoing conception is inspired by a personal pessimism. But a view which really tries to diagnose the facts in their ultimate seriousness is for this reason not pessimistic. Such a diagnosis is, on the contrary, the first prerequisite for a sound therapy. Real pessimism is sometimes wilfully blind to the seriousness of the situation in order not to be disturbed by a paralyzing unrest at the back of one’s mind; and such a pessimist does not want the tension of a double moral standard caused by the disharmony between a practical and a fundamental point of view.

I do not take this lightly. On the contrary, nothing else has been so disturbing to me as this disharmony. The discrepancy between our practice and our principles tempts us constantly to a paralyzing acquiescence, to a subterfuge in vague relativistic generalities. Dialectical thought also offers such an escape — it is held in high esteem at present, which is not without reason; but I have not been sufficiently impressed by its charms to adopt it.

The problem becomes even more acute if from a basic religious
commitment a practical solution is sought for society as it is at present. To chart a course in practical affairs would not only require a new book but also all-sided practical knowledge and ability, which I do not possess.

To avoid getting in over my head I shall therefore have to confine the discussion to an analysis of those salient aspects of our society which differ from a Christian structural order. A more detailed inquiry will be made into the industrial field.

Our task is made easier because the starting points for the development of a more wholesome social order have already been discussed. In addition, our time is marked by a discontent with the course of events resulting in various efforts for social recovery (e.g., the opposition to collectivism, the positive contributions in the field of evangelization, the efforts in factories to restore human relations, to organize economic life and to oppose massification in general). It needs no special mention that people of every conviction are contributing to the struggle. And in this respect even for the socialists life is often stronger than their logic. It would be ungrateful not to note this state of affairs, and stupid not to make use of such resistance by turning it to account as much as possible and by joining it. This fact will appear in the sequel.

It may seem superfluous to remind the reader that in this book the issue is not men and their characters, nor the choice of the best and the rejection of the bad ones. On the contrary, though that question is also of importance, I have steered entirely clear of it that I might concentrate on what is more essential to society, the motivating principles of human action. The question of the good and the bad is relative; for there is no one who does good and sins not. (Eccl. 7:20; Ps. 14:3; Jer. 17:9; Matth. 15:19.) The propelling force in society, and also in the change of human attitude and behavior, is the product of a complex of vital convictions concentrated in principles.

On the other hand, it is of course evident that the various efforts to reform society, to remedy social abuses, ought to be approached critically. We should seek to determine whether in the light of certain principles and norms (or in the dim twilight or even darkness of so-called value-free inquiries) it was possible to take note of everything that is relevant. And what is going to replace the abuses that have rightly been detected? Such questions must be put, notwithstanding all due appreciation. Otherwise we shall run the risk of falling into a new error.

The consideration of the reactions to our social distress discloses
many weaknesses: a lack of a proper conception of the origin and nature of authority; a secularization of the idea of liberty; a misconception of the nature and independence of the societal relationships; a denial of the religious origin of the present spiritual decay; the absolutizing of the personality or of the community; confidence in an elite and the acquiescence in the existence of the masses; preponderance of the ideal of security; an excessive expectation from science, organization, and from a natural order; and a one-sided orientation to economic standards and to human needs.

In illustration let us again examine the views of Röpke, who has combatted modern society and its socialistic trend in a convincing manner. Here and there his argument could have been stronger, but his intuition and gift of observation are adequate compensation. With due appreciation for his fight against collectivism, I must mention certain reservations.

He has realized the cultural power of Christianity as well as the fact that the present decadence is caused by secularization and a loss of faith. But he has not discerned the source of the power behind the traditional heritage and declining Western cultural values. Therefore, he does not fathom the depth of the decline nor does he have a solution. He believes we have overcome the depths of decadence at various points and expresses confidence in the natural order.¹

To Röpke the essential thing is freedom. He acknowledges that man is not simply indirectly related to God through the medium of earthly authority. But he does not understand this relationship as one in which man is directly responsible for the way in which he serves God. Röpke’s idea of freedom is absolutized. He also defends competition and property in the name of freedom, and they too become independent as to their ultimate meaning. Authority and the sovereignty of the State have only a legal ground in the consent of the citizen.² In a typical liberal fashion these conceptions induce him to leave the economic field to the natural order of events.³ He is unaware of the necessity of establishing a balance between order and freedom in the economic sphere as well. And while he expressly points out that no middle choice is possible between market economy and regulated economy, between freedom and collectivism, he still recognizes the duty of the State to interfere in economic life. This neoliberalism dulls the edge of the choice, though not in the sense of a “consciously planned economy,” as has been stated.⁴

The trouble is, however, that a distinction between governmental interference — in conformity or not in conformity to the preservation of
the natural order — is not sufficient to set the limits of authority. And the problem of governmental competence does not even enter in the antithesis of concentration and decentralization, which elsewhere he deems decisive. For a trustworthy solution can be found only if an inquiry is instituted into the nature of governmental authority and of economic life; sphere-sovereignty and the origin of authority must be discussed.

At this point the reader will understand why I believe that the observance of Scriptural principles is necessary for social reconstruction. And our concern is with the principles for such a social reform. But this formulation is not exempt from misconception. For a merely formal application of principles is useless. Principles must be infused into the souls of men who understand them in the light of their origin, and they must be realized so that man fulfils his calling. Principles are a mandate of creation; they come to man through the redemption of Christ. And their function is to emancipate life in keeping with the intention of such redemption.

Such principles are links in the chain of redemption, and they will function properly only if the man who handles them is filled with a Christian mind. They can then become manifestations of love in compliance with the great commandment. They become manifestations of reverence, not so much for man but for the calling of man, and consequently for the freedom man needs to follow his calling and to answer for his life and work to God. Such manifestations spring from a respect of life as religion.

The distress and cultural crisis of our society can be overcome only if life is liberated. A sharp distinction must be made. Freedom is not only to be free from. Such a freedom moves in a vacuum. The liberation from galling social restraints must have meaning, it must be freedom to unfold cosmic reality significantly.

This brings us to the very heart of our subject. The urge toward a collectivistic social structure flows from a need of securities, for which men are willing to surrender their freedom from the restraints necessary to obtain these securities. But much more essential is the fact that men are unequal to the responsibility of this freedom of restraints, for they no longer know why they should be free. Through the Renaissance and humanism, life has lost its religious purpose; it is without perspectives, within the hermetic insulation of the “Dies-seitig,” i.e., life without religious relation and communication. The most profound thinker of secular positive science can delude us no longer. He leaves the question of the “why” alone, because he no
longer knows a meaningful, convincing, and vital answer. Modern man has lost the awareness of being called to a task by an authority beyond the cosmic horizon; he no longer knows what happens to his answer, or what his work means. As a result the anxiety of loneliness steals upon him. And man, who desires to be free “from,” flees before the torturing question “why,” into the shackles of collectivity.

The Reformation was an act of liberation from the constraints of the collectivistic social order of the Middle Ages. That liberation was possible only because it opened the way to the true worship of God. It was a liberation unto the obedience of His Word. Thus life came to full bloom; for man knew himself again as called directly by God. “There is no other period in history in which free men have given their energy so completely for the one purpose: work.”

This is a statement made by Fromm in a book on freedom in which he also deals with the Reformation. This book is an instructive illustration of the importance of a kind of secular wisdom pretending to operate only with the so-called ‘facts.’ Fromm does not deal with the “why” because he is really at a loss to answer the question. What is remarkable is that Fromm correctly ascertains various facts but comprehends nothing of their cause and meaning.

He wishes to view freedom “only” psychologically, and to leave out of consideration any judgment about the truth of convictions concerning life and of religious conceptions. (As if it would then make sense to treat freedom. But Fromm appears to be unable to make a purely psychological analysis.) Freedom, he says, exists in a perpetual state of tension between the liberation from social bondage and imposed commandments (according to him the fall in sin is a liberation), and its consequence is isolation, loneliness, and anxiety. The escape from this dilemma is “the full realization of positive freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man.” This then is Fromm’s attempt to exceed the limits of his psychological method by risking an answer to the question: “Why?” Whatever the attraction it may have, it is still no answer to the question: “unto what?”

Fromm now transfers his vacuum to the Reformation with the conviction that he will thus understand Luther and Calvin. On the one hand Luther and Calvin freed themselves from existing social restraints, but the resulting loneliness produced in Luther a compulsory longing for security, which is not the utterance of an authentic faith, but is rooted in a necessity to overcome an unbearable doubt. And Calvin created the doctrine of predestination to provide himself with
a new security. Both are thus driven by jealousy to rely on the division of men into the elect and the damned, thereby preparing the way for Hitler's theory of the chosen race. It is significant that Fromm has not even taken the trouble to mention the appeal of these Reformers to the Scripture, let alone to analyze it.

There is another misconception of religion and consequently of freedom, viz., that of Freud. He tries to explain religion psychosocially from the Oedipus-complex, and that as an escape from reality, an unmanly abandonment of the hostile and rivalrous attitude towards the father, as a submission, as the easy way out. Riesman discusses this psychologistic determinism with regard to the life of religion, and with Fromm he is of opinion that Freud does not take religion seriously enough. But when Fromm, and with him Riesman, want to take religion seriously it becomes to them a mirror of the social situation in men, of their struggle and hope. To them the social situation is reflected in the structure of religious doctrine. Here is no gain in insight into religion. Psychologism has been replaced by sociologism, by a sociological determinateness of religion. To Fromm religion is as a matter of fact merely a myth with an active part to play in the social struggle. The arrogance of science and the imprisonment in a purely secular way of thought prevent Freud as well as Fromm from any insight into the essence of religion; especially the fact that religion is the expression of the binding of man's heart to what is not of this world, the bond with God. That is why Fromm, too, does not know what to do with freedom, and cannot even understand it.

This brief digression illustrates not only how limited the possibilities of modern science have become — we have seen this already in Mannheim and Polak — but it also shows us how small the chances of liberating society have become.

The inability of attaining a truly free life because of the still unanswered question as to why life should be free, reveals itself both in a narrowed insight into existing possibilities and in a short sightedness with respect to perspectives. Such is evident in the masses and in the elite in their urge to collectivity and in their spasmodic search for the securities that they would acquire through the organization of such collectivity.

Modern life is strained; distressed and superficial. One must go a long way to find spontaneity, courage, convictions and perspectives. (I do not mean planned perspectives, but risky ones.)

But such virtues are the fruit of a free life guided by faith. Not a faith that merely exists as an attitude only (Jaspers), but faith as an
anchor of hope. Whoever will not believe that freedom must have an anchorage, will have to choose between Nietzsche and Sartre. Such a faith relies upon the promises of God, prays for His blessing, feeds on His securities, and sleeps the sleep of the confident; no matter how menaced by the central control of wages and prices, pensions and insurance.

Setting a distance between actuality and our viewpoint

To obtain room for freedom and to propel society towards its liberation, we must first take up a position some distance away from the present problems. We must abstract ourselves from the question: What can we do? and look at what is happening, at what Christ is doing. We must not be looking only at what is before our eyes; a crisis, a treaty, a war, an election; but regard what it all means in its deeper sense. Our own age must be viewed within the framework of history. This is seldom done by history writers. The case should be otherwise; God's Word shows us the way. It teaches that all the powers and governments which bestir themselves so impressively upon the world's stage, are subject to Christ (Col. 2:10; Prov. 21:1). They are links in the chain, elements in the process of world history controlled and directed by Christ through the ages unto the end; to the final consummation and the last judgment. We live in a peculiar time, a Christological era.

In one respect history signifies that the enemies of Christ will be subdued, and vanquished by the Lord (Heb. 1:13). Such enemies are Farao, the mother of Ahazia, Herod, Nietzsche, Hitler, and all who oppose Him. In another respect history signifies the completion of the number of the saints (Rev. 6:11) and realizes the commission of the gospel to all nations. And again in another respect, history is the completion of the plan of civilization from the garden of Eden to the Heavenly City. Yet on the other hand depletion is closely intertwined with completion. For Babylon will be the city of the end. And the Antichrist shall appear with this city as the climax of an age-long process of apostasy and social dislocation.

Not everything is clear to us. God's eternal counsel is in its depths a mystery that must be brought to completion. (Ps. 33:11; Prov. 19:21; Rev. 10:7.) It is a mystery in things great and small. For who can penetrate the mystery of creation, of freedom, of sin, of suffering, of the cross of Golgotha? And who can understand this particular suffering, accident, good fortune, friendship, encounter, and all such happenings, which are unsearchable surprises or problems?
When we are twenty, we want an answer and a solution. When we are forty, we leave the question marks, and we know that we cannot prevent church schisms, wars, and poverty. And the unanswered questions accumulate. "Wherefore is fuller than therefore; a question often comes from heaven's abundance, the answer is mostly a speck, a mere tap on a window pane."

Indeed, we walk amid questions all around us, but not in dense darkness, for God gives answers that we can note and must hearken to. Not for everything, but for what we need. To hear and to see, man must view the practice of life and his own activity from a distance; at the distance of faith. Such is difficult for we are busy and in a hurry. However, it will be necessary to gain distance and repose. For only then can we take cognizance of the glorious fact that Christ is hastening on, as His works bear witness. Only then can we learn how to listen to what He demands from us.

This distance of faith is necessary for us to persevere in our Christian attitude of mind in a world of abundance and enormous changes. We should not try to escape from the world, but to work in it as a Christian should. Christians will do well to remember that now they are in an exceptional position in the Western world.

The normal situation for the community of Jesus Christ is not to be influential and prosperous, but poor and oppressed. Jesus says that it is our lot to have tribulations in the world (John 16: 33, 2 Tim. 3: 12). "We are Christ's sheep," says Sikkel, "and it so happens that sheep are to be slaughtered." Of course, we must earnestly long for a flourishing Christian life, and may enjoy its partial realization with gratitude. The question is, however, what is exceptional and what is normal.

While living in an oasis, we must guard against looking upon the oasis as a general condition, forgetting the desert. This statement also applies to our view of the past. We run the risk of forgetting the unwritten story of the hardships of the small man behind the written story of the elite. We ought, moreover, to be mindful of the misery endured by Christians in Russia, China, Hungary, and by Protestants in Spain.

The danger lurking in a long period of prosperity for Christians is that they are apt to get secularized gradually without being aware of it, and even that they are carried away by the spirit of the age. We are perhaps not oppressed because we no longer take offense. Perhaps the defamation made to God every day, the defamation of neutrality and negation, affects us but little because the holiness of the Lord is far from us, and because the longing for Christ does not live in us.
To quote Calvin: "No one has made good progress in the school of Christ unless he anticipates with joy the day of his death and of the final resurrection."¹² Such a sentiment is usually lacking in most of us. Most Christians are now so prosperous and influential that they find it hard to understand Calvin. It seems to be natural in the course of history that obedience to God is followed by His blessing, as it is proved by the history of the Reformation in Holland. And then this blessing is succeeded by a process of secularization of everything that had been won in wealth and influence.¹³ But it is human weakness that leads to secularization, and not fate. Calvin says, “The heart is controlled by greed of gold and glory, and evil lusts. It is so burdened that it cannot rise higher. In brief, the whole soul, entangled in the enticements of the flesh, seeks its happiness on earth.”¹⁴

A position of power is a temptation to secularization. At the present time the increasing domination of humanism upon practical life adds to this temptation. The world threatens our influence unless we “just go along.” And if we do we may retain our power, but we lose the honor of our King; we retain our influence, but not the influence Christ would exercise through us.

For those who would compromise the problem is easy. Such imagine they can save the honor of Christ by dialectical and paradoxical theories or by a reduction of God’s ordinances to social justice and service to society or by neutralizing everyday life.

But those of us who would obey a clear command have a much harder task. After a period of prosperity God is perhaps again leading them from the oasis into the desert. They must be in the desert, but not of the desert. To my mind this is the cause of the unrest and of the feeling of dissatisfaction in Christian circles. By nervously holding on to what we have, we lose the emphasis of obedience and the clearness of the Christian message.

It is of greatest importance to set a distance between us and world history in order to discern what Christ is accomplishing. Why do we concern ourselves so greatly about our own position? We should know that the time will come when our position will be entirely lost, but Christ shall nevertheless rule the world. We now have a foretaste of the future.

Christianity has lived through many such experiences in history. There is, however, a difference in the current moment in history. The history of Western culture is in the main a history of a Christian culture followed by secularization, increasing in extent and intensity. It is moving to a final catastrophe. Kuyper understood how far humanity had advanced on that road.¹⁵ He knew that the parousia
is drawing near and that humanity is wrestling through her mortal agony, unless a reawakening shall come through the gospel. A religious revolution, a revival of faith, is needed, Brunner said. "Should this not come, then a total collapse is not to be averted." Europe is dying, because it has no God.

We need not speculate whether God shall lead us back to the catacombs. An awakening consciousness of this probability is, however, part of a proper perspective of the work of Christ in history.

The distance we must attain in taking a proper view of the present world must serve to convince us that the recession of Christian influence is one of the aspects of Christ's reign today. Shall this knowledge weaken our activity? Only such knowledge can deliver us from a paralysis that comes from a nervous grasping at what we have. If we let go, the way to true action is open, the action of faith.

A choice must be made between such an adaptation to historical development that our position suffers the least possible damage, and an adaptation to the true course of history, i.e., to what Christ allows and wills. Only from a faith rooted in Him and integrated into His history can fruitful Christian action come. It will ever be a wonder how God makes such faith a blessing to ourselves, to the communion of the saints, and to the whole world.

Adaptation or joining

Through establishing a distance between ourselves and history there are perspectives of faith opened to us which inspire human activity. We are taught to note that such activity is of only relative importance. In the last instance trust is then no longer based on man but on God's providential direction of life. Human enterprise is not superfluous, but it is dependent on whether God will bless it; and its limitations are clear.

And in particular man learns to abandon the attempt to find an integral and comprehensive solution to his difficulties. He relinquishes his spasmodic effort to control society scientifically by means of integral central organization and planning, and he stops trying to force the future. For he knows in advance that such control will fail at the very point at which it is aimed: the bridling of sin in its penetration of society. Besides, this policy will sterilize and kill sources of life's riches, the diversity of possibilities and social forms. Such a control of social life, such hierarchical collectivization, deadens and stupifies life. It diverts attention from real life by substituting what really is not life, but at best a fruit of life and its adornment: security and happiness.
The attitude of mind acquired in the pistic* distance is the necessary prerequisite for the liberation of life, for the preservation and protection of a climate in which the life of everyone can flourish in free personal responsibility. The attitude of faith is the condition for free choice, for the free formative activity, for enterprise and adventure, chances and risk, the inseparable accompaniments of a life of faith and trust.

For the majority of people this climate no longer exists. Apart from the circumstance that in most cases they are hardly interested in this fact — which is an aggravating circumstance, and not a norm — we are faced with the question as to what standpoint must be chosen.

Many, even among those who ought to know better, are inclined to adapt their principles to existing practical conditions. In this case the ideals of security and of the all-embracing community play a great role in their motivation at present. They reverse order in the meaning of freedom and measure it in terms of automobiles, television sets, and refrigerators, while in fact such are but the fruits of freedom. Of course a different standard is sometimes necessary, but at present only by way of an exception, not as a rule. Then freedom is measured in terms of a different kind of objects, viz., food, clothing, and housing.

In this climate of accommodation, e.g., sphere-sovereignty is transformed into a pragmatic idea of subsidiarity. The state is after all the biggest social form — as if geography were decisive; moreover, other societal relationships are international. The state is thought able to survey everything — as if the facts could provide us with a norm; besides, the government only fancies it can survey everything. The state is considered as a totality of which other associations, especially the economic, are but parts — as if there had never been any mention of autonomy and sphere-sovereignty. And thus a position is sought between the interests of society and the fear of an omnipotent state.

A refined self-deception lurks in the way in which some Christians, too, adapt themselves to collectivization, especially when they are tempted to think for others and to try to protect them against themselves, on the presumption of having a better insight. It is supposed that science excels practical knowledge. And to effectuate such 'better' insight, the organization of the community is undertaken for the elite — a denaturing of authority — to take control. Such a mentality is not new; but its re-appearance in history is a phenomenon of reaction.

* Tr. Note. Pistic is a derivative from the Greek word for faith. (D.H.F.)
Of course, many do not acquiesce completely in such an adaptation to the actual course of events, but their resistance is only a cure of symptoms.

What are we to do? We should at least have enough common sense to place ourselves in our own time and look at things as they really are. In any case this is our starting-point. Well, then, in Holland the facts are as follows: we have a very dense and rapidly increasing population. We are forced to emigrate and to industrialize at a quick rate; we have import duties, quotas, government subsidies and government investments. The strategic positions of economic life are already occupied and under government control. An increasing number of important industries are being nationalized. A directed economy has for the most part become a fact. The state manages economic life by maneuvering wages, prices, investments, taxes, and rents. Industrial-economic organization has been given public juridical competence and contributes to the fusion of government and economic life. In Western countries the menace of war and the fact of a cold war oblige the authorities to centralize the national effort and to support international integration — political, military and economic.

We must start from these facts. The difference is, however, that we ought not to adapt ourselves to the facts as if they were inevitable but we must take our cue from them, because they are the ingredients of reality. From actual reality alone the road starts, leading to the future. However, it is of paramount importance what road we take. There is a direction in which society can unfold and realize itself, and another which leads to eventual disintegration. In spite of all mitigation and no matter how trivial the difference may appear at first, the criterion presented is sufficient to discriminate between progress and decline. And it may be said that our society has been moving towards its decline for a long time past.

At times the situation is complicated still further. In a given emergency it is necessary to accept delay in progress or even regression. It must then be asked whether the digressions are only the result of such an emergency and limited to it. Moreover, they should be corrected as soon as possible. Such retardation has the tendency to result in degeneration. This is very evident in the event of a war.

The all-important question is what we shall consider normal and abnormal in the structure of a social order. The answer to this question is the goal of our action for the future. The two directions start at this point and at first diverge but slightly. The one course will result in a social order directed by Christian principles; under
given circumstances and with a socialistic aim to guide it, the other
direction will end in a totalitarian structure.

There is no disguising the fact that we are a long way from a desir-
able future, whereas the path to totalitarianism is pretty short, espe-
cially if planned adaptation continues to be the slogan. It will be a
difficult road if we strive for the liberation of man and society; but
an easy path if we prefer controlled collectivization. The correct
course is long and difficult for restoration can be only a gradual and
cautious process which has to start simultaneously in all the areas
where the social diseases of our time have obtained a firm footing,
e.g., government, industry, commerce, family, school, recreation, etc.
The path is wearisome, for it deviates from the direction in which
society has long been moving. A change must be brought about by
people who have been long used to adaptation and have lost the
habit of exertion in obedience and conformity to norms which alone
can lead to true culture.

The correct path is also beset with practical compromises, because
a measure of cooperation is indispensable. Moreover, in this path
we have to find the proper direction as a man might have to in the
dark when his only light is a glowing iron nail beckoning to him in
the distance.

In this path we have to be content with the faith in a better future
and the hope for a better society, whose contours are at present only
faintly discernible.

The way is marked by many delays; there is the threat of wars and
the certainty of many discouragements, for even in this road people
will prefer comfort and will for a long time move with the masses.
We must risk the reproach of being negative, for much that now
exists must be broken down and nothing else but the removal of the
restraints will take its place. Responsibilities must be shifted from the
elite to the masses and the latter must lose their mass character and
again become personalities and real communities. In this path man
cannot coddle himself with promises and securities; but he will have
to face his own cares and to conquer them by his own personal
exertion.

Yet such a course must be taken now, before it is too late. Commu-
nism is rather insignificant, when we consider what it is that we have
to combat. Our struggle is concerned with the social development in
the countries that are still free, where the conditions for communism
or something like it are developing. If we lose this battle, loss or
victory in the struggle against a communistic bloc will be of little
significance.
What constitutes the difference and what does not

After all that has been said before it may be sufficient if we indicate the difference without aiming at completeness. The attitude of the free enterprising and humble man who respects his fellow men in their calling offers a striking contrast to that of the passive restricted masses, eager only for security as well as to arrogant elite, presumptuously seeking to protect the passive masses. (It is not our purpose to divide humanity in this respect into two groups; we all possess too many arrogant traits and too little of the spirit of enterprise and humility.)

A society of an hierarchical, collective organized structure, with a preponderance of responsibilities at the center, is the opposite of a society with independent societal relationships in which through a proper balance of authority and freedom there is an earnest endeavor to leave every one a maximum of free responsibility. (In this connection the term “decentralization” had better not be used, for it has the significance of distribution, which suggests exactly the reverse of what we are thinking of. Moreover, this term obscures the characteristic difference between the task of those who bear authority and of those who ought to stand in respect of it.)

It is often thought that the essential difference between the two forms of society is that in a free society the little man and the weak become the dupes, whereas in a collectivistic society they are protected and their social status and opportunities are closer to those at the top of the ladder.

I need no longer explain that there is another main difference. Moreover, there is no ground for such a conception even as a secondary consideration. It is, in the first place, out of the question that the weak and lowly will find no protection when they need it in a free society. Such is the case only in an individualistic society. Secondly, the collectivistic order does not diminish the distance between the upper and the lower classes; it simply eradicates the existing differences between those who do not belong to the elite. The elite are outside of any such process of standardization. And in accordance with what elites have always done, their concern will be to establish and to protect their own position. They are already doing so at the moment, in spite of their real or pretended social feelings.

And in the third place, it is to be expected that owing to the difference between the result of the free activity of an entire society and that of an elite, the living standard for the masses in a collective society will be much lower than that of the ordinary man in a free
society. It will probably be very near the lowest level in a free society. This is of course only a guess that cannot be corroborated by experiments. But it is undeniable that the reduction of potential freedom in a hierarchical collectivistic society to the amount of freedom of the elite, is the dominating factor.

Economic responsibilities

Our contention was that the root of the present crisis in civilization and society is to be sought in the secularization of life. It is true, there exist valuable initiatives to overcome the crisis also in this secularized life. But they can become effective only when especially the process of secularization is broken through. For this purpose it is essential for the Christian’s attitude to set a typical pistic distance from actual reality and from self. He is not thereby made passive; on the contrary, he is stimulated to act. This is the prerequisite for Christian activity that aims at the liberation of society in our own time. Thus adaptation to a so-called inevitable situation can be avoided. On the other hand the way to freedom should certainly not be revolutionary action. The issue is a radical change in the minds of men, combined with a gradual change in society.

What does such a liberation imply? It is the rejection of collectivism without accepting its opposite, viz., the error of individualism. On the Christian standpoint both views are objectionable. After all, the opposition to both these societal heresies concerns the shaping of society. Heimann, e.g., rejects the rationalistic systems of collectivism and individualism because they fail to recognize the essential unity of personality and community. He thinks that the power of love is able to remedy these heresies in a Christian sense. Though such an endeavor is extremely important for the human side of the problem, it is not yet relevant to the societal aspect of the question. A Christian society has a different structure from the two rejected types, as has been shown in Chapter three.

We shall now illustrate this thesis more practically; first, the economic sphere. It is not our intention to give an exhaustive analysis and a concrete elaboration of the problems discussed in present day economics. I will even take the liberty to omit the question as to whether or not our argument is always relevant to present day social practice. If at some point it is not, I will not try to make it so. Our remarks serve only to illustrate my conception of new ways in the social order.

Does government have responsibility in the economic life of the
community? Not in an economic sense. Its responsibility in that area is determined by its own nature. The sole concern of government is the protection of the rights of its citizens and of their societal relationships (taken in the sense intended above on pp. 68 ff. and 198 ff.), and making only such provisions as are required for the flourishing of an economy. In an emergency, in a transition stage, or in some cases of economic default, the government may properly take the initiative to institute societal organizations in this sphere that may be necessary to relieve the situation. But such measure ought only to be temporary and intended to pass into the hands of economic subjects.

The responsibilities of economic life rest in the first instance with those who primarily develop its activities. These may be persons or families. They are frequently the consumers of economic goods and services. And they may be societal relationships, which is generally the case with producers and distributors. When the economic responsibility of these subjects is wholly or in large measure eliminated, the economic life of the community is wholly or in part abolished. All that is left is an organized production and distribution.

While allowing for the right of government to protect the rights of citizens in borderline cases, e.g., from monopolies, the responsibility for complex formation of economic balances ought to belong to the smallest independent units that initiate economic transactions, that is to the whole body of independent persons and enterprises.

This does not mean, however, that such industries and business concerns cannot partially transfer responsibility to coordinating bodies. Such industrial bodies may be necessary for more than one reason. For example, in enterprises that are links in the same chain of production, a need may be felt for a vertical organization where collective consultation can promote general instructions and regulations for the undertakings concerned.

Moreover another kind of organization may prevent a merciless competition by establishing rules against excess. But owing to the similarity of work in these undertakings, such horizontal organizations have a very important social task in addition to their economic function. This social function is even the principal task in the present statutory trade organizations. It is concerned with the position of those employed in these undertakings, their wages, conditions of

* What follows has been written with reference to the building up of an industrial organization in the Netherlands. This passage has been maintained in the translation because it is an apt illustration of the way in which the principles set forth can be applied. As such the public industrial organization has more than local significance.
labor, training, etc.. Thus it will be clear that employees, through the medium of their unions, ought to be admitted as members of these horizontal organizations and have an equal voice with the employers. As the social position of the workman is affected by decisions about economic affairs made within the vertical industrial organizations, labor ought to have a cooperative part in such decisions through their own representatives.

There is nothing strange in the fact that binding agreements are reached, and that at a later stage cooperative bodies are formed. Their formation is as normal as that of a synod of churches with the same confession. It has only been delayed by an egotistical individualism. This individualism did not see the need of cooperation in the same kind of work in society, which is as necessary as maintaining the independence of the economic agents — which gives rise to competition with a view to economy in this field.

What we have said opens a number of important perspectives which ought to be kept in view if we do not want to overreach ourselves. The most important is this. Such industrial organizations for cooperation ought to establish a measure of order in economic, social and industrial labor relations. Such organizations share the social and industrial responsibility with individual industries. The measure of regulation is determined by the requirement that it must serve to bring to its greatest possible efficiency the independent activity of the various enterprises. This regulation must strive to establish such an environment for the various independent industries that the maximum of economic activity by free enterprises will be realized. We therefore meet here a balance between order and freedom analogous to the equilibrium already discussed between authority and freedom within the various relationships.

It would be incorrect to call this order the authority of the cooperative bodies. For economic industrial cooperative bodies do not constitute a societal relationship in the same sense, for example, as the state does for municipalities and provinces. The very economic character of this field prevents such formation. And besides, their regulations proceed from the voluntary self-restraint of the enterprises themselves. We must guard against considering a branch of industry as a community, and we should therefore not try to make it so in the future. The concentration of power issuing from such a conception would contribute to collectivism and the formation of a managing elite. It would conflict also with the essentially competitive character (for the sake of the sparing use of scanty goods) of economic life.

In this case also, it cannot precisely be established where the
balance must lie. Too little regulation endangers economic life with arbitrary and harsh treatment which interfere with prosperity and happiness. On the other hand, too much regulation may obstruct economic activity. Viewed thus, an industrial organization for cooperation between enterprises and between management and employees is not in conflict with a free economy, in fact the latter needs such an organization in order not to deteriorate. And further, we should reject the thought that industrial organizations should come first and delegate responsibilities to private individual enterprises in a system of decentralization. Such a hierarchical view suggests the dangerous idea of an authoritative distribution of duties. Responsibilities are not distributed to individual enterprises, but the latter transmit them to coordinating bodies, thereby exercising voluntary self-restraint. The process starts from the bottom and not from the top.

The industrial organization described here is exclusively concerned with industrial life. The government does not have a function in this field; its interference with these things would be contrary to the nature of government. It is in any case entirely incorrect to assume that the government must here apportion the responsibilities. Socialists take the view that government must determine the main lines of the economic management and the industrial organization must fill in the details. But the state has nothing to order here; it only protects where impermissible departures threaten. And as to the main trends, such belong to the competence of the above mentioned industrial organizations. The state, in any event, has no direct economic authority in economic life. Industry and the industrial organizations ought to operate privately.

Of course, in view of the rights of the public, the state from its nature has the duty to nullify agreements and regulations if these rights are in need of protection. And it will also be clear that in certain cases the government has the right to sanction by statute regulations made by the industrial organization when such deal with a borderline situation in which the government has to operate. Above all, when a concentration of power through industrial organizations assumes the character of a monopoly in some branch of industry, or that of a hierarchical integration of a chain of production, it becomes the task of government to give proper attention to the situation in the interest of the rights of the public.

The introduction of industrial organizations may lead to a wrong development, as in the Netherlands. The cause is that the industrial organization has there been given the function of a decentralized governmental authority. This results in the organization laying down
rules with the competence and with the power of government. Such rules are concerned with matters which are entirely outside of the competence and the authority of the government. As a consequence the erroneous notion is given even greater force, that it is the function of government to direct economic life. Another notion equally dangerous is the idea that an industrial organization ought to form a community of economic life.

All this enhances the tendency toward an hierarchical organized collectivization of industry by government. The balance between order and freedom is weighted on the side of regulation; and the boundaries between the spheres of government and of economic life are eradicated. Many officials in government usurp too many functions and many labor union leaders seek to utilize industrial organization to acquire control over social and economic life.

What is more remarkable but not inexplicable is the fact that many industrialists gladly sacrifice their economic independence. When they have to choose between a limitation of their independence in their enterprises by labor unions and a limitation by the state through industrial organizations, they prefer the latter. For in practice they will then be the managers, although nominally delegated by the government. They exchange their economic independence for an organizational power on a higher level.

In the case of the three groups of power: state officials, leaders of labor unions, and industrialists, we are in our time faced with the tendency to a concentration of the power bearers. Thus, without open revolution, an elite silently develops which acquires a dominating position, not only in industry, but menacing all of society.

Let me illustrate how responsibilities ought to be distributed. Consider the fixing of wages. This matter ought to be arranged by the employer and his employees in the same enterprise; and we should bear in mind that the wage of every employee ought to be treated separately by taking account of the man, his work, and the company. A further agreement can be made between the trade union and the company, embodying more general features of wage rules. Through an industrial organization an even wider and more general agreement, a wage scale with sufficiently broad limits, may be agreed upon for an entire branch of industry. An understanding about proportionate wages according to the type of work may be desirable. For that purpose a scientific job evaluation and classification, though without perfectionistic hair splitting, may be useful.

Such obligations, however, do not alter the fact that the responsibility for the wage scale is primarily a matter of agree-
ment between employer and employees (through their union).

In this matter it is the task of the state to protect the rights of the workman by seeing that their wages do not fall below a just minimum. As all practical matters, such a standard is an historical and geographical variable. Its actual determination is as difficult as the fixing of legal penalties for crime.

When the responsibilities are distributed as mentioned above a deadening process of equalization in economic activities may be prevented. Within the margins of agreement a long series of factors will have great influence upon the actual setting of a wage: the position of the enterprise, the ability, the personality and the circumstances of the employee, the personality, the economic, and organizational qualities of the employer, director, and foreman. It may be said that this is unfair. Many factors are independent of the employee concerned. And the suggestion is made to pool the extra profits of the companies for distribution over all the enterprises; even civil servants are to receive their share.

Such a view is folly. It is the fruit of collectivism and of the scientific approach to reality. It completely ignores the factors in which the worker has an influence. And besides, no account is taken of the liberty of the employee to choose or to leave an employer. Thus the stimulus, that the freedom of the employee exercises over economic life is abandoned. The idea of a general pool is a sign on the path which leads also to compulsory labor, prohibition of strikes, controlled vacations, the controlled choice of employment, abode, etc. It may end in totalitarianism.

The proponents of a common collective fund forget that the diversity of circumstances that are partially controlled by man is the essential character of real life. It is the life in which God places man and calls him to his task, and promises His blessing if man obeys the divine calling. The employee stands in a moral relation to the company. They belong together and share each other's ups and downs. This is God's will, so that man may not be an individualist and an egotist. The man who stands for a levelling equalization will have to level a bit more. He will have to pull up trees in the country and transport them to the cities where their lack is keenly felt, although it is not the townsman's fault that he does not live in the country. He will have to correct the inequality in the fact that everybody has his own father and mother, as well as the fact that one man possesses the accuracy required for a civil servant, and another is full of a spirit of enterprise, a third has a constructive disposition. Force will have to be employed to see that Mr. A. does not think first of his pleasure,
nor Mr. B. of the future of his children, nor Mr. C. of his standing, and Mr. D. of his calling. Such control is the death of life.

It will be clear that in the above discussion about the liberation of society in the relation between the government and economic life, we have been defending the promotion of the sphere-sovereignty of both government and economic life. Therefore, I can subscribe to what Drucker says about the independence of an enterprise and a market in an interesting book elaborating this theme. But it is doubtful whether he does full justice to the sphere-sovereignty of the political sector.

This is owing to his view of our present society as an industrial social order. In his turn, however, he gives in to the facts as they are, holding the opinion that with the decline of political governments the point of gravitation should shift to the local governments of enterprises and plant communities. But political democracy cannot be replaced by non-political authorities in the defense of liberty. In another section of his book Drucker implicitly admits this stating that the affairs of the enterprise cannot be dealt with from outside.

For the rest, it is a pity that he pays so little attention to the positive function of the political government, implying the duty to act with authority according to its own nature also in the economic field. He rejects socialistic collectivism, and especially the thought that the government is able to direct economic life successfully to avoid depression, unemployment, and insecurity. But then he is confronted with the question as to what task the government may rightly have in economic life. This is the question about the sphere-sovereignty of the government and the state.

We have not yet dealt with the question as to how responsibilities are divided within an enterprise. For the present our interest is only in those who exercise authority in an industry and thus also represent it in a coordinating body. In the next section we shall discuss the question without such a restriction, and then we shall not merely study its formal organizational aspect.

It must first of all be understood that an enterprise has a responsible function of authority, which may consist of one or more persons or functions and which may delegate authority to lower functions.

I would once more remind the reader of the fact that the government of an enterprise, too, does not derive its authority from its power, although this power is the indispensable prerequisite of its authority. Sheer power degenerates authority and life in general into a mere
struggle for power, stabilized in systems of the balance of power. The conception of such a struggle is frequently found in modern sociologists and has been taken over from Darwin and Marx. Authority does not proceed from the will of the people either, although the will of the people is very important for the establishment and the proper functioning of government. Government is part of the structure of the creation of societal relationships; its authority, either in the state, or the family or an enterprise, owes its competence to Christ, who has the absolute authority over life. This truth holds, whether the bearers of authority realize it or not. Their rejection or acceptance of this truth is of no consequence so long as they and their subordinates actually obey this principle of the creation.

In its relation to the outside world the government of an enterprise is entrusted with the direction of the economic course of affairs. For matters within the enterprise it has definitive responsibility for the economic, social, and especially the organizational, technical and scientific (in the case of a productive enterprise) aspects of the undertaking.*

This authority, in the case of an individual, rests with the owner, since he must be able to dispose of his own property. The final decision and the definitive direction of the execution are in his hands. Authority and ownership must not, however, be substituted for one another. The former follows from the latter, because in this case business is ownership, and the employees, who are under authority, work within the setting of ownership. But authority implies something quite different from the power of possession. (I need not explain any more that the making of a profit is not the main purpose of the enterprise; it is at best one of the aims in connection with the main purpose.)

But our position is not yet complete. It is but evidence of a proper understanding of the demands of cooperation, when the industrialist keeps his workmen informed as much as possible about the run of things, future economic plans, and internal problems of organization and production. It is still more important that he consults with his employees about decisions to be made in the matter of organization, ways of production, and matters relative to external economic perspectives. Such cooperation is the natural standard operating pro-

* What we have said in no way abolishes the sphere-sovereignty of technique and science. The direction of the enterprise determines the scope, financially and otherwise, within which the scientific and technical sectors must move and the subjects with which they are to deal. This general authority does not direct the scientific research and technical development itself. Industrial authority enters the picture where provisional or final scientific and technical results call for economic or organizational decisions.
cedure in smaller enterprises. In large industries the permanent setup of an industrial council for the enterprise can be considered. It has been introduced by law in the Netherlands. Such a council can give independent advice, and in particular it can provide for the transmission of information from the bottom to the highest levels.

Such an industrial council, however, has other tasks besides those mentioned above. The other tasks also sustain a connection with the enterprise and lie within the sphere of authority. But in this case the competence of judging about them is not founded on private ownership. They therefore do not belong to the decision of the owner. Such is connected with the fact that the owner has no power of disposition over the workmen. They are not property. Social legislation and the workmen's contracts are evidence of this.

Before elaborating this point, we must try to prevent a misconception. The point at issue here is not the problem of the balance of power between authority and freedom. There is a general problem of the limits of authority. The proprietor has authority over his subordinates in the enterprise. Also in this instance the correct norm is to hold to the general rule that it is the function of authority to institute and maintain such order that the free activity of the subordinates shall be most effectually promoted. When put thus, the question of authority goes far beyond the level of power of disposition over mere property. And such is inevitable, since where workmen are concerned it is not a matter of property.

But let us return to the question of authority in an enterprise for which property is not the basis of authority, because the question arises in the marginal zones of the enterprise. In such marginal issues the owner and worker have equal rights; on the other hand there are issues, whose solution must be integrated into the sphere of authority. The issues in discussion concern the area where a free man passes into the function of a working man under authority, and where a laborer is entitled to claim guarantees against arbitrariness. It may be argued that the workman is protected in regard to the authority of the employer by social legislation. But that concerns only the borderline situation and only the exception. The eventual regulation in this matter by the industrial organizations, and in general by the workman's agreement through collective bargaining, define the lines of authority more precisely. The compliance with such rules should be under the supervision of an industrial council.

But the point of gravity does not lie in the rules that reach the enterprise from without, from the state, industrial organization and collective bargaining. The employee works in the enterprise as
an independent unit, and there lies the ultimate decision about his work. Even the hiring agreement is not enough. Within the limits thus prescribed there still remains a marginal area for decisions where the owner should not have the only and last word. The maintaining of working conditions for the employees does fall under the authority of the employer, but for the establishment of such measures as hygiene, safety working hours, vacations and the like, there has to be a joint decision. The industrial council is the proper agency for this.

Consequently, the industrial council has two groups of duties to perform, but in neither of them does it have executive competence. Such competence resides in the authority of the enterprise. In the first case the council has the task to give advice to the authority; and, in the second case, the council is the place where the two parties meet with equal rights: the employer and the employees. This construction seems to be more correct than that proposed by Drucker. He wants to coordinate the management responsible for the economic performance with the self-governing plant community which has subordinate but autonomous responsibility for social affairs. In the first place the economic and the social cannot be thus separated, And in the second place his system lacks the advice of the plant community in economic affairs. The most important objection is that he forgets that also for social affairs, in so far as they do not belong to the second group of tasks, authority of management is required. Consequently, it is not self-government which provides a good solution of this problem, but giving the employees a voice in the decisions, and the delegation of authority to them in the execution.

An industrial council with these functions is also applicable to a limited liability company. The latter also has an established authority, in this instance formed by a board of directors, competent within the same limits in matters concerning employees. And, on the other hand, the council has an interest in the information and advice given by the employees for the benefit of the enterprise.

But in this case a new problem arises. Who is the owner here? The board of directors is not; nor some superior council that appoints and supervises them. Some would consider the stockholders owners who delegate their powers to directors and managers. In some instances this may still be the case, but not in cases where stockholders do not even know the enterprise. Generally speaking, the present tendency, as Drucker says, is to divorce control from ownership. We may even go further by saying that ownership without the power of disposal is meaningless. Legally there is some relation of ownership
with the enterprise for the stockholders, but it is a forced relation without reality. The average stockholder is a person who wishes to draw revenue from his savings and who is willing to run a risk for the sake of higher returns. His interest goes no further, nor does his power over the property.

Two facts may be noted here. Such corporations or limited companies become independent impersonal powers. And in the second place the largest are under the joint government of a small group of managers and directors who are not themselves the owners. This situation is not without danger, because in the absence of resistance it may quietly pass into a comprehensive collective organization, in which the chosen few will constitute part of the managerial class.

It is not simple to find a proper form for such corporations, which are really nameless and so impersonal, unless their dimensions are greatly reduced. The industrial council, discussed above, and policy discussions by the plant community that we shall discuss later, may provide a good corrective against the danger mentioned. But they do not provide any decision about the appointment or supervision of the management of the enterprise. It may well be possible and recommended for various reasons, that the practice in America to make employees stockholders might offer a good solution. But under the present conditions I fail to see why wholly arbitrary shareholders should have more right in the constitution of authority in the enterprise than the employees. In my opinion the solution does not lie in the industrial council which is built from the bottom upwards and which should be restricted to advice and consultation in typical affairs of the enterprise. Such a solution is not faultless, to my mind, especially in connection with the different nature of the tasks this council will have to perform and in view of the relativizing of authority. It is equally wrong to let the employees participate in the daily management. A manager should be elected for quite different reasons (even if he has been chosen from the employees). The relation to authority must not become obscured. The obvious thing, therefore, is that the employees are represented through their unions in the board of the limited company.

That there are psychological objections against the idea of giving the employees a voice with the stockholders in the board of directors of the limited company is understood. But if we would make the enterprise more of a common interest, then these objections should not be emphasized by segregating the responsible parties into two councils; they could be overcome by cultivating a habit of a closer acquaintance in one council.
In three ways and in each case in a different manner, the employee will be able to play his role with regard to authority in a corporation with negotiable shares: through industrial organizations, the industrial council, and the board of directors.

The factory

The second case to be discussed with regard to the liberation of society is the life of the worker in industry. Already in the final paragraph of the preceding section the internal aspect of the undertaking was discussed, but we did not touch the heart of the matter. This central point to be considered now is labor as such in a labor community.

In Chapter V we dwelt extensively on the deformation of labor in modern industry. It is worthy of note that Adam Smith, the father of the classic school of economics, foresaw and understood the distress of labor 150 years ago. This distress appears from a somewhat semi-conscious feeling of discontent and distaste with which many workmen view their labor environment and their work. It expresses itself in a loss of enthusiasm for the daily task and in a dissatisfaction with the fact that the workman finds himself unappreciated in the enterprise.

This is not a question of minor importance. Such modern cultural problems as massification, use of free time, and secularization are closely connected with the present distress of labor. We may well say that in this question an essential facet of our cultural crisis has come to the fore.

This distress must be overcome first of all in labor proper. If this question is ignored, all other measures will be futile. On the basis of a real solution and simultaneous with it, the second important objective must be the restoration of a community within industry. It might be thought that the realization of a share in discussion and direction, by means of the industrial council, as mentioned in the former paragraph, is the decisive step on the way to a new formation of the community in industry. That is not the case. And still less must we expect from it a kind of democratization of industry. The structure of the modern enterprise and the specialization in the hierarchical form of its direction make that impossible. (It may suffice to refer to Chapter V.)

Of course the industrial council is valuable, but it is nevertheless of much less importance for our problem than is generally thought. It will even be of no importance unless a fellowship in a narrower
sense, namely, the relation of the workman with his immediate environment, is restored. Only as a keystone in the process has the industrial council meaning. It must be the seal on the spirit of community restored everywhere in the enterprise. The formation of a genuine community does not halt in a large scale enterprise before the relation between laborer and a top manager, but before that between laborer and foreman. The industrial council without anything more leaves the worker cold. He will become interested only through his interest in the place he occupies, through his interest and joy in his task, and in his immediate surroundings.

With respect to that essential point, the solution is much harder to obtain. It is a matter with various interdependent aspects. Attention should be paid to organization, communication, supervision, training, mobility and the like. But above all it is a question of attitude and the morale of all concerned. And this fact renders the problem much more difficult to solve than a question of mere technology. Man as such is the issue in this case. Attempts should be made to find out in the first place what motivates man in general in his work, and what motivates this man in particular in his work. And this is not sufficient. His motives should be judged critically as to their correctness. The problem is one of values.

Science tries to abstract these values from its field of research. But in that case it can do no more than collect facts. And even this depends on a choice and on an interpretation. And besides, the arrangement and ordering of the facts cannot be accomplished without evaluation, although the attempt is made to mitigate the importance of such evaluation by calling it a theory or a hypothesis. But our question requires a positive attitude of science. By abstraction science cannot at all arrive at a solution to our problems.

It is clear that we have to deal with various problems. Subsequently we will discuss: 1. motivation; 2. the societal core of the problem; 3. the man in the job; 4. the social aspect of work; 5. devaluation of labor.

1. We shall elaborate this point because it is an essential element in our argument. Of late very many extensive sociological investigations have been made in enterprises, unions, etc., in order to find out the motivations of men, their background and their relation to other factors. By means of questionnaires and interviews data are collected as a basis for research. These facts, however, are not reliable without qualification. Everything depends on what information is or is not asked of those concerned and how the questions are framed.
Here are some instances of prejudiced questions put in an interview held by the Industrial Relations Center of the University of Chicago, about the attitudes of the members of local unions. The persons interrogated were union leaders: “What keeps you active? What do you get out of it? Would it make any difference to you if local...... disappeared? Why?” 25 These questions reveal a particular view of man, a particular evaluation, viz., an individualistic view in which man considers himself as the center and the standard of value. They compel the party that is interrogated to answer them in an egocentric way.

This example is not haphazard, but it illustrates a systematic background of values found in many investigators. They consider a man’s motivation as dependent on his needs for which he seeks satisfaction. The morale of a man is then understood as the sum total of his satisfactions. According to Lawshe the needs experienced by all normal men are the need for security and the need for independence.26 In an enterprise the needs bear on the satisfaction on the job, involvement in the work-group, identification with the large organization, the immediate supervisor and the reward system, (according to the research men of the University of Michigan).27

In this connection it is interesting to note Homans’ typical conception of the relation between the group and its environment in his interesting book on the human group: “The group spontaneously evolves the behavior necessary to improve its standard of living in the environment. In the curious coincidence between the needs for survival and the organism’s capacity to meet those needs, the group and the animal body are the same in kind, if not in degree.” 28 The difference from the preceding views is that in Homans’ self-seeking has been transferred from the individual level to that of the group. This does not constitute a real difference in view of life, however, and it certainly does not, if we remember that in this case the individual needs have not really been replaced by group-needs. For here man sees that his individual needs are better served via the group than in an individualistic way. We need not elucidate now that this line of thought is rooted in humanism in so far as the latter has lost sight of the Law-giver and his norms, in a historical development via Darwin, Marx, Nietzsche, etc., and has retained only man as a standard — in this case comparable to the animal body.

The important fact for us is that the essential rôle of these needs cannot be inferred in a positive way from the facts. This rôle is certainly connected with these facts, but they arise as key aspects 29 only as a result of the way the questions are asked and of the interpretation of the answers in which a view of man or, if you like,
a theory, has been embodied. Of course such needs can be observed, but the question is whether or not something else, something more fundamental can be observed in the motivation of man; the question is whether his motivation is an ego-motivation; or to put it differently, the question is whether one of the two major criteria in the investigation (the other criterion is productivity) has been chosen correctly as satisfaction.30

Let us choose an example. Lawshe gives a hierarchy of needs. In the front rank are the basic physiological needs (hunger, thirst, sleep, sexual satisfaction, air etc.). Then follow safety, love (i.e. the need to be given love), esteem (self-esteem and the esteem of others), and self-realization.31 In all these needs the self is the center of thought, the goal of activity and the ultimate standard. That is why in this hierarchy there is no room for religion, for it would not agree with the view of life from which these needs have been construed. And yet is not religion a very essential need in man? And further, the fact that there are people who sacrifice their lives for a cause cannot be reconciled to the thesis that physiological needs are basic.

In a view of life other than the humanistic individualistic outlook, a different key aspect will be chosen from the needs for the motivation of man in the investigation and interpretation of the facts. Thus on the Christian point of view the motivation will be understood in terms of vocation. The difference between motivation by needs and that by vocation is that in the former man chooses himself as the final goal of life; in the latter man renounces his own person in everything and is aware of the relation of responsibility towards God.

This second viewpoint, however, does not imply that man has no needs. But they are of secondary importance, a concomitant, such as, e.g., self-realization, which is a concomitant phenomenon of the performance of a cultural task. A choice has to be made if we are to find out what motivates man. To my mind it is his vocation in life. Man does not live for his own sake, and therefore his needs are not his fundamental motives. But are there no people who know hardly anything of their vocation and are almost entirely dominated by their own needs? No doubt there are such people; but this fact will also come to light if in our investigations the true starting point is chosen for our theory. For then vocation as well as needs are assigned their own interdependent rôles. Then we do not overlook those who live according to their vocation as we are apt to do when we choose motivation by needs.

But there is something else. Not only does science state facts by means of its research (and this procedure already implies valuation, as
we have seen); it also has to test these statements of fact by means of values, and to evaluate them. In the case under discussion, productivity, satisfaction, morale, motivation, etc. are connected with each other by science in order ultimately to improve the condition in an enterprise.

What is this improved condition? Is it greater productivity or more satisfaction? Or, in view of the future, of our culture, are there any more important criteria? In any case science can get no further here without evaluation.

Science will not go so far as to make practical suggestions, but on the basis of its research it will, e.g., try to elucidate the conditions necessary for increased productivity. If the productivity of man increases when he is motivated by a vocation (and to my mind this is really the case, because there exists essentially a breach between the individual's needs and the goals of an organization), instead of a need, then this fact is one more important reason for science to distance itself from the viewpoint of ego-motivation. A promising conclusion drawn from an investigation instituted by the University of Michigan proves that our thesis is no mere hypothesis. The investigation was concerned with the success of conferences. One of the conclusions reached is that the satisfaction of conference members is greater if they are concentrated "upon the problem before them rather than upon self-advancement by means of their participation."^32 We would also point out an article by Ohmann in the Harvard Business Review, in which he asks the question whether or not industry is in need of a new religion. The job is life and the modern workman seeks after something to believe in, something that will give meaning to his job.^83

The conception of the ego-motivation is something of our own time exclusively, as has been stated already. Humanism has developed an internal crisis. Ego-motivation is far from being a harmless view; on the contrary, it leads men of science to a prejudiced view of reality which has a harmful influence on life when realized. Nietzsche, who knew that science is prejudiced, paved the way. Burnham is a modern instance of such a view. He holds that man's motivation is the seeking of self and self-assertion.

But I will add a few examples from an elaborate investigation of the unions carried out for the University of Chicago. The conceptions of the investigators clearly show in how far they consider the motivation directed by needs to self-assertion and the struggle for power. Their assumption is, e.g., that a community is a forum within which competing power groups strive for the control of strategic points.^84 About collective bargaining the remark is made that it does not exist
unless each party is free to negotiate with a club which is within handy reach in case of necessity. The merit of collective bargaining is that it "absorbs the energies and interests of many leaders of the working class who might otherwise direct their energies to the overthrow of the existing economic order." The world of the union organizer is a pragmatic one in which success is his standard. He has to diminish the workers' identification with the employer: unrest and dissatisfaction among the workers is essential for him. By having a good salary the local union leader has an incentive to maintain himself in office. He "builds a political machine which he can then use to ensure his remaining in office."

No doubt all these things exist; but fortunately, for the unprejudiced investigator whose judgment is not vitiated by such a cynical view of life, there is a lot more to be found in many people. In so far as cynicism dominates a union, the man of science does not exceed his competence when he calls this lack of vocation and idealism a danger to the union and to society as a whole. Why should he abstain from making such a statement, when on the other hand he considers himself able to point the way to democracy and good leadership in the union? In the investigation mentioned above the investigator elevates facts to norms and thus cooperates in an attitude which leads our civilization to destruction. The cause is not that his science is value free, for in reality it is not value free. But the cause is that many investigators no longer know the true norms in essential points.

2. We revert to our statement that the restoration of labor is difficult because it depends on the disposition of those concerned. It has already appeared that an investigation of this circumstance may lead us on the wrong track. But the greatest difficulty is that after discovering where the shoe pinches and improving the organization, it appears that the people in the organization have to be changed to the correct behavior, or better still, also the correct attitude. No doubt, for this change much may be gained by training, but the possibility to change man is always limited. It is limited by what he wishes, and by what he refuses to do, by what he can do and cannot do. These remarks on the disposition of men in connection with the problem of the restoration of labor are sufficient at least to remove the impression that our problem requires only correct insight and organizational measures for its solution. We do not intend to elaborate this point because then we should lose sight of our subject, viz., the formation of society.
What then is the fundamental viewpoint with regard to the restoration of labor in industry? The important thing, no doubt, is that man as such is considered. Now not to change him, but to learn what has to be changed in his environment. A series of important investigations have contributed to turn the attention to man in an enterprise. We may mention the research of Adolf Levenstein (1912), of Hendrik de Man (1927), of Rexford B. Hersey (1932), of Robert Hoppeck (1935), and of Mayo (1929–1939).

This research broke through the sphere of scientific management especially developed by Taylor. By replacing management of initiative and incentive, in which everything was left to the working man, by scientific management, Taylor has undoubtedly achieved extraordinary results in an increased productivity and higher wages. His program included: introducing the science of the job, selection and training of men, the connection between workmen and science through management, and the almost equal division of work and responsibility between the workman and the management. It is incorrect to accuse Taylor of forgetting man. He rightly states that he considers man as an individual, and science enables him to better develop his work. Yet all this does not say that in Taylor’s system justice is done to man. On the contrary. In another passage of his work he summarizes the main features of his system in five points, but on two points his expectations are pitched too high — viz., harmony and cooperation, not individualism — because these two points do not follow from the two others he really strives after, viz., science and maximum output. With him science rules and management enforces its laws, in the work, without any reservation, so that, if need be, the working man is left no freedom. There is therefore no question of an equal division of responsibility. The last of the five points reads as follows: “The development of each man to his greatest efficiency and prosperity.” 38 Taylor firmly believed in this thesis because he believed in a science to which the liberty of the workman had to give way. It should be noted that Taylor’s thesis does not mean that each man should develop his personal gifts to their utmost capacity, by means of scientific management. He only achieves that which directing science forces upon him. It will appear in the sequel that the last cited thesis is incorrect. Even higher efficiency and prosperity can be attained if man is allowed to reach full development in his work. This does not mean a setback to the time before Taylor, but it implies some reserve in the use of science which has on the other hand then to contribute to giving man the full measure of his responsibility.